

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Soviet Union
Regional Affairs

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FBIS 50th Anniversary Note

To Our Consumers:

This year the Foreign Broadcast Information Service observes its 50th anniversary.

The service, first called the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, was established in 1941 prior to the U.S. entry into World War II. At the time, a number of U.S. Government officials were concerned about the content of foreign radio broadcasts—a relatively new means of conveying information and propaganda across borders. On their advice, President Franklin D. Roosevelt in late February 1941 allotted money from his emergency fund to institute the recording, translating, transcribing, and analyzing of selected foreign broadcasts for the U.S. Government. During World War II the service demonstrated that monitoring was a fast, economical, and reliable way to follow overseas developments.

Today the Foreign Broadcast Information Service provides its consumers throughout the federal government, according to their diverse official interests, with information from a broad range of foreign public media. FBIS information also is available to readers outside of the government, through the National Technical Information Service. Objectivity, accuracy, and timeliness are our production watchwords.

We members of the current staff of FBIS extend our thanks to consumers for their interest in FBIS products. To past staffers we extend our thanks for helping the service reach this anniversary year. At the same time, we pledge our continued commitment to providing a useful information service.

R. W. Manners
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

Soviet Union
SUPPLEMENT
Regional Affairs

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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

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Lithuania

Appeal Criticizes Gorbachev on Baltics

91UN0745B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 3, Jan 91 p 3

[Appeal by science and culture workers: "The Voice of the Intelligentsia"]

[Text] We, people involved with science and culture, appeal to everyone who knows us, reads us, listens to us, and watches us.

All of us wanted to reach the time of a normal human life. Nobody was sure it was possible, but at least we had hopes of it. Our hopes have collapsed. We can see now that perestroyka, which was born in April 1985 in Moscow, was shot down on the night of 13 January in Vilnius. All this time we have been supporting our president and sometimes closed our eyes to the lack of consistency in his policies. We were hoping that he would become the stronghold of democracy, that he would remain faithful to the president's oath. However, the Vilnius crimes were not denounced by either the president or the Supreme Soviet. After this it has become impossible to lie to ourselves any more. The coup has already started. If it succeeds we will again see camps, repressions, fear, starvation, and devastation. But that is not all; our country will separate itself from the rest of the mankind by yet another iron curtain and it will become a nuclear threat for the entire world.

What can be done?

At this dramatic time, as our president and the Supreme Soviet are betraying democracy, we appeal to you to show your support for the legitimate legislatures and governments of the republics, elected by the people. They are defenseless. They do not have either an army or the KGB. Nothing but broad popular support can endow them with the strength necessary for the defense of their sovereignty and their laws. The Union of republics cannot exist on bayonets and tanks.

We appeal to the people to unite into a wide democratic movement that can withstand the coming dictatorship.

As the first step, we are calling upon you to fight for the immediate withdrawal of the butcher army from the Baltic states!

[Signed] I. Andreyeva, S. Aranovich, E. Artemyev, Yu. Afanasyev, B. Akhmadulina, A. Bitov, I. Biryukov, O. Borisov, L. Vavakin, A. Vaksberg, B. Vasilyev, V. Vasilyev, I. Vinogradov, A. Gelman, I. Geleyn, Z. Gerdt, A. German, G. Gladkov, M. Gluzskiy, Yu. Gnedovskiy, S. Govorukhin, B. Golovnya, G. Gorin, A. Grebnev, Yu. Davydov, G. Daneliya, V. Dashkevich, L. Dodin, D. Dolinin, L. Durov, Vl. Yegerev, A. Yemelyanov, V. Yerofeyev, R. Ibragimbekov, Al. Ivanov, F. Iskander, S. Kaledin, G. Kancheli, S. Karmalita, L. Karpinskiy, G. Kasparov, Yu. Kim, Yu. Klepikov, E. Klimov, E. Kolmanovskiy, V. Kornilov, Ya. Kostyukovskiy, E. Krylatov, A. Kurchatkin, A. Kushner, K. Lavrentyev, K. Lavrov, E. Lotyanu, V. Lunin, V. Makanin, Ye. Maksimova, I. Maslennikov, B. Messerer, E. Mirzoyan, N. Mordyukova, Yu. Moritz, M. Poltoranin, Yu. Nikulin, F. Novikov, M. Orekhov, G. Panfilov, A. Petrov, L. Petrushevskaya, V. Pichul, Yu. Platonov, A. Plakhov, A. Shnitke, Yu. Polyakov, E. Popov, O. Poptsov, A. Razumovskiy, Ye. Reyn, Ye. Rozanov, Yu. Rost, Yu. Ryzhov, S. Ryabchenko, E. Ryazanov, Yu. Ryashentsev, Yu. Saulskiy, A. Svobodin, Ye. Sidorov, A. Simonov, S. Slonimskiy, A. Smirnov, A. Sokurov, S. Solovyev, A. Tkachenko, P. Todorovskiy, M. Ulyanov, S. Fedorov, L. Fedoseyeva-Shukshina, L. Filatov, S. Khadzhiyev, T. Khrennikov, D. Khudonazarov, K. Tsereteli, L. Chukovskaya, I. Churikova, O. Chukhontsev, G. Chukhray, D. Shakhovskoy, E. Shengelaya, R. Shchedrin, Yu. Shcherbak, Yu. Shchekochikhin, K. Shcherbakov, Yu. Edlis, Ye. Yakovlev, O. Yankovskiy, M. Tariverdiyev.

The appeal to their fellow countrymen was adopted at the meeting of culture and science workers which took place at the USSR Union of Cinematographers on 16 January 1991.

MOSCOW NEWS Quizzes Vilnius Officers

PM0602172691 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 4, 27 Jan-3 Feb 91 p 10

[Yuriy Teplyakov report: "So Who Did the Killing?"]

[Text] Vilnius—I went to Vilnius to speak to those who are now again condemned throughout the world—the Soviet military, whose tanks had taken control of the city's streets. They allowed me onto their premises on one condition: that I report their true thoughts, problems and worries. I did not go to judge them. Readers can make their own assessment.

Colonel

Had I met the regiment's commander, Nikolay Astakov, on the street, I would have thought he was a teacher. Thin, soft-spoken and as blue-eyed as hundreds of thousands of people in Russia, he also seemed a bit shy, as he asked me if it were OK for him to smoke, although we were in his office.

"Yes, those were my tanks at the radio station and TV tower. When the National Salvation Committee asked me for help, I didn't hesitate."

"They say that questioning is the way to the truth."

"This is for those who don't know the truth. I learned the truth a long time ago. I've been serving in Lithuania since 1988. I saw the Sajudis movement grow and mature. Let me give one example. Before Sajudis arose, our officers lived like normal people and had apartments in the city. Today, the regiment's headquarters is all helter-skelter. Every other room, is home for a family.

Over there lives a captain, his wife and child. Across the corridor, an NCO with two kids. We have to put up with it. They don't admit our children into their kindergartens and refuse to give jobs to officers' wives. We've no residence permits only because we're military and Russian.

"When we took control of the press House the other day, they said we deprived Lithuania of its voice. Is this so? I never once saw a communist or representative of the working class speak here on TV (even as objects of criticism). Therefore I drove my tank to the TV station willingly. I had my orders and my heart also told me to go there."

"You were sure that the National Salvation Committee would let everybody speak their minds. How could you be sure when when nobody knows who these people are?"

"I know many of them personally. We've met. They're good guys.

"At 1:30 a.m. four tanks were sent to the tower and three to the TV station. They didn't have live ammunition. I also ordered all camouflage removed since there was no danger of air strikes. We didn't touch anybody. We arrived at the tower at about 2 o'clock to see a huge crowd of angry people. They had bottles of gasoline, stones and even some sabres. We brought one home. They claim that we crushed a girl. Whatever sins they can justly accuse us of, of this we are innocent. A girl versus a tank. Nothing could be more horrible. But they wanted it to sound horrible. A tank is a 50-ton monster. It can crush a truck laden with sand. It can crush a man so that nothing will be left except maybe his shoes. And the girl was whole when they buried her. Such vicious story-tellers deserve to have their tongues torn out. There are my tanks: there's not a single drop of blood on them. You can invite experts from any country in the world to examine them. I'm ready."

"The majority of people accuse you of something else—of fulfilling an order by a sort of secret committee which has no legal power."

"I can't discern nuances when I see red because of insults. My blood boiled when a Sajudis leader, Ozolas, called Russians 'subhuman'. Had I not seen people humiliated, humiliated right and left, had I not seen a sea of human grief of people insulted only because they speak Russian, I would never have led my tanks into the streets of Vilnius. Talk to my officers who were at the tower with me, and listen to what they have to say."

Lieutenants

Several minutes later I spoke with three lieutenants—young fellows a bit over twenty. They sat opposite me, trying to straighten their soiled coveralls. They had just arrived from hangars, from the tanks they had operated a few nights earlier. I was the only journalist who they had met face to face.

"We didn't know the way to the tower and we have never driven our tanks in the street. They're designed for action in the field. And we were afraid we might bump into something.

"Our hearts were heavy. Behind us was a column of paratroopers. And God knows what we had to expect at the TV tower."

"Our task was to clear all obstacles so that the paratroopers coud pass and to control the crossrods."

"Were there assaults on your tanks?"

"There were. But we moved our barrel and people dispersed. When they got really close, we resorted to the smokescreen we use on the battlefield."

"Have you heard that Boris Yeltsin has appealed to Russian soldiers, that they disobey orders?"

"We heard it while at the tower. After all, we were there for three days. But an order is an order. If you don't fulfil it, you go to prison. Yeltsin's proposal to create a Russian army is a dream, that it would only become an army of Russian nationalists."

The guys were embarrassed, I felt they disagreed, but the commander himself came into the room at that moment and the three lieutenants stopped talking.

It was only later that one lieutenant said he liked a piece from Aleksandr Nevzorov's report. The TV anchor said that the guys had done what they had been ordered to do, but that there are bastards who would not own up to having issued the order...

"Did he mean the National Salvation Committee?"

"No, he meant those higher up, who are far from Vilnius, who never heard the curses we heard.'

Generals

Later that evening, in the division's HQ, I met the Commander of the USSR Ground Forces, Army General Valentin Varennikov, and the division's Commander, Major-General Vladimir Uskhopchik.

Said Varennikov:

"The night of January 13 is not an isolated event. The tragedy began on the night of March 11, 1989. That's where you'll find the guilty.

"Some people underestimate the National Salvation Committee. They think it has no power. They're wrong. It had the right to appeal to the chief of the garrison, and the latter decided to try to prevent the conflict and help worker detachments free the TV station. Let me repeat: all participants in the effort to normalize and stabilize the situation should commended. Everything was in keeping with the Field Manual that has been approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. So where do you see breaches of the Constitution?!"

"If everything was in keeping with the Constitution, why refer to the order of the National Salvation Committee, why strenghen an official document with an order by a non-governmental organization?"

The general didn't flinch: "The initiative was the Committee's. This is a fact! Why should we lie? And still I see nothing criminal here. There are 800,000 Lithuanian citizens who are loyal to the Constitutions of the USSR and the Republic. Why should we forget about these people? At the moment of crisis, these Soviet citizens approached this Soviet general and asked him to prevent bloodshed! Could he ignore their plea? But he should have done more. He should have arrested those who fired the shots that killed people."

"When did you learn about the events?"

"The next day. I was in Armenia."

"Was it that morning, as was the case with the President?"

"I don't know when the President learned about it. And it doesn't matter. The military district's Command in the Baltics is responsible for everything within its control. The Defence Minister and the President are not.

"Everything was correct and in line with the Constitution. The Republic should obey the laws of the country. When we have a new Constitution, we'll act differently. So far, there's only the Law of the USSR. When Sajudis was striving for power, it proposed slogans that people believed. When it gained power, it changed its slogans. Sajudis is going fascist. This is not good. We'll stop them."

"What do you think, General Uskhopchik?"

"Lithuania's Interior Ministry is corrupt. The civil defence is corrupt. The KGB is nearly corrupt. The President can only rely on the army. In my unit, not a single man put his party card on the table. The situation in the republic can only be stabilized if Soviet laws are fulfilled. I see no other way."

"Have you met with Lithuania's government?"

"They are disoriented. They don't what they will be doing tomorrow. They asked me about the curfew. I told them the curfew will continue because weapons, medicines, and money—both roubles and hard currency—are being smuggled into Vilnius.

The Army General interrupted:

"If Lithuania's Supreme Soviet is realistic, it should understand it can't go on like this any longer. People in the army are awfully strained. Passions may come to a head. Officers are not mannequins. They have nerves. Today, they fulfil orders. Tomorrow, they may use their weapons without an order. God knows what will happen then. I'm not trying to scare you."

We talked for over an hour. Somebody from the division's HQ wanted the generals on the phone. It was time to go, and I asked the Garrison Commander one final question:

"You've explained everything. But are you sure that you're right? Don't you understand that the world wants to know who's responsible for the blood spilt in Vilnius? Don't you understand you may fall victim to somebody else's policy? Don't you have any doubts?

General Uskhopchik was silent for a few seconds, but even these few seconds seemed to long for his boss who answered the question for him:

"He has no doubts. He shouldn't worry. He should be commended for what he did. He did everything in line with the Field Manual. Listen '...a garrison commander shall maintain close contact with the local party and government bodies.'"

The general was quoting the Field Manual. And fear, like lead, crept into my soul: the Manual doesn't name any villains.

KGB Explains Special Troops in Lithuania

91UN0777B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 4, Jan 91 p 8

[Statement by Major General A. Karbainov, chief of the USSR KGB Public Relations Center, to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent P. Lukyanchenko]

[Text] **It is said that the "Alpha" antiterrorist special group of the KGB, dressed in paratrooper and OMON [Special Purpose Militia Unit] uniforms, took part in the Vilnius operation to seize the television center on 13 January; that 22-year-old KGB Lieutenant V. Shatskikh, who died during the seizure, was a member of this group, and that he was shot by his own people for the purpose of inciting open fire?**

Major General A. Karbainov, chief of the USSR KGB Public Relations Center, replies to a question by our correspondent P. Lukyanchenko:

A small group of KGB employees was in the area of the events that occurred in Vilnius on the night of 12 to 13 January of this year. It arrived in Vilnius in view of the critical situation that developed in Lithuania, and not in connection with this date. Our employees performed guard functions there. Among them were those who are taking a direct part in the fight against terrorist displays. It would be strange if employees of state security organs were not present where a tense and, moreover, unpredictable situation was unfolding. I would like to emphasize that not one of them fired even a shot and that Lieutenant Shatskikh was shot in the back. We have already reported the facts of his death in the press.

KGB Official Denies Rumors About Baltic Troops

91UN0746A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 3, Jan 91 p 8

[Interview with the chief of the USSR KGB Center for Public Liaison, Major General A. Karbainov, by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent P. Lukyanchenko; place and date not given]

[Text] [Lukyanchenko] It was announced that the National Salvation Committee (KNS) had taken power in Lithuania, and that Army units deployed in the republic report to it. Appeals and decrees are being published in the official mass media on behalf of the KNS. Does the USSR KGB have information on who gave the KNS such powers and when, who its members are, and whether it includes the military, KGB representatives, and members of the leadership of the Communist Party of Lithuania (on CPSU platform) Central Committee?

[Karbainov] The USSR KGB Center for Public Liaison learned about the creation of the National Salvation Committee of Lithuania from the newspapers in which, incidentally, the main provisions of its political program were published. We do not know either the number or identity of KNS membership.

[Lukyanchenko] It was reported that a KGB division stationed in Vitebsk had refused to obey an order to redeploy to the Baltic area, and that the officers of this division had been turning in their party cards in protest. How true is this?

[Karbainov] These reports are not true. The division in question has received no orders to redeploy. This means that it is simply absurd to talk about a refusal. No cases of officers quitting the CPSU have been registered.

[Lukyanchenko] It became known from unofficial sources that paratrooper and other military units, including those reporting to the KGB, a total of 83,000 men, had been urgently redeployed to the Moscow area (to Kubinka and Kuskovo). Is this true?

[Karbainov] This question is similar to the previous one. The answer is going to be the same: There have been, and there are, no movements of KGB troops to the vicinity of Moscow.

Lithuanian Paramilitaries' Role Questioned

PM2401105991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Lieutenant Colonel O. Vladykin article: "Provocation Lasting One Year"]

[Text] Now, after the Vilnius tragedy, a great deal is being written and said to the effect that the desire to resist coercion is inherent in every individual. And it is particularly natural for a whole people. In my view, the indisputable nature of this statement is obvious. In this connection, the following question arises: What reaction, then, must the open violation of the USSR Constitution bring out in people? After all, through the desire of the elected representatives of the people, it expresses the interests and hopes of millions of citizens of a huge country. Incidentally, this includes those living in the Baltic states. So that force was constantly being used in Lithuania long before the events of January 1991, which, I stress, provoked natural resistance and the tragic clash that finally ensued.

It all began 11 March last year. It was then that the intriguers who were pursuing power hastily announced the strictly rhetorical independence of Lithuania. Acting like thieves in the night, they did not attempt to find out about the mood of the whole population they represented, and they did not even carry out an election campaign; they hastened to repeal the Union Constitution just before the USSR Congress of People's Deputies made its decision on the procedure for the secession of republics from the Union.

And then the real "war of laws" broke out. In Lithuania acts were adopted one after another which were aimed at the destruction of normal relations with the Soviet Union. In March for example, there was the law about the invalidity of the USSR Law on Compulsory Military Service. In September came the turn of the Law on Political Parties, which virtually prohibited the activity of communists in the republic. The relevant organs of internal affairs and the prosecutor's office were formed to replace those that were part of analogous structures under the Union's authority. Changes and additions were made in the Lithuanian Republic Penal Code, which placed people under threat of the death sentence for "deliberate participation... in the activity of another state," which included the USSR after the declaration of independence.

Altogether a large number of laws and various resolutions appeared that violated the Lithuanian-Soviet ties that had been forming for years, and canceled out the rights and freedoms of those who continued to consider themselves USSR citizens. But around 50 of the acts adopted in the republic are of a particularly dangerous and destabilizing nature, because they were aimed against the Soviet Armed Forces. The most important one of these—the law on the territorial defense service—placed Lithuania in direct confrontation with the Union in the military sphere. The very emergence of such forces as alternatives to the Soviet Army units and their consequent intensive development on the republic's territory made the probability of their involvement in an armed clash quite realistic.

A. Butkevicius, general director of the "territorial defense" department, was already admitting quite openly the possibility of such a turn of events during our meeting with him, although admittedly this was in mid-December. And indeed he could not give any other answer to a direct question since, a month before this conversation, speaking on republic television, Vice Premier R. Ozolas had spoken even more frankly. He stated, naturally without breathing a word about his government's antidemocratic activity, that the use of some kind of "repressive measures" by the Soviet Union in Lithuania would provoke resistance not from social formations but from state (Lithuanian—O.V.) defense subunits. And so that there would be no doubt about the capabilities of these forces, Ozolas made the following assurance in an interview with the newspaper GIMTASIS KRASTAS: "Do not worry about what to resist with: If Lithuania takes this path, we will definitely find something to use."

This was not bravado on the vice premier's part: He knew what he was talking about. In Vilnius, Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee official V. Shurupov familiarized me with the impressive data testifying to the level of equipment of the "territorial defense" subunits. The department seized by force the majority of the republic DOSAAF [Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy] centers and all the available equipment in them. As a result it has 390 vehicles at its disposal, obtained last year from the USSR Ministry of Defense. These include covered personnel carriers, specialized military vehicles, and ambulances. Many means of communication have also fallen into the hands of the "defenders of the territory." For instance, in the Vilnius radio club alone there were 10 military R-105 and R-109 radio sets that had been acquired by new owners. And in Klaipeda radio sets were being collected and bought intensively for communication on ships.

And the weapons.... Department head A. Butkevicius assured me that his subordinates are only armed to a bare minimum—they will perhaps have Simonov semiautomatic carbines to defend various classified installations. But he said that no attempt is being made to acquire combat hardware illegally. If, however, we need more of them, then.... "We hope to come to a reasonable understanding with Moscow to buy weapons in the Soviet Union for all these things," Butkevicius said.

A brand new tradition.... I managed to find out from authoritative sources that emissaries are being sent from the "territorial defense" department to the Transcaucasus to obtain weapons. At a 16 November Panevezys meeting with draftees' parents A. Baitkaitis, deputy general director of the department, spoke about planned purchases of weapons in Germany. Furthermore, by all accounts, a number of Lithuanian enterprises are preparing to convert to the production of their own weapons. There are facts that directly confirm this.

The Vilnius Garrison command, for example, has received statements from many former servicemen whom the Lithuanian paramilitary department tried to involve in work as arms specialists. Thus, Warrant Officer K., who was in the reserves, was regularly called in personally by A. Butkevicius and asked to serve as an arms production technologist. The warrant officer really did have such a specialization from one of the Soviet Army training institutions, and he had devoted many years to his favorite subject. But he considered it immoral to take a military oath for the second time in his life, and started to be constantly persecuted for this. All his attempts to find work in any civil institution met with obstacles artificially created by the "territorial defense" department.

Cases such as this cannot be seen as anything but extraordinary. Particularly if you look at them in the light of the events of recent days. On the one hand there are in the republic quite well organized, highly mobile, and secretly armed forces comprising thousands of men. On the other there are various sociopolitical organizations, production collectives, and citizens of all nationalities demanding with increasing insistence the dissolution of a parliament that has wound up in a political impasse and the introduction of direct presidential rule in Lithuania. After all, you will recall that as far back as 27 November, sensing that such demands were likely to be made, Supreme Soviet Chairman V. Landsbergis in his television address made threats against people already driven to extremes because of never-ending oppression and the violation of their human dignity and civil rights. If any attempt was made to remove the republic leadership, he said, the state structures created for the protection of public order and territorial security could resist it. So that Mr. Landsbergis long ago removed any doubts about what the republic paramilitary formations are intended for.

Today it would be altogether naive to question this. Subunits of "protectors of the territory" are present in all major population centers. By declaring Lithuania in a state of war with the USSR, Landsbergis has given them permission to use weapons. They are opening fire on Soviet Army servicemen, as happened at the Vilnius television center. And I do not doubt that this will happen again if such an opportunity presents itself. After all, 70 guns and 40,000 live rounds, bulletproof vests, and other army property were discovered just on premises where department command points were located. And equipment that has yet to be recovered could be used at any time.

One wonders if the republic authorities are really seriously hoping to use the "territorial defense" forces to fully implement their far-reaching plans. Hardly, because this would simply go against common sense. They have been relying on something else. Here they were counting primarily on the casualties—inevitable in the event of an armed clash—who would be sure to provoke the sympathy of world public opinion toward "violated Lithuania." In fact, this scenario was acted out, although it turned out to be more difficult to act out because of an unsuccessful attempt to provoke the military to fire the first shots. These were in fact fired by the "defenders" of the television tower—in a base manner, into a Soviet lieutenant's back. They were tired of waiting. Because the main point was to provoke mass demonstrations by supporters of Sajudism, whose nucleus would be the same organized, suitably equipped formations of "defenders." In the face of the extremely divided, recently polarized Lithuanian society, the forces that had prepared for the clashes in advance and had at their disposal administrative structures specially created for the imminent clashes could undoubtedly gain the advantage.

No, such circumstances should not have been disregarded at a time when passions were inflamed to the utmost degree in the republic.

The USSR president called on the republic Supreme Soviet to face the truth and see the real reasons for the prevailing situation. He proposed that the parliamentarians immediately fully restore the validity of the USSR Constitution and the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution and repeal the previously adopted unconstitutional acts. The republic authorities have totally refused to carry out the President's appeal.

Now we must establish that the Lithuanian paramilitary department is continuing to exist and function. Its chief, A. Butkevicius, is continuing to make one provocative statement after another, inflaming anti-Army hysteria even more. And there is nothing stopping him from giving the formations under his command the order to act at any moment. Yes, the Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy premises and some of the equipment stored there have been taken away and returned to the rightful owners. But all the organizational structures and the coordination administration have been kept. This means that there is still a real danger of new armed clashes and a new outbreak of violence.

So, perhaps the republic authorities, if they really want peace for the peoples of Lithuania, as they never tire of saying, will find the strength to eliminate one of the main destabilizing factors. Otherwise the threat will persist of a repeat of the bloodshed. And the USSR President, who expressed serious alarm at a recent union parliament sitting about the existence of illegal paramilitary formations, will for his part have to take tough measures to dissolve and disarm them.

Politician, Soldier on Attitude to Army

LD2401161991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 24 Jan 91

[Report by correspondent Vladimir Perfilyev in Lithuania]

[Text] Completely contradictory views are being expressd as regards relations to the soldiers of the Soviet Army in the republic. The army issue has really become a trump card both in the hands of politicians and of those who live here. What is the real attitude of official figures to the army? I put this question to Audrius Butkevicius, a deputy of the republic's Supreme Council and the director general of the department for the protection of the kray.

[Butkevicius] I have tried more than once to have some contact with servicemen and have asked that there should be meetings in which servicemen and representatives of the Lithuanian government could participate. But my proposals are thrown out all the time, in spite of the fact that we have tried to create the sort of situation in which servicemen receive the same as do those living in the republic. And people are uninformed. Some disinformation has been going around all this time; there is a disinformation campaign that officers in Lithuania do not receive what is necessary.

[Perfilyev] I would like to touch on one more issue. Yesterday, the chairman of the republc's Supreme Council said that everything must be done to forestall interethnic strife. How can this be attained?

[Butkevicius] I would put it a different way. Anything said against officers and servicmen at the moment is a provocation. all the time, we have striven to avoid clashes on ethnic issues. Up to this point in time, there has not been a single clash on ethnic grounds in Lithuania.

[Perfilyev] Now, another opinion, the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksey Kirichenko, a military political worker.

[Kirichenko] Over the last two years we ourselves have been experiencing efforts to force an anti-army psychosis, an anti-army mood. The label of occupier has already become normal, and not only in the media, but also in official legal acts which are being adopted by the republic's parliament and government. In only one year, since 11 March last year, about 50 acts of this kind have been adopted, which are anticonstitutional and which encroach upon both the rights of servicemen and which are directed against the armed forces. In particular, I would like to say that a law has been aodpted which has declared as illegal the law on general military service. The activities of military registration and enlistment offices have practically been forbidden. Legislative acts have been adopted which call on youths who are Lithuanian by nationality to desert from the ranks of the armed forces. The republic's decree, adopted [words indistinct] has in particular forbidden the registration of servicemen at the place where they live when it is directly on the territory of military units. The financing [word indistinct] of all military commissariats is forbidden. Practically all servicemen were deprived of the right to take part in the elections last year.

There are instances when the wives of servicemen have called for an ambulance, and because they do not know Lithuanian they have simply been refused basic medical assistance. There have been incidents when stones and empty bottles have been thrown at an officer or a soldier. They have been insulted and cursed.

Consequently, the statement by the present leaders of the republic saying that we make no claims on the army, we are trying to resolve the issues by means of dialogue. Well, I personally have my doubts about this.

Lithuanian Democratic Forces Appeal Cited

PM2401120591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 24 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Undated report from Vilnius by correspondent Captain Second Rank V. Gromak under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Steps Toward Dialogue"]

[Text] The situation in Lithuania has not become less complex. The reality today is dyarchy.

The Lithuanian National Salvation Committee has made a statement advocating dialogue between representatives of the Lithuanian Congress of Democratic Forces and the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, with a representative of the USSR president mediating.

The Lithuanian National Salvation Committee has proposed to the Congress of Democratic Forces that a delegation be formed and empowered to conduct talks on the basis of the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee statement of 18 January this year. This was also discussed yesterday at a meeting between USSR People's Deputy G. Tarazevich, the USSR Supreme Soviet's representative in Lithuania, and representatives of the Lithuanian Congress of Democratic Forces, which embraces 22 social organizations, including the Lithuanian Communist Party.

Yesterday the Congress of Democratic Forces also adopted an appeal to the republic Supreme Soviet. It states, in part: "To avoid further conflict in society the Lithuanian Congress of Democratic Forces addresses the republic's Supreme Soviet and proposes the following:

"1. The abrogation of all legislative enactments adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet since 11 March 1990 which contradict the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution and the USSR Constitution.

"2. The restoration of the operation of the Lithuanian SSR and USSR Constitutions in the republic.

"3. The fulfillment of the decisions of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the demands of all decrees from the country's president.

"4. The stabilization of the political, economic, and legal situation in the republic."

The military are also having meetings of various kinds. Yesterday internationalist servicemen and USSR Supreme Soviet Deputies R. Odzhiyev, V. Yakushkin, and A. Uvarov visited the Severnyy camp. They met with officers and visited servicemen's families.

Vilnius Groups Support Salvation Committee

91UN0745C Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No. 3, Jan 91 p 3

[Unattributed report on letters from Vilnius residents]

[Text] We, the people of Vilnius, are extremely concerned at the situation that exists in our city. Uncontrolled groups of people insult passers-by who do not speak Lithuanian and demand that they go home "while they are still in one piece." All this is done under the pretext of defending the government and the legislature.

Mikhail Sergeyevich, you alone can stop this orgy of nationalism and fascism. Is it possible that you do not see anything?

We do not ask, we demand that presidential rule be introduced in Lithuania. This is the only measure that can bring some order and can prevent huge numbers of casualties.

[Signed] With hopes and respect for you, residents of Vilnius (15 signatures).

* * *

The working people feel outraged at the policy of the Lithuanian leadership. We have no trust in it. The situation in the republic has come to a cul-de-sac beyond which there is disaster. We entrust our destiny to the National Salvation Committee of Lithuania and we express our full support for it.

[Signed] Group of workers of the Vilnius radio equipment factory.

* * *

The actions of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet keep adding to the explosive situation in both the capital and the republic.

Nationalistic appeals and addresses can lead to the outbreak of civil war. The Lithuanian National Salvation Committee is the only body that can save the people of Lithuania from the coming catastrophe. We support the creation of the National Salvation Committee; we also support its actions, which are directed to the good of the ethnic groups of Lithuania.

[Signed] Citizens committee of the "Vilma" central association.

Rumormongering in Lithuania Deplored

PM2501124191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Jan 91 Second Edition p 1

[V. Okulov and Yu. Stroganov report: "The Baltics: The Tension Continues—That is How Rumors Start"]

[Text] Vilnius, 20 Jan—What is the mechanism that creates the alarming rumors making people in Lithuania today look warily into the faces of people they meet on the street, and households shudder at outside noises? Who gains by these rumors? We have asked ourselves these questions many times in recent days.

The tense political situation in Vilnius, with its potential for unexpected flareups, is apparently being deliberately fueled by some people. People have repeatedly heard allegations that Lithuanian nationalists have burst into a kindergarten or a Russian school and smashed everything indiscriminately. These rumors alternate with others: Soviet Army servicemen are allegedly behaving high-handedly toward the population of the republic capital. It is almost impossible to verify the rumors: The parties deny their involvement in such actions.

As for the Army, it is well known that the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation which came to Vilnius on a peacemaking mission managed to organize contacts between the military and the republic leadership. An accord aimed at lowering the tension in their relations and establishing public order was reached. The infrequent conflicts between the military and civilians, of which there are currently no sequels, are in our view more likely to be the result of the long mutual misunderstanding and irritation which has built up over many months. The peaceful settlement of these conflicts is proof of people's unwillingness to aggravate the situation.

However, some people need to intensify it. They stubbornly claim that after the tragic events of 13 January there are a mass of missing people. Who are they? The local "independent" press, prone to publish sensations and exposes, would not have passed up an opportunity to name names, but in fact it has not: A rumor spreads, and there is no time to refute or confirm it. We read in one republic newspaper that there is purportedly a list of missing people that, happily, is shortening all the time. Just a couple of weeks ago, attention would hardly have been paid to such a list. Runaway teenagers, "missing" husbands, drunks on their periodic drinking bouts, sick people arriving unconscious at clinics—surely the same newspapers have written about such events in previous years without attaching a sinister significance to them?

The phone rings: An anonymous speaker says that the windows have been broken at Russian school No.6. We know that relations between people of different nationalities in Vilnius today have deteriorated. We hurry to the address to check the authenticity of the report ourselves. And what do we find? The school is fine. Who needed to make the call? Evidently those who do not want relations between Russians, Poles, and Belorussians—the so-called Russian-speaking population—and Lithuanians in the republic to return to their habitual course of a few years ago.

And here is another piece of news: It is claimed that paratroopers are secretly taking away the corpses of guerrillas who were killed at the television tower. As is well known, a check did not confirm the rumor, but it continues to circulate. Another item in the newspapers and reports from Lithuanian radio broadcasting from Kaunas allege that an officer of the Vilnius garrison called on paratroopers not to obey the command. In fact he turns out to be only the military representative of an enterprise... And a report that following appeals some paratroopers deserted from a unit's base turns out to have been a lie. The same goes for the report that V. Shved, second secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, is carrying out a secret mission in the Kremlin, whereas he is on a business trip abroad.

Rumor, following the initiative of journalists of certain publications, all but dubbed A. Naudzjunas, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, and Professor J. Jermalivicius, leader of a Central Committee department, organizers of the National Salvation Committee, whose members' names are kept secret for security reasons. However, in conversation with us both Communists categorically refuted the rumors of their involvement in this organization. Talk of this kind is far from innocent, especially in view of calls for reprisals against members of the committee and the declared intention of the Lithuanian Republic Prosecutor's Office to track down the members of this organization. The former prime minister of the republic, K. Prunskiene, has become the victim of malicious rumors, or more likely, even provocateur accusations. She stated at a press conference that the Lithuanian Freedom League, well-known for its extremism, is daily distributing leaflets in parliament and in the city accusing her of being a traitor to the Lithuanian people. I am even being threatened with physical reprisals, K. Prunskiene said, and I was forced to request the Lithuanian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] to organize a bodyguard.

At times you get the impression that rumors are fed even by some of the wording in official documents. For instance, a protest to the USSR president signed by V. Landsbergis, chairman of the republic parliament, begins with the claim that "the savagery of USSR Armed Forces soldiers in Lithuania is continuing." However, the Lithuanian news agency ELTA reports, citing Audrjus Azubalis, Supreme Soviet press spokesman: "Last night was unusually calm in Lithuania. Neither the MVD, nor the Territorial Defense Department received reports of arbitrary actions by the military, unless you count the fact that three Armed Forces guard posts in Vilnius stopped cars and checked the passengers' documents." Of course, it does happen that rumors cease to be rumors and become facts. But only if they receive corroboration. However, the very fact that a veritable avalanche of conjecture is raining down on the population of Lithuania causes us anxious reflection. It is difficult in this situation for the inhabitants of the republic to keep calm.

'Soviet Empire's' Baltic Policy Assailed

91UN0757A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by V. Pozner: "What I Cannot Say on Television"]

[Text] I am an employee of USSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting]. It determines the circle of subjects or, more accurately the subject, which I cannot discuss on the pages of the periodical press. That subject is the operations policy of USSR Gosteleradio. Despite my keen desire to talk about what goes on within that same mass information medium (or, as they increasingly say now, that mass disinformation medium), I am put off by the thought of using the typed page of the newspaper or journal for that purpose. If I could express myself on television, I would not feel any awkwardness. But dreaming of such freedom of speech borders on naivete. Nowhere in the world is there a single newspaper or radio or television station that allows an employee or a freelance journalist under contract to it to use the printed page or airwaves belonging to it to criticize it.

However, there is one circumstance that puts a television journalist in a hopeless position: Gosteleradio's existence by itself, that is, the absence of alternative television and of that same pluralism which is supposedly so dear to the hearts of our leaders. After all, for example, if I worked at the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA (which is difficult to imagine, but our flights of fantasy may be astounding), and if I considered the policy of that newspaper to be unacceptable to me, I could offer my services to a whole series of newspapers representing an alternative. Even KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. In the case of Gosteleradio there is nowhere else to go inasmuch as there is no other television. It is the only state agency for the medium.

I have written this introduction in order to explain why I am not writing in this article about the state of affairs at Gosteleradio.

And so I would like to share a few thoughts concerning the events that have taken place and are taking place in the republics of the Baltic region—and not in them alone—as well as concerning the reaction to those events. I will begin in an indirect fashion.

Across its history, as the Russian state developed it expanded its borders. It has demonstrated a tendency toward expansion that is manifest and apparent to the naked eye, swallowing up its weaker neighbors. I hasten to emphasize that there is nothing "specifically Russian" in this. It is enough to cast even a superficial glance at the development of all states to be convinced of a general rule consisting of the constant seizure of new territories and the conquest of ever greater area by states that are young, full of vital forces, and developing. If we apply this to more recent history, these thoughts are true, in particular, for the giant colonial empires of Portugal, Spain, France, Great Britain, and...Russia. True, there are two differences between the first four and the last one.

First, Portugal, Spain, France, and England were significantly smaller than their colonies in terms of both population and territory; Russia, on the other hand, was significantly larger. Second, in the case of the first "quartet," the colonies as a rule were separated from the center of the empire by seas and even oceans and did not have any common borders with them (with the exception of England and Scotland). Not so with the Russian empire. Its colonies bordered directly on it, in a fashion becoming a part of it. There were no natural physical or geographic borders with reference to which one could say "Here is Russia and here are its colonies."

I already hear the indignant question asked by some super-patriots: "Are you putting an equals sign between the Russian empire and the USSR?!" I answer, "No, I am not." Moreover, I insist that any amateur who does insert such an equals sign—and unfortunately there are many of them—is deeply mistaken. There was and, in general, still is one important difference in relations between the Russian imperial center and its outlying districts on the one hand and the Soviet socialist center and its outlying districts on the other. It consists of policy, the essence of which was expressed by Lenin when he (repeatedly) said in effect that the non-Russian population of the Russian empire was subject to a double burden (on the part of tsarism, which also burdened the Russians, and on the part of the Russians). As a result, asserted Lenin, the Soviet state is obliged to give preferential treatment to the former colonial peoples and invest more money into the development of systems of education, public health, industry, etc. for them. And under Soviet power the colonial peoples, formerly completely without rights, received their own political and administrative structures in the form of republics and other formations, they received representation, albeit formal, in the supreme state organs of power, and they received the right to teach in their ethnic language in the schools (which was in large part prohibited in tsarist Russia). All of this and many other things categorically forbid identification of the Russian empire with the Soviet Union. At the same time, in my opinion, there are grounds to affirm that a USSR empire also exists.

The problem is not that the borders of the Soviet Union coincide almost exactly with those of the Russian empire. Nor is it that the Soviet state has ruthlessly and without any concern for the future ravaged the mineral resources and the land and wasted the natural and other wealth of the former colonies (in the end it has observed "equality" in this instance, acting the same way with Russia itself). Finally, the problem is not that, if not de jure then certainly de facto, the non-Russian population has been discriminated against, which has led in particular to the wish of an increasingly large number of parents in the republics to put their children into Russian-speaking schools (because without fluent mastery of Russian it is difficult to count on a career) and to the beginnings of the "extinction" of Belorussian and Ukrainian; no, that is not the problem if only because even the Russians have begun to forget and lose their own language, Russian, and have begun to speak not Russian but rather a language that is thin, clumsy, and gray, like a cloth for wrapping our feet, and flat like a pancake. We need to recognize that in the USSR even the Russians are "second- class citizens"; the first-class citizens were those who became part of the party-bureaucratic system. But if none of these things are the mark of an empire, then what compels me to use the expression "Soviet empire"? First, the circumstance that the former imperial center, that is to say Soviet Russia, has never determined of the former colonies whether they want independence (with the exception of Finland). Second, and more significantly, the new Soviet Government needed force to include in the USSR the former territories belonging to tsarist Russia. This is what demonstrates the sufficient and necessary condition, as they say in mathematics, to talk about a Soviet empire.

Today it is overtaken by the same thing that has overtaken all empires independent of the kind of sociopolitical system they had. They either perished under their own weight or unraveled themselves. In both cases the thirst for freedom and the desire for independence of the colonial peoples was vast. In both cases the result was the same for former colonies: freedom. But it was not the same for the former imperial center. Those who fought to the end, trying to hold the colonies by force, inevitably suffered painful defeats or, at times, mortal defeats. The result was different for those who had the foresight to grant their colonies independence...

Recently I think increasingly about France and about Charles de Gaulle, its most loyal and even, perhaps, its greatest son. I believe everyone will agree that de Gaulle was more than just a patriot of France. He was a patriot in the highest sense of the word. In one sense de Gaulle embodied France, lived it, and cared for its glory and its might. But it was de Gaulle who compelled France to part with its last significant colony, Algeria. Let us recall.

Algeria was conquered by France in the 1830's. For over 100 years about 2 million Frenchmen put down roots in the fruitful earth of Algeria. More than just one or two generations of Frenchmen were born, lived, and died in Algeria. This French-speaking population grew accustomed to Algeria and even became different in some fashion from the "French" Frenchmen. They became so different that they were given the nickname "pied noir." For the "pied noirs" Algeria was home, closer to them than France itself. It is not surprising that the thought of "surrendering" Algeria to the Algerians seemed to them—and also to many other Frenchmen living in France but accustomed to a certain state of affairs—not only unacceptable and senseless, but traitorous and anti-French. The decision to use force against the Algerians and the decision to fight them was at first hotly supported not only by the "pied noirs," not only by the majority of Frenchmen, but also by the most French among them—General Charles de Gaulle.

But as the hopelessness of that war, its prolonged character, the desperate opposition of the Algerian people, and the increasing isolation of France became apparent, President Charles de Gaulle began to change his point of view. It should be remembered that this reevaluation of values took place without any pressure on the part of the West. And what kind of pressure could there be? The West has never or almost never condemned "its own" for use of armed force against the countries and residents of the third or developing world, whether in Asia, Africa, or Latin America. The West has never or almost never threatened to use or used sanctions against "its own," even in the event of a glaring violation of human rights. So France did not have to concern itself with the possibility of such actions. Then what prompted President de Gaulle to decide to end the war with Algeria, sit down at the negotiating table with the leaders of the national liberation movement, come to an agreement with them concerning a plebiscite, and, on the basis of that, grant Algeria its independence?

President Charles de Gaulle made that decision based on the interests of France. De Gaulle, wise and infinitely concerned for France, understood that the bloodshed in Algeria was harming France and that France would lose not only its sons but something far more important although less perceptible—it would lose its greatness, it would lose that magnetic and quite unique grandeur that thrills the heart of a Frenchman when he sees his flag, that compels him to raise his head proudly when he hears the "Marseillaise," and that sounds in his voice when he pronounces the word "France." De Gaulle understood that history does not stop and that any people who aspire to freedom will necessarily become free. He also understood that the people of Algeria, having received their freedom from France, would behave toward France and build their relations with it not at all like a people who have had to win that freedom by force.

But not all Frenchmen shared this concept of the interests of France. Moreover, many cursed de Gaulle, declared him a traitor to France and the French people, and swore to avenge that treachery—and this in reference to a hero of the French underground in the years of World War II. The first to anathematize de Gaulle were the two million "pied noirs." But many others joined them. Among the most irreconcilable and vehement opponents of the president was the military—of course not all, but many, especially the senior officer ranks and the generals. These forces created the infamous terrorist organization, the OAS [Organisation Armee Secret], which raged in France for some years, was accused of the death of more than one Frenchman, set a goal of murdering Charles de Gaulle, and only by a miracle did not succeed in achieving that goal.

You ask me, "What relation does all this have to the subject you promised and to the events taking place in the republics of the Baltic area as well as in many other republics?" In my opinion, the most direct relation.

A true patriot of the Soviet Union, concerned for its present and its future, for its honor and dignity, and for its glory and prosperity, cannot help but understand that forcibly keeping any people in the USSR contradicts the interests of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has its own "pied noirs" whose ancestors settled on lands conquered by force and who consider those lands their own. We see them, in particular, among the USSR people's deputies. We have our own OAS people, ready for anything. We see them, in particular, in the broadcasts of USSR Gosteleradio and Leningrad television. But that is not the question. The real question is whether the Soviet Union has its own Charles de Gaulle.

Events in Lithuania Termed 'Criminal'

PM0502164691 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 3, 20-27 Jan 91 p 1

["Statement by the Moscow News Board of Directors: "Unwilling To Go, the Regime Stoops to Crime"]

[Text] Today's issue of Moscow News is printed with black borders. We are mourning the Baltic victims, but not only them. On the bloody Sunday of January 13, guns were fied at democracy. For the first time in the Soviet Union, a blow was dealt to a government freely elected by the people.

A regime in its death throes has a last-ditch stand: economic reform has been blocked, censorship of the media reinstated, brazen demagogy revived, and an open war on the Republics declared.

The attempted coup in Lithuania has been masterminded by the leadership of the Lithuanian Communist Party which is part and parcel of the CPSU. The latter stood up to defend its property in the Baltic Republics with the help of the state's institutions of force: the Army and the Interior Ministry.

The right to self-determination of all Soviet nations has been violated. The events in Lithuania can be unambiguously classified as CRIMINAL. It is a crime against one's own people to push them towards civil war. There is no need to turn the Union of fraternal nations into a fraternal cemetery to keep them together.

The situation in Vilnius is partly due to the fact that the Republic's leadership had withdrawn from the Soviet Union's democratic forces. Lithuanian people's deputies have been absent for almost a year from the USSR Supreme Soviet, a fact that could not but have negative consequences.

Today the desire for independence is growing in other Union Republics. Never before has it been clearer than now that none of them will be able to hold out on their own. Anonymous committees of national salvation like the one set up in Lithuania may any day spring up in other Baltic Republics, in Moscow, Leningrad, or Yerevan. It is crystal clear whose power these salvation committees seek to salvage.

Last Monday, speaking at the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR President and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee tried to justify their actions in Lithuania. If it hadn't been for his address, we might have demanded the resignation of Interior Minister Pugo, of Gosteleradio Chairman Kravchenko (for misinforming the nation), or of Defense Minister Marshal Yazov (for confusing the Garrison and Guard Duty Regulations with the USSR Constitution). We would have had every right to insist on an impartial investigation of the crime and on the institution of criminal proceedings against the secret members of Lithuania's national salvation committee, on charges of anticonstitutional activities.

But who will answer for what happened?

After the bloody Sunday in Vilnius, what is left of our President's favourite topics of "humane socialism", "new thinking" and the "European home"? Virtually nothing. Lithuania is more than a tragic page in the history of the USSR's internal affairs. The events in Lithuania have undermined the hopes the entire world community cherished with respect to the Soviet Union, and violated the international accords signed on behalf of the Soviet people.

The Lithuanian tragedy, however, must not fill our hearts with despair. While opposing the onslaught of dictatorship and totalitarianism, we are pinning our hopes on the leadership of other Union Republics.

We appeal to reporters and journalists: If you lack courage or opportunity to tell the truth, at least abstain from telling lies! Lies will fool no one anymore. They are evident today.

We are counting on mass protests against the antidemocratic wave inundating the Baltic Region and threatening the entire country. If sympathy and mercy are still alive in our hearts, let us declare a nationwide mourning for the victims of the Vilnius tragedy on January 20.

Members of the "Moscow News" Board of Directors:

Tengiz Abuladze, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, Aleksandr Bovin, Oleg Bogomolov, Aleksandr Borshchagovskiy, Aleksey Gelman, Igor Golembiovskiy, Ion Drutse, Mikhail Zhvanetskiy, Tatyana Zaslavskaya, Mark Zakharov, Yuriy Karyakin, Elem Klimov, Igor Klyamkin, Gennadiy Lisichin, Andrey Nuykin, Bulat Okudzhava, Nikolay Petrakov, Gavriil Popov, Yuriy Ryzhov, Lyudmila Saraskina, Sergey Stankevich, Galina Starovoytova, Vladimir Tikhonov, Svyatoslav Federov, Yuriy Chernichenko, Stanislav Shatalin, Vitaliy Shostakovskiy, Nikolay Shmelev, Aleksandr Tsipko.

Alekseyev on Legality of Baltic Actions

PM0602172291 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 4, 27 Jan-3 Feb 91 p 10

[Interview with Sergey Alekseyev, Chairman of the Committee for Constitutional Supervision, by Yegor Yakovlev; place and date not given: "The Non-Legal Aspects of the Battle"]

[Text] Yegor Yakovlev: Last week in Komsomolskaya Pravda I read a short statement signed by you about the events in Vilnius. It was stressed that you were expressing your own personal opinion. Hence my first question. You are a well-known authority on law, and also chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Constitutional Supervision, do these two authorities agree in their opinion, or do they every disagree?

Sergey Alekseyev: There's no disagreement. But still there is a difference in positions. When I speak out as an authority on law I'm motivated solely by my conscience and professional experience. However when I speak as the chairman of the committee, as the head of a collegiate body, not only my innermost conviction, but also the strict wording of the law forbids me from speaking on behalf of this body. This would be a transgression of the principles of the sake of which our committee was set up and also the norms which are directly prescribed by the law.

Now about the events in Vilnius: everything that happened there occurred beyond the framework of the law and beyond the framework of the Constitution. Whatever was committed by the Armed Forces and toe so-called Committee for National Salvation stands outside the law. Yet I am also in duty bound to see the second aspect of the events. I believe that, for all the civility of its intentions and for all its desire to give vent to understandable national interests and aspirations, the Lithuanian leadership also stepped across the brink of legality, having failed to reckon with legal realities. Today, to our heart's content, we can condemn what happened to the Baltics in 1940. Personally, I greatly sympathize with the inhabitants of these Republics and feel their pain as if it were my own. Yet dozens of years have elapsed, people have resigned themselves to what happened.

New legal relations and structures have arisen accompanied with interethnic marriages and diversified ties... Is it possible to disrupt them? Isn't this tantamount to disrupting life itself?

Ye. Ya: I also thought about this. Landsbergis, I believe, started acting as if he arrived there only a week after the Soviet armed invasion of the Baltics.

S.A.: If the situation were to be appraised concisely, I'd say that a "non-legal field" has been formed in Lithuania, giving scope for power-based, one-sided actions. These are followed by arbitrary rule, lawlessness and everything terrible which we have been departing from but are still unable to leave behind.

Ye. Ya.: Let us trace the specific violations of legality, starting with the establishment in Lithuania of the clandestine Committee for National Salvation.

S.A.: The danger stems not from the committee as such, but from its claims to power. When a public committee arrogates a function inappropriate to it, initiates the seizure of power and to a certain extent holds control over the armed forces, this alone places it outside the law, outside the Constitution.

Ye. Ya.: It is an open secret that this committee has essentially become a derivative structure of the CPL (on the CPSU's platform). How do you assess this from the standpoint of the law? On the other hand, the CPL is a contingent encouraged by the CPSU. What can be said about a party involved in the establishment of this committee, in this practice of "salvation"?

S.A.: All this is outside the frame-work of legality, as is generally the direct party leadership of the state, which is inconsistent with the constitution after the repeal of notorious Article 6. And from the standpoint of the Communist Party's interests, this amounts to a discrediting of the party—something we are feeling today as we witness the catastrophic fall of its prestige. Nevertheless, it would still be more correct to speak about political and moral responsibility. Judicial, all the more so criminal liability, on the basis of belonging to some party or social movement, amounts to phenomena from Stalinist and Hitlerite "justice". Yet here, like everywhere, prevalence must be given to personal guilt in transgressing the law—a guilt established by the court.

Ye.Ya.: The army's actions based on orders from an unconstitutional organization, the assassination of people—all this belongs to the category of criminal offences, isn't that right?

S.A.: This is a quite logical way of posing the question. I can't yet give complete legal qualification to the developments, yet it's not in doubt that this contains corpus delicti under the criminal law.

Ye.Ya.: What should the Defense Minister's responsibility be under the law if an army subunit commits unconstitutional actions?

S.A.: I think that he, too, can be made answerable. There are two variants here: either he was posted about the state of things, which entails one measure of responsibility, or else some subunits escaped his control, becoming ungovernable, but this also involves liability.

Ye.Ya.: How does a legal specialist appraise the army's capture of a state-owned radio and TV station under the pretext that the latter is carrying out anti-Soviet broadcasts?

S.A.: This initiative by the military does not in any way fit into the framework of the Constitution.

Ye.Ya.: And how does the framework of the Constitution square with the statement made by the president who, speaking after that tragic night, qualified the attack on the station in exactly this way—by saying it had carried out anti-Soviet broadcasts?

S.A.: His were political explanations, but not legal ones.

Ye.Ya.: Did the president have a right to act proceeding from political instead of legal considerations?

S.A.: I wouldn't pose the question so rigidly. In keeping with his status, the President still has a certain fredom to act as he sees fit. His activities are not regulated down to every step. Moreover, you know that the president did not act: he only motivated someone else's actions. If we are to believe the material gathered, he is not directly implicated in the Vilnius events. As to the political argumentation of developments, this is his right.

Ye.Ya.: But the motivation of particular acts and their appraisal through the lips of the president—this is already reminscent of an action. Even the president's inaction looks like action. No one was made answerable for the Tbilisi tragedy, despite the conclusions of the Surpeme Soviet's commission led by Sobchak. Don't you find that in such cases the motivation itself develops into subsequent action? For instance, if after Tbilisi, General Rodionov is promoted to the high post of Chief of the General Staff Acadey, the chief of the Vilnius garrison sees this as an unmistakable invitation: act and no harm will be done to you. The other day a leaflet appeared on the doors of MN—a committee for Russia's salvation has been set up with no less scathing demands than in Lithuania. The Latvian salvation committee has proclaimed an ultimatum. For me this amounts to the development of a definite scenario...

S.A.: All of this is very alarming. If the tragedy in Vilnius is an explosion of emotions, a one-shot episode, that's one thing. If, however, we're faced with the development of a combined scenario, then the events are more serious for the country as a whole. And they call for the adequate assessment at the highest level.

Vilnius Casualties Detailed

91UN0745A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 3, Jan 91 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Minute of Silence"]

[Text] **An attempt has been made to "solidify the Union" with the help of tanks. The following people died in the capital of Lithuania:**

Asanavichyute, Loreta, 1967; crushed by a tank, died in the Red Cross hospital.
Vaytkus, Vitautas, 1973; died of gunshot wounds.
Gerbutavichyus, Darnus, 1973; died of gunshot wounds.
Druskis, Virginius, 1969; died of gunshot wounds.
Kavalyukas, Algimantas, 1939; crushed by a tank.
Kananinskas, Alvidas, 1952; killed by an artillery shell explosion.
Masyulis, Titas, 1962; died of gunshot wounds.
Makulka, Alvidas, 1955; died of a heart failure during picketing at Independence Square.
Matsyulyavichyus, Vidas, 1966; died of gunshot wounds.
Povilaytis, Apolinares-Yuozas, 1937; died of gunshot wounds.
Shatskikh, Viktor (serviceman), 1969; died of gunshot wounds (shot in the back).
Shchimulenis, Ignas, 1973; crushed by a tank.
Yukmyavichyus, Rimantas, 1966; died of gunshot wounds.
Yankauskas, Rolandas, 1969; died of gunshot wounds.

Three hundred and thirty one people were seriously injured, 65 people are missing.

(Information of the Lithuanian Ministry of Health, as of 17 January 1991.)

Damage at Vilnius Press House Described

91UN0793A Moscow TRUD in Russian 26 Jan 91 p 2

[Report by TRUD special correspondent G. Konchyus under the rubric "Events in the Baltic": "Lithuania"]

[Text] Vilnius—Two weeks have now elapsed since assault troops occupied the Press House in Vilnius and in just minutes sent all the workers in the editorial offices and printing houses packing. Former party worker L. Bartoshevichyus has been named as the director of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee publishing house. However, the new administration has not yet succeeded in organizing the production of newspapers. Most of the workers have refused to go to work while the military are still in the building.

Since last Monday small groups of publishing house workers have been permitted to go to their work places and remove personal belongings. Eyewitnesses are saying that many things are missing. In the offices, furniture and equipment have been smashed. Workers in the TIESA editorial office are complaining that the photo laboratory has suffered most: cameras and lenses have disappeared and much of the apparatus has simply been trampled.

There are also losses at the TRUD newspaper publishing house. The teletype machine used to pass reports from the editorial office to their own correspondent has been smashed and damage has been done to the furniture in the offices of the publishing house representation. There are, however, still more serious losses. An entire print run of our new supplement—the weekly KHOZYAIN—was put together and printed in Vilnius. At the time that the assault troops entered the next issue was almost ready for printing. It was possible to remove only some of the original articles and photographs from the Press House. All the rest—the photographic film of the newspaper columns that had been prepared and other materials—remained in the printing house. Your correspondent has still been unable to go there. The armed guard standing at the doors will not talk and the telephone of the director, L. Bartoshevichyus, remains chronically silent...

On 23 January, at the request of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs also occupied the publishing house warehouse where newsprint belonging to the TRUD publishing house is stored.

Yesterday the leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee invited the editors of newspapers printed at that publishing house to visit with them. The parties agreed to renew publication of all newspapers and to set up an inventory commission. It was proposed that the matter of the spoiled property be passed to the procurator's office.

'Official Version' of Vilnius Events Mocked

LD3101165191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jan 91 p 2

["KP Investigation" by special correspondents A. Krayniy and D. Muratov: "'Goodbye, They Are Already on the Third Floor...' The Lithuanian Television Announcer Pronounced This Sentence When Paratroopers Burst Into the Studio. We Will Describe Just a Few Facts Preceding That Report"]

[Text] Vilnius—To all appearances, a dictatorship, if one comes, will start by replacing announcers.

New announcers will dispel panic and report that armored personnel carriers are patrolling the streets at the request of working people, soldiers are checking passports, savings banks are making a note of incomes in them, and the question of suspending the Law on the Press is only being discussed...

Maybe this is roughly how the Soviet variety of dictatorship is born—**dictatorship without a change of power**. Theoreticians will most likely call it "legal" and substantiate it with a law—for example, the "Regulations of the Garrison and Guard Services." And order will ensue for us. Please take into account—the authors are not cawing (so as not to hinder the cuckoos), but they will not call the events of 13 January in Lithuania a rehearsal, for it was already itself an action.

We will try to prove it.

1) A coup d'etat organized by a "group of members of the Communist Party" of the republic with the assistance of the military and the tacit consent of the center began on the night of 12-13 January (and has not yet ended).

2) The events of 13 January have nothing whatever to do with Lithuania's complex ethnic problems.

And so, the official version.

"On the evening of 12 January 1991 representatives of workers collectives in Vilnius (more than 80 people) attempted to deliver a petition to the republic Supreme Soviet, in which they demanded its resignation. However, Sajudis members...began beating them up and mocking them.

"In this connection the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee (no such organization has been registered—authors' note) decided to put to the republic radio and television workers a suggestion that they stop fueling hysteria over the air and inflaming the situation. However, that appeal was not accepted either. After that the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee decided to appeal to the worker detachments of the Vilnius City to take control of the building of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the television tower.

"To support and protect the fighters of the worker detachments against the armed guerrillas of the Territorial Protection Department (1,500 of whom had gathered in the television tower building, armed with edged weapons and firearms), the committee asked for assistance to be given to the chief of Vilnius Garrison. Such assistance was given...

"...According to some reports, 13 people died, according to others 10, with more than 130 injured..."

From an information report of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee's version practically coincides with the assessments by TASS and "Vremya," and so we will not cite them. You will see for yourselves by leafing through the newspapers. We will point just to two characteristic aspects: First, the seizure of state installations was justified by some sort of spontaneous indignation on the part of the working class; second, the whole logic of the exposition substantiates, as it were, both the legality of the Army's presence and the legality of the anonymous "National Salvation Committee," which has taken "all power into its hands."

In the opinion of Juozas Jermalavicius, member of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau and the only person in the world to have seen the committee members face to face, the people are split into a working class which advocates the integrity of the USSR and naive people who have been led into the impasse of separatism by extremists in parliament. It was precisely this people that had its decisive say under the leadership of the National Salvation Committee. We would not agree on this either. Yes, workers from large Vilnius enterprises did participate in the 8 January rally outside parliament, when a price hike by many times over had been announced. Let us note that Russians, Lithuanians, and Poles all participated in the rally, and economic demands were advanced. And the parliament rescinded its decision under pressure from **the entire people of the republic**, not just some part of them. After that **there were no mass actions by the working class**. After that a proven ploy was used—action in **the name** of the workers. The Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee maintains—for the National Salvation Committee—that the latter turned for assistance to the worker detachments. And these "detachments" forced their way to the television tower and the television center; it was precisely these detachments, according to the National Salvation Committee's claim, that were beaten up on attempting to present petitions—which served as the grounds for turning to the military and involving tanks in the conflict. This is how it was. **It certainly was not workers who constituted** the backbone of the detachments and their strike groups. According to the data at our disposal, and they are confirmed by a cassette handed to us by military journalist Igor Lymar, several officers of the local higher military school had gathered in the building of Vilnius City Communist Party Committee at 2200 13 January. Reserve officers were called in to assist them.

A Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee worker who called himself Valeriy Borisovich, a reserve colonel, was the leader of one of the assault groups. We have established that the combat detachments were supported by a special subunit of the USSR KGB Seventh Directorate for Combating Terrorism. Staffers of the Lithuanian State Territorial Protection Department undoubtedly offered resistance to the "detachments." But, of course, this organization proved powerless against the military. We should not speak of guerrillas in this case. The actions of the combat detachments were coordinated by the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee. We have managed to ascertain that even the buses which transported the "detachment members" to the television center and the television tower had been ordered in advance by the Central Committee's economic service—motor transport of the Institute of Political Science (formerly the Higher Party School) was used.

We also know from certain sources that the "shifts" of worker detachments at the installations guarded by them are bussed in from the military school.

We hope you will excuse the authors a certain "technologicalness" and abundance of details, but, in our view, facts are preferable to assessments.

We regret that we cannot explain to you the way in which workers signed the "letters from Vilnius labor collectives"—one of them bears the "signature" of 19 major enterprises. What, did they go around everyone? Did they read them out at general meetings of labor collectives? To be honest, nothing is known about this. On the other hand, we do know that the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee's duplicating equipment was used to reproduce requests to M. Gorbachev to introduce presidential rule in the republic. And they were distributed to journalists at the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Press Center.

In our view, the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee did not so much defend the interests of the working class as, let us repeat, speak in its name. We have encountered a situation where the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee has stopped playing the part of first violin but has grabbed the conductor's baton. The Central Committee did not participate, as it were, in the events—thus diverting any rebukes; but it conducted the orchestra through intermediaries—the "workers" and the "National Salvation Committee." And we will now try to show the links between that committee and the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

First, the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee's version.

"...On 11 January 1991 the Congress of Democratic Forces sent the republic Supreme Soviet the 'Ultimatum of Labor Collectives and Democratic Forces.' It demanded that it respond by agreeing to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's appeal and validating the Lithuanian SSR and USSR Constitutions on the republic's territory without delay.

"After the ultimatum expired, it was announced that the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee had been formed and had assumed concern for the future of the Lithuanian SSR..."

Then the committee repeatedly declared that it had "taken full power in the republic into its hands." Well, we heard all sorts of statements. But then something incredible happened: A committee elected by someone (under a living government!) declares that the latter has been removed and turns to the Army, which brings the troops in, and while all this is happening the committee preserves total anonymity! This is what we think: Did tanks take to the street following a call from persons unknown? Or did paratroopers obey an order from an organization which is registered nowhere? And if this is so, would it not be possible, let us assume, to order to one's house by telephone, instead of a taxi, a couple of self-propelled guns and two or three helicopters as fire support?

In general, it is impossible to take this splendid version seriously. And so, strange though it may seem, the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee is not guilty of anything. **If only because it never existed.** It is a myth. An invention. A lightning conductor. Just such a lightning conductor as the "worker" detachments.

In our opinion, the "National Salvation Committee" is a pseudonym for the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

Judge for yourselves. J. Jermalavicius, who is authorized to liaise with the committee, claimed literally until the last that he maintained contact with the National Salvation Committee through their anonymous courier but knew none of the committee members by sight. And yet the committee "was elected at the congress [of Democratic Forces]," which includes the Communist Party, and so they should, nonetheless, be "in the know," should they not? (Jermalavicius refused to acquaint us with the Central Committee's representative at the congress).

And then, there is such a strict security-pass regime at the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee that one of your authors was expelled from there by submachine gunners under the leadership of a militia major, while for the unknown courier of a secret office access there would be all the more impossible.

But these are trifles. Here are facts of a different order. An official IZVESTIYA report, evidently an oversight by TASS, named General Naudjiunas, secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, as a member of the National Salvation Committee. The general denied it, but on video tapes of the taking of the television center we saw "a civilian of military bearing" pass without hindrance from a vehicle past soldiers to the captured building. Knowledgeable people "identified" him as the general-cum-secretary...

Let us remind you that all the "committee's" statements were also disseminated directly by Central Committee Bureau Member Jermalavicius. Just a messenger? And yet the voice of the unknown person who made the "committee's" first verbal statement after the taking of the television center belonged to Juozas Juozasovich [Jermavalicius]! You have only to compare the audio cassettes which we have and this becomes clear. So what kind of mysterious "committee" is this for which it is necessary not only to distribute leaflets but also to add the sound track?

Now is the right time to recall that many statements by the "committee" mentioned the repressive measures against soldiers, Communists, and "anti-Sajudists" contained in the sinister order 009A of the Territorial Protection Department. These included the creation of secret prisons, nighttime seizures of Communist Party members, bribery of the State Automobile Inspectorate, and special brigades to neutralize dissidents. This order was first made public by two Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee secretaries on Central Television 22 November 1990. **But there never was such an order (009A).** With the help of the law-enforcement organs we succeeded in ascertaining the mechanics of its emergence.

...One evening an unknown person of some 40 years of age had dictated this order, which he himself had noted down from memory in his notebook, to a worker of one of the rayon party committees—let us call him M. After this M. had forwarded his text to the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee. From there it was made public to the whole country. No one saw the original, nor does anyone know the person who brought it, and M. somehow forgot to ask his name. Such an order does not exist in the orders book of the Territorial Protection Department. The expert assessment of the law-enforcement organs was that it was a forgery. Despite this, 009A became one of the propaganda trumps of the National Salvation Committee.

Now the last point: At our request J. Jermalavicius passed to the "committee" a note from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's correspondents asking them to telephone. The call came: "It is too early for us to speak." On 17 January J. Jermalavicius told us that in a day or two the committee would nonetheless confide in the people. The "removal of all kinds of masks" did not take place. And it will not take place. And it could not take place. Mask, do we know you?...

...But what of the Army? This time too, unfortunately, they could not manage without the Army. Obeying the National Salvation Committee's call, the Army left its barracks and went to aid the plotters. But the Army is too general a term. Pskov Division paratroopers and local internal troops were operating in the streets of Vilnius. Here is the official version of the Ministry of Defense: Major General V. Uskhopchik, garrison chief and commander of the Vilnius Motorized Rifle Division, was instilling order in the garrison. But let us agree on terminology.

We open the regulations. The "General Provisions" section, Article 1: "The military units, military educational institutions, and establishments located permanently or temporarily inside or outside a population center constitute a garrison." Need we comment on this wording? The Army is not the militia, and a city's territory proper cannot be a garrison. Otherwise this is military dictatorship.

We want not to yield to emotions but to be dry and businesslike. We will try.

And so, to continue. The internal troops who operated jointly with the paratroopers are not subordinate to the defense minister nor, consequently, in any way to Maj. Gen. V. Uskhopchik in our case. They have their own minister—Boris Karlovich Pugo, who in turn also "knew nothing."

As for the paratroopers, having come to ensure the draft, they were quite unable to aid the triumph of the Law on Compulsory Military Service. Rumors of the Pskov Division's arrival flooded the city and, as military commissariat officers told us, some draftees really did report to the draft centers, but the paratroopers did not carry out any "operations." One rayon military commissar was offered the assistance of a platoon, but he reckoned up the consequences of that action and refused it. This, in fact, was the extent of the paratroop forces' assistance in implementing the draft.

But they really did place the tower and the television center and, before that, Press House under guard.

But that is by the by. As regards Maj. Gen. Uskhopchik, he would not even be able to raise the paratroopers. The latter are directly subordinate to their own commander, the chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and the minister of defense.

We were told: The Army has been reduced to a dangerous state and taken to the limit of its patience by the discriminatory measures adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet. The USSR president told us all this. And it is the truth. The draft was essentially wrecked in Lithuania, and an abundance of verbal attacks were made: The occupiers are present illegally on the territory of a sovereign state, and we will shut off light and water. All this was undoubtedly inflaming the temperature, and yet both the television center and the television tower were seized by paratroopers from Pskov, which has been

Russian from time immemorial! The Vilnius Division stayed in its barracks. Taking the draft figures for Moscow, let us say, and finding them a little higher than the Lithuanian ones, is the entire Army now to be dispersed to the draft centers so that those who are being discharged can look for replacements for themselves?

A week would pass and the USSR president would speak in harsh terms of the inadmissibility of public organizations' appealing to the Armed Forces. But only one public organization appeals to the Army (and does so successfully every time)—the CPSU.

We do not know who issued the order to the troops, but we know what happened next. Soldiers and officers loyal to their oath seized what they had been told to seize. None of them is guilty of anything. One of us has sat at the controls of a turret-traversing mechanism and looked at the world through a slit of safety glass. You cannot see too well through it even in daylight, and hardly anything can be seen at night. The driver-mechanic, even a super experienced one, could not have seen the crowd recoil and cast Loretta, a 23-year-old girl, onto the slightly snow-covered ground. The armor is strong and, seated behind it, it is impossible to hear bones cracking beneath the caterpillar track. But whoever drove the tanks, the paratroopers fighting vehicles, and the armored personnel carriers into the streets and issued (albeit only to officers) live cartridges is undoubtedly guilty, whatever reasons gave rise to the order. As distinct from Baku, blood was shed in Vilnius only after they tried to resolve a political conflict (not an interethnic one, we will emphasize this repeatedly) with the help of submachine guns. If the Army had not been in the streets, there would have been no bloodshed.

Now a question: Why did the "party group" do all this with the support of the Army, exploiting displeasure at the price hike? For a coup must either be completed or be suppressed, but a situation of dyarchy persists in the republic. We believe that the "National Salvation Committee" had no intention of taking power (seizing the parliament and the Council of Ministers). It was necessary to push the center into establishing presidential rule. And the center evidently wanted that. Maybe bearing in mind the Russian option... Of course, the leaders of the state learned of everything, as always, "only in the morning," as was the case with both Tbilisi and Baku. In just the same way the investigation will evidently come up against an impasse, being unable to answer the question—"Who issued the order?" Such a sad certainty exists: For the investigation into the explosion at the Baku television center, where a KGB special group was operating, has also been virtually frozen...

But permit us to disbelieve this time that the country's leadership is simply "poorly informed." We know that Achalov, deputy defense minister and former commander of Airborne Troops, was in Vilnius during the days preceding 13 January. We know that the special subunit of the Seventh KGB Directorate, which included Viktor Shatskikh, who was killed, most likely, by a stray bullet, is directly subordinate to the KGB leadership. In actual fact that organization must have known with whom and why its people—whom it threw into combat and from whom it then hastened to dissociate itself—were storming the television center.

We also know perfectly well that every movement of paratroopers is reported to the Ministry of Defense, and this applies even more so when taking to the streets of a republic's capital. Not to mention the fact that every large subunit has its own "special officer" whose duties include providing information on the current situation. So it is impossible to speak of the center's noninvolvement.

The center did have grounds for this action—the rather feeble policy of the Lithuanian parliament, which had contrived without any state wisdom to anger at one go soldiers, Communist Party members, workers, and Russian-speaking citizens with its unforgivably one-sided decisions, cadre changes, and the "removal" of Prunskiene and Brazauskas from the political arena.

The Lithuanian parliament, let us repeat, gave the center undoubted grounds to exploit the political dilettantism of the young power, and the Lithuanian conflict has a chance of escalating from a republic into a union one. It is no coincidence that a massive critical strike has been mounted against Russian deputies and B. Yeltsin's position on the Baltic question. Having compromised the Baltic authorities, it is also possible to destroy politically those who supported them. We believe that in the very near future we will be gladdened by new facts of "extremism" in Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. Justifying its military interference, the center will most likely adduce new proof of the need for it—weapons, maybe, instructions from Western special services, etc. This is precisely why, despite the president's statements about the inadmissibility of various public organizations' appealing to the Army, installations are still being guarded in Lithuania.

And the final point. We have not entered into polemics with any publication, but we cannot overlook the rebuke addressed to us by the CPSU Central Committee newspaper GLASNOST. We were accused of falsifying the photograph of human legs beneath caterpillar tracks published 15 January. A staged photograph with two actors—the tank and its victim. Field journalist! [zhurnalist polevoy!] We have found the girl whose legs ended up beneath the tracks—L. Truciliauskaite. We have looked at those legs in the First Soviet Hospital in Vilnius. You go too.

"We were standing right outside the television tower when light tanks started driving around. I came running up with my girl friend, fell, and saw the tank's tube above me. Well, its gun, and it pinned down my legs. I was conscious, my right leg was cracking, and my left was badly pinned down. It was very painful, and the tank was standing there and not moving. People started yelling to the tankman, who started up the tank, and I did not know which way it would move now. The tank moved off me, and I was picked up and taken away. I have fractures in my right leg, the vessels in the left have been damaged, and the swelling is persisting. I do not know how I will walk."

But life goes on. After Lithuania they have changed our large-denomination bank notes...

Moscow Trade Unions Protest Vilnius Events

91UN0777C Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Jan 91 p 1

["Resolution of the Council of the Moscow Federation of Trade Unions on Events in Lithuania"—MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA headline]

[Text] The Council of the Moscow Federation of Trade Unions is shocked by the death of people during the events in Vilnius on 13 January 1991 and expresses its deep condolences to the families and friends of those who died. The grave violation of individual rights, including the most important of them, the right to life, is a result of the intolerable prolongation of the dispute between state authorities and political forces both at the central and republic level. We declare a firm protest against the employment of weapons in the resolution of problems of an economic and political nature.

The ambitions of political leaders and a disregard of the realities of life under a general deficiency and breakdown of the economy exacerbate the already difficult position of the workers. Their opinion is not considered in decisionmaking, but in crisis and desperate situations, both the left and the right appeal to the labor collectives.

The Council of the MFP [Moscow Federation of Trade Unions] calls on the Moscow labor collectives, member organizations, and formal and informal movements to exercise common sense, not to submit to the provocation of demagogues, and to understand that all critical problems of the country, Russia, and the city can be resolved only in an atmosphere of civic peace, by way of dialogue and a search for mutually acceptable compromises, and through strict observance of the constitutional rights of all citizens, regardless of their nationality and language.

NO—to the escalation of violence!

Russian Writers Club Condemns Use of Force

91UN0759B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 3, 23 Jan 91 p 2

[Statement by the Russian Soviet PEN-Center: "There Is No Justification"]

[Text] The Russian Soviet PEN [Poets, Playwrights, Essayists, Editors, and Novelists Club] Center resolutely condemns the use of force against a sovereign Lithuania and sincerely grieves for the victims of this punitive action.

We cannot arrive at democracy by way of blood and repression. The death of people, be it in the Baltic area or Transcaucasia, Central Asia or Moldova, cannot be justified by any considerations, no matter with whom they originate.

An attempt to take advantage of the tragedy that happened in order to restrict the freedom of the press causes our deeply felt indignation.

We demand that military interference in political processes be stopped immediately and that the organizers of crimes committed against humanity be punished. Nothing can hinder the striving of the peoples for freedom and independence.

[Signed] A. Rybakov, S. Aleshin, B. Akhmadulina, T. Bek, A. Bitov, Z. Boguslavskaya, A. Vaksberg, L. Vaneyeva, I. Vinogradov, A. Voznesenskiy, Yu. Davydov, V. Dudintsev, Ye. Yevtushenko, V. Yerofeyev, I. Zolotusskiy, L. Zorin, M. Zhvanetskiy, Al. Ivanov, N. Ivanova, A. Ivanchenko, F. Iskander, S. Kaledin, I. Kashafutdinov, A. Kim, V. Kornilov, A. Kurchatkin, S. Lipkin, I. Lisnyanskaya, V. Makanin, B. Mozhayev, Yu. Morits, V. Narbikova, V. Ognev, B. Okudzhava, Yu. Polyakov, Ye. Popov, A. Pristavkin, Ye. Rzhevskaya, M. Roshchin, Yu. Ryashentsev, Ye. Sidorov, Vl. Sokolov, Al. Tkachenko, S. Chuprinin, O. Chukhontsev, M. Shatrov, I. Shklyarevskiy, N. Shmelev, Yu. Edlis

Blame for Vilnius Events Assessed

91UN0759A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 3, 23 Jan 91 p 2

[Article by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA special correspondents Yuriy Rost and Georgiy Tselms: "A Voyage to Vilnius..."]

[Text] **THE 10 DAYS THAT HAVE NOW PASSED SINCE THESE TRAGIC EVENTS HAVE CLARIFIED LITTLE AS FAR AS THE MECHANICS OF THE SEIZURE OF A TV TOWER AND THE HOUSE OF THE PRESS ARE CONCERNED. NOT A SINGLE LEGAL ORGANIZATION HAS CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR SENSELESS CASUALTIES.**

...In Search of Lost Illusions

We would like to write about the Lithuanian events in a human, regular language because both the events themselves and official comments on them may be described as a tragic farce that is heavily flavored with fantasies (putting it mildly), or more precisely, lies.

An attempted state coup in Lithuania has not succeeded so far. Most of the populace supports its legitimately elected leadership. At present, the popularity of Landsbergis is many points higher than it was before hostilities began. If we follow a diabolical logic that is so popular in the corridors of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU) Central Committee, the hostilities play into the hands of the chairman of the Supreme Council of Lithuania. In early January his rating was lower than that of Prime Minister Prunskiene or Deputy Prime Minister Brazauskas. His rivals have now been swept away. The former adversaries in the parliament have rallied in the face of aggression. The people, the bulk of whom did not necessarily accept the reforms of Landsbergis uncritically, have now forgiven him for all of their unhappiness. Presidential rule would not have changed this situation because it is introduced for a period of time (to be sure, this might be an entire lifetime, but still it is merely a period of time). It would have merely "put on hold" the legitimately elected government for a period of time. A temporary lack of freedom would have rallied the Lithuanians and the non-Lithuanians alike, and the address for dissatisfaction with economic and political failures would have shifted from Vilnius to Moscow.

Therefore, did the events of 11-13 January benefit Landsbergis? At any rate, they did not hurt him. However, it did not occur to even the most experienced commentators who have now resurfaced from times long gone to suspect the Lithuanian leadership of an armed provocation against its own people. Many thanks for this.

Why did soldiers need the Lithuanian putsch? Has the Army gained popularity, has its combat morale improved? While constantly referring to the fact that the Army is called upon to protect our people against foreign enemies, the government nonetheless drags it into internal political conflicts. Meanwhile, the soldiers (in particular the airborne troops) have been trained to act for effect rather than persuade and seek a consensus. Sad as it may be to perceive, the soldiers themselves are a weapon that needs to be handled with care. Despite the fact that it was specifically a tank and paratrooper assault that resulted in so many casualties and fatalities, we do not want "to pin" all the blame on these people. They were carrying out a criminal order. Deceptive stories about extremist TV broadcasts and fantastic appeals from TV screens to kill communists and traitors, "Judases" to their people, were allegedly the pretext for seizing the TV and radio station. We watched several hours of recordings of broadcasts with the latest news and appeals of recent days in a row. They included appeals to resist, resist spiritually and defend the democratic system the people themselves have chosen. During the last hours of the last day, poet Marcinkevicius appeared on camera. Our reader, it is a pity that you did not hear this speech. This was an appeal for wisdom, tolerance, and perseverance. He asked the non-Lithuanians of Lithuania to forgive unintended wrongs. Also, there were the very last minutes: A confused anchorwoman who had said farewell to the viewers and did not know what else to say, and subsequently footage from a rolling camera left behind in a corridor. There were soldiers somewhat surprised by silence in the empty TV building. Nobody resisted them. They just walked and tried to open doors; later, someone noticed the camera and calmly turned it away toward a window... It would be a very mundane picture, if it were not for camouflage uniforms...

Who had the soldiers fire?

Do these events play into the hands of the president of our country who has proclaimed the path of democratization? If you look at the consequences of this insane action you will easily figure out that this would not have been very advantageous for such a president. The peoples of republics advocating sovereignty (even within the framework of a federation, confederation, or union) were put on their guard. Mistrust is a poor ally in common endeavors. Presidential power is a proclaimed dictatorship. When shipped in on the armor of tanks, such power, to put it mildly, is devoid of charm not only for those who gain it but also for those who have not claimed it so far. Indeed, shooting by paratroopers is not advantageous for a democratic president.

Let us accept the version saying that our president did not know the details, all the more so because this version worked well for him during the previous events in Tbilisi and Baku. Please, do not grin sarcastically. You know, the president himself does not work the phones and find out what is happening where. This is reported to him by people in the know. If the KGB chief himself erroneously supposes that the Lithuanians (as previously the Georgians and the Azeris) slaughtered themselves, and that there would have been more victims had it not been for the paratroopers... If, at the request of the Supreme Soviet, a very well-informed (perhaps, informed by the same KGB?) TV reporter still repeated, in error, for the entire country to hear that corpses from traffic accidents were brought to the TV tower (which looks very much like the explanation of deaths in Tbilisi by highly competent organs)... If ranking representatives of the USSR Ministry of Defense try to persuade us that they restored public order in keeping with the manuals of garrison and guard duties... how is the president to know what is actually going on in his country? Perhaps, he could change informants, but what guarantee is there that they will not deceive him even more? It is horrible how all of them confuse him! Incidentally, in the auditorium of Vilnius parliament Prunskiene told us about her last meeting with the president during which he invited the attention of the prime minister to the fact that the parliament had stopped its proceedings when he was analyzing events (this happened on the day a rally was held in front of the parliament building after a price increase, one day before Mrs. Prunskiene's government fell). However, the Supreme Council had been in regular session for several hours by then. Delaying information in terms of time is a thing fraught with consequences for state decisions.

There also are other sources that confirm that unauthentic and untimely information reaches the president. In addition, he said himself that the events in Vilnius came as a complete surprise to him. Therefore, we did not hurt the president's feelings by our supposition.

Moreover, we are quite willing to assume that the president did not plan to overthrow the legitimate authorities and replace them with a mysterious and nameless Committee for National Salvation.

This is a nice illusion.

However, we give up this illusion because we cannot make a statement on the plans of the CPSU Central Committee general secretary with such confidence. The party that has lost total power in some republics and cities is striving to regain it by force, and the CPSU Central Committee general secretary cannot but want this and show his loyalty to the ideals tried in the past...

...In Search of a Mysterious Committee

No, "a mysterious committee" is not a euphemistic term for the KGB. We cannot say anything about the KGB, and this means that it did a good job. We are talking about the Committee for National Salvation.

In recent days, not a single article from Vilnius has failed to mention this ghostly organization.

Who are the members of this invisible organ, which other committees and organizations do they represent? Besides, "was there a boy to begin with?"

The most precise answer is: It appears to us that there is no committee of any kind. However, in this case the issue arises of who called in the troops and who imposed a curfew.

This is the mystery of mysteries! The president refers to "actual dual power," but he is only able to name one power, the legitimate one. Representative of the Ministry of Defense Major General Yu. Nayman said at first that there was a document in keeping with which the paratroopers who arrived in Lithuania to help military commissariats went on a rampage. Later, when I asked him to show me this document, he fell silent, despite this being a simple question: Is the document signed, or is it anonymous? Further explanations boiled down to the Committee for National Salvation somehow asking the troops of the garrison to first gain control of television and radio broadcasting, and subsequently impose a curfew. To be sure, a version exists according to which the Army, in keeping with the manual of guard duties, decides itself where there is order and where it needs to be restored. This is gratifying.

However, let us return to the committee. It will appear with the membership needed in the event a different power enters the arena in Lithuania (instead of the legitimate one). We may assure you that this will be a quite well-organized structure. There are people even now whose faces we do not know, but who are in place and are ready to head "national accord." There also is a force capable of organizing a 300,000-strong rally with its own bulldozers, vehicles, and soldiers (without weapons?). "It is just that the force has not managed to do this yet." This force has good connections with the Army, the Soviet militia, and the KGB because the not quite depoliticized organs are being repoliticized, that is, the CPSU is regaining its positions.

Readers, there will not be any hints and conjectures regarding those who the troops are protecting by taking the hit. We heard about an organization that should seize power and "save the people" at the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU) Central Committee from a member of the Central Committee Bureau who introduced himself (read attentively) "Professor J. Jermaliavicius, representative for liaison with the Committee for National Salvation..."

In a corridor next to the press center where journalists from the Vremya program, PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and others receive their information, Jermaliavicius showed us two documents that were a signal of sorts to restore order (one of them was about "imposing a curfew").

Fortunately, few of our readers are familiar with such documents. We hope that no one has yet read an anonymous document on a curfew.

A typewritten page run off on a rotary press—and...this is the end of legitimate power?

Read it, though.

"Resolution of the Committee for National Salvation dated 13 January.

"On Imposing a Curfew in the Republic

"Taking into account an explosion of violations of public rules, loss of life, repeated use of firearms and gases, beatings of workers, and other serious crimes, the Committee for National Salvation resolves to: In the interest of safety of Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] citizens, impose a curfew in the republic from 0600 hours on 13 January, and ask the Ministry of Internal Affairs to enforce corresponding procedures: All citizens are prohibited from leaving their permanent domiciles from 2200 to 0600 hours, holding meetings, pickets, rallies, street processions, and demonstrations; keeping and using firearms and poisonous gases; using copying, radio-transmitting and receiving equipment, and audio amplifying equipment; and creating and operating in military formations of citizens not envisaged by the law; and impose special procedures for entering and leaving the city and for verifying identity documents in the places of assembly of citizens. If necessary, searches of personal effects and transportation vehicles.

[Signed] **COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SALVATION**

[Dated] Vilnius, 13 January, 0500

Now let specialists tell us: Does an informal organization not registered by anyone have a right to impose a curfew in the republic? Even if the quite registered Communist Party of Lithuania hides behind it?

Despite the fact that we do not have legal degrees, we will express our doubt as to this, as well as the fact that there is dual power in Lithuania. The parliament is working; a radio station is on the air, and TV may also somehow be pulled in. At the Communist Party of Lithuania Central Committee, they explained to us the fact that Leningrad TV came up with a response to "600 Seconds" by a button being pushed at the CIA. We do not know; we are convinced that at present the CIA has concerns other than refuting the romantic thriller of "600 Seconds." Incidentally, we do not know where the button was pushed in order to show it to the entire union. However, we also think that it was not at all at the CIA.

Article Views Western Reactions to Lithuania

PM2401103091 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 18 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by observer Aleksandr Golts under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "Are We Responsible Enough?"]

[Text] Strange as it may seem at first glance, the fact remains: As a result of the tragic events in Lithuania, what is probably one of its leaders' most cherished wishes has come true. Namely: The "Lithuanian question" has reached the highest orbits of international politics, at one point even crowding the subject of the Persian Gulf off the pages of the world press.

It must be honestly admitted that the reaction in the majority of countries was rapid and negative. They immediately attributed the bloodshed to the sending in of troops. The stormy reaction was reminiscent of the events after the regrettable incident of the downing of the South Korean airliner. Demonstrations outside Soviet embassies and other institutions abroad, demonstrations which in Poland almost turned into riots. Indignant statements by public figures, hard-hitting newspaper articles. Thus THE TIMES wrote in recent days: "Any Western aid should be stopped, and if necessary this could also apply to aid that is already on its way."

Another British newspaper, the FINANCIAL TIMES, went even further, saying that the West should review its position with regard to agreements on arms control and further disarmament. A new cold war lies ahead, the newspaper believes. Lastly, L. Gelb noted in THE NEW YORK TIMES that the next phase in Soviet-U.S. relations will be characterized by inaction, the growth of mutual misunderstandings, and the absence of breakthroughs at talks and in cooperation in general. As you can see, there is no shortage of gloomy predictions and pessimistic forecasts.

However, in most countries the official reaction was far more restrained. True, virtually all the statements by leaders of Western states have contained words like "condemning," "regret," and "serious concern" over what happened in Vilnius. At the same time U.S. President G. Bush did not omit to observe: "For some years now the USSR has been following a course of democratic, worldwide changes. And we have supported these efforts. At this time the United States and the West are redoubling their efforts to strengthen and inspire peaceful changes in the USSR." French Foreign Minister R. Dumas has persistently emphasized the need to assess the situation in the Soviet Union very cautiously. Spanish Foreign Minister F. Ordonez also called for a very careful approach. The Netherlands parliament expressed satisfaction that the European Community has decided not to resort to economic sanctions yet. And FRG Chancellor H. Kohl, in a government statement, warned directly against a "hasty condemnation of the Soviet leadership."

Of course, the situation should not be oversimplified. Our country's prestige has suffered a blow that will have certain consequences. Nonetheless I repeat: The reaction in the West was admittedly quite definite, but it was extremely restrained. Especially compared with the days of confrontation.

Why are Western government circles showing such restraint? Some people think it is because the USSR is supporting UN actions with regard to Iraq. But if those people are right, they are only partly right. The outside world has a far more serious interest in our country than that dictated by the USSR's attitude to events in the Persian Gulf. It so happened that the Vilnius events fell on the fifth anniversary of M.S. Gorbachev's Statement containing a program for the step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons and the transition to a nuclear-free world. In essence this was the first document of the new political thinking. It was here that the processes began that led to the reduction in arsenals of nuclear and conventional arms and made it possible to reach agreement on reducing armed forces and to embark on the formation of a new international order in Europe and throughout the world.

This course was derived from the paramountcy of pan-human values and demanded that in virtually any situation the solution be sought not in strength, but in political means. It was this course that pushed back our country's horizons and turned it into a friendly power for the whole world. And it was no accident that R. Dumas, while expressing concern over events in Lithuania, called on people not to forget the deeds associated with perestroyka—the withdrawal of the troops from Afghanistan, the unification of Germany, and other changes in Europe and throughout the world. The first growing shoots of the new international order proved valuable not only for the Soviet Union, but also for all our partners. They are no less interested than Moscow in developing that process.

Furthermore it is obvious to me that people in the West have no intention of promoting the collapse of the USSR. They are very well aware that our country's disintegration as a unified state will basically lead to the elimination of the existing system of international relations, especially in the military sphere. And no one wants to abandon the security acquired by such a long and difficult route.

Finally—and this is the main point, to me—it seems that foreign leaders, unlike some of my compatriots, believe that we ourselves will soon acquire the common sense to tackle our problems and find a way out of the existing situation by peaceful means, through dialogue and cooperation. Because if the threat of nuclear war hung over us all, today, perhaps, we are threatened no less forcefully by a fierce confrontation at all levels, a confrontation that ignores all arguments. And this could lead to tragedy on a scale before which everything that has happened before in the USSR will pale into insignificance. No sensible person, either here or in the West, can want that.

As for the responsibility that rests with central organs of power, it is obvious. Here one must agree with the newly appointed Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh, who noted: Of course, complete identity of internal and international law is impossible, but the same line must be followed on the basic principles—our policy must defend people's interests. Let me add: Every time those interests are violated, the Soviet Union's international prestige will suffer too.

Recent events show by no means everything depends on the stance taken by the center. The trouble is that forces and leaders who claim to pursue an independent foreign and domestic policy alike but are in no way burdened with the responsibility are emerging with increasing confidence at the forefront of society's life. What other interpretation can there be for the dozens of decisions adopted at republic level which contradict not only the constitution but also the very human rights, enshrined by the world community, for whose observance they fight so hard!

Nor is it possible not to regret that populist passions, not to put it any stronger, are being transferred to the foreign policy sphere. When actions in the international arena are designed not to resolve some problem but merely to pin more vicious labels on your political opponents in the future. Take the recent appeal to the UN secretary general from the Latvian, Lithuanian, RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], and Estonian leaders. Let me remind you that they urged him to convene "an international conference under UN auspices to settle the problem of the Baltic states." And they asked him to defer the fulfillment of "UN Resolution 678" in this connection. Much as you might like to, it is difficult to work out what link the authors of the document saw between the events in the Baltic region and the crisis in the Gulf. Furthermore I cannot accept that the authors of the appeal did not know that this resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council. And that the UN secretary general, even if he wanted to, would never be able to defer its implementation. Thus, they were simply playing at foreign policy, and the document they adopted was designed for strictly propagandist domestic consumption. Incidentally, of all foreign figures the only one to have talked about convening the Security Council because of Lithuania was D. Owen, former leader of the now disbanded British Social Democratic Party.

But who can predict the possible international consequences of RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman B.N. Yeltsin's statement of intent to create a separate Russian Army? Especially since this statement is backed up by explanations which were given to American military leaders by somebody who also appears to be a totally official personage—V. Lopatin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Public Security and Relations With the USSR Ministry of Defense and the USSR KGB. He stated outright that the republics will also take the USSR's nuclear potential under their control. If this is so, the Americans have something to rack their brains over. They should be seriously thinking about not how to reduce but how to increase their might. Because if V. Lopatin is to be believed, a dozen or so nuclear states could soon appear in Europe and Asia. Some of them with claims against each other. And given such a situation Bush should hardly be traveling to Moscow to sign a strategic offensive arms treaty. Because one of the republics might refuse to reduce its share of the nuclear arsenal.

No matter what they say, it is impossible to discern a responsible policy in such statements, try as you might. There was a time when we were prevented from pursuing an effective foreign policy by a confrontational and ideologically blinkered approach and a desire to see our own deficiencies as "intrigues by the enemy in Washington." Today a number of republic leaders are displaying precisely the same kind of blinkered approach in their desire to see "Moscow intrigues" in any problem. There was a time when we incurred material losses and risked people's lives to try to "prevail" over the United States in one area or another. Whereas now there are calls for strikes and bloodshed to "defeat Moscow."

In my view the time has come to apply the principles of the new political thinking and the ability to compromise not only in foreign policy but in domestic policy too. That is the right way. But I ask myself for the umpteenth time: Do we have enough responsibility? Not, at this stage, to lead the country to prosperity and a place in the world community worthy of its peoples. At present this is beyond us. Today we need responsibility just to survive.

Consequences of Sajudis Policies Viewed

91UN0859A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 7 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by Vitaliy Sinenko and Levon Chakhmakhchyan: "Naked in a Bed of Nettles: To What 'Sajudis' Policy Is Leading"]

[Text] Militant nationalism and all that goes with it is just one facet of the contradictions that have intensified to the utmost in Lithuania. Various forces have clashed in opposition here, the main ones being socialism and anticommunism, Soviet statehood and anti-Sovietism, and internationalism and chauvinism. There have been in society for each school a corresponding social base and people with their own goals and interests. Those same shadow economy tricksters and supporters of the bourgeois system are worried more by the problem of a change in the state system than national self-determination. The nationalism that is being stoked is merely a card in a big game. Forces of social and political revanche have surfaced and manifested themselves here against this background.

These forces proved more cohesive and organized at the elections, and although only 41.2 percent of the total electorate voted for the present parliament and it does not express the wishes of the entire population of the republic, power has been seized, nonetheless. However, the activity of these authorities, which have brought crashing down on their own people a whole number of anticonstitutional enactments and decisions, is complicated by the fact that not all—be they Lithuanians, Poles, Jews, Belorussians, or Russians—have been rushing in well-ordered obedient columns toward the bourgeois practices that are being restored. Soviet power has not been unkind to everyone, and some people remember the bourgeois past, when there were both the lash and farm laborers, some people know their history and have not lost a capacity for thinking scientifically, seeing behind the fine appeals concerning national revival merely a yoke for their people, and some people have had no desire to immediately outlaw the communists and "foreigners"....

All this is upsetting, of course, to the "Sajudists," the majority of parliament and Mr. V. Landsbergis personally. Nothing is being shunned here either—blackmail, threats, physical reprisals against dissidents. But the main weapon—and this is understood full well by all witnesses of the Vilnius tragedy—have been the mass media.

The press has been directed along a single, strictly charted anti-Soviet course. All unsuitable people have been dismissed, publications that have taken exception have been closed and people have been expelled not only from the Press Center but from the republic. Those who disagree with the Sajudists and have a different view of what his happening have been unable to object, to explain, to warn even or to beg for mercy. They have not been allowed near "their" press, television cameras, and microphones. A strict watch has been kept on this, it being well understood that power lies with those who control the mass news media.

The present outward calm in Lithuania is, in our view, deceptive. The volcano of contradictions has not abated, it is not being allowed to abate.

And it is in this atmosphere that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet has passed a decree on a general poll of the population aimed at an ultimate break with the USSR. Parliament is making haste—the atmosphere for the satisfaction of separatist aspirations could not be better—and the corresponding soil has been prepared in the public mood. But local politicians understand its fragility. People could calm down, emotions and fear would pass, and sober calculation and a capacity for comparing and analyzing would return.

The poll has hastily been scheduled for 9 February, more than a month prior to the general referendum announced by the USSR Supreme Soviet on the question of preservation of a renewed federation of republics. Yesterday USSR President M. Gorbachev deemed by his edict the poll and the attempts to declare it a "plebiscite on the future of the Lithuanian state" legally invalid. In announcing the action Lithuanian members of parliament were not about to act frontally, so to speak. The question offered the population contains no direct words about secession from the USSR. It has merely to answer "yes" or "no" to the following question: "Are you in favor of the Lithuanian state being an independent democratic republic?" Who is against this? After all, far from everyone will understand that in having voted for such solemn words and having gone to bed, he could tomorrow be waking up in an entirely different country, not the most highly developed, unfortunately, with an unpredictable future. Also remaining outside of the equation for the voter is the fact that the poll is essentially to complete a series of illegal enactments beginning with the restoration on 11 March 1990 of the 1938 bourgeois constitution, the declaration on secession from the USSR, and others in conflict with the USSR Constitution.

The events of the night of 12 January pushed aside and screened what had happened in Lithuania the day before—a multiple increase in prices, the incapacity of the republic government to ensure the normal functioning of the economy and the spontaneous explosion of public anger. "Immediately declaring the republic's independence is the same as sitting naked in a bed of nettles" is what Academician E. Vilkas said long before the price increases and the water cannon from the doors of parliament pouring hot water on the excited crowd.

The words of the leaders of "Sajudis" concerning a break with the USSR, independence and total self-sufficiency without the corresponding economic study smack of irresponsibility and recklessness. After all, political ambitions ultimately have to be paid for by the ordinary citizens, but even given their consent, belt-tightening and reconciliation with deprivations would be necessary—the republic's "divorce" from the USSR should be civilized, not to the detriment of other nations and republics.

But the picture of economic indicators of Lithuania's interterritorial relations as yet leaves much to be desired. Exports of produce to the Union republics are considerably less than imports, and this difference in world prices in 1989, what is more, constituted 3.32 billion foreign currency rubles. At the same time, however, there can be no talk of conquering the Western market; alas, commodities are imported, in the main—the excess of imports over exports constitutes 433.6 million foreign currency rubles. How, one wonders, are the bankrupt authorities in Lithuania thinking of paying off their debts to the Union community and at the expense of which part of the population will they ensure their political and, possibly, personal economic prosperity in the future?

There is as yet no answer to what will happen, in the event of separation, with the population speaking a foreign language and those who have a different viewpoint on Lithuania's future. Who will take up the protection of their rights and how?

Little time is left to the day when the country's citizens, participating in an all-Union referendum for the first time, will say whether our country will be a united, powerful organism or will disintegrate into appanage principality states. A truly fateful question in our millennial history. And chance occurrences and emotional outbursts caused by moods of the moment or stoked by the devotees and organizers of social destabilization are impermissible here. Reality shows, however, that destructive forces are shriller, more active and more decisive than those that are attempting to create and forecast the consequences of their actions.

And the consequences of the collapse of the Union could be very bitter. Here is just one problem—the position of the so-called nonindigenous nationalities. One-fourth of inhabitants of the USSR—over 70 million persons—would find themselves citizens of other states. To follow the logic of the parliaments of some republics, which, flouting commonly recognized human rights, are resorting increasingly strictly to discriminatory measures, these people would be foreigners on their native soil, which has subsequently frequently generously watered "several" generations.

This word "refugee" is eerie, particularly if it applies to one's own family, near ones, and friends. But, its human meaning aside, it also has an economic meaning, which would strike absolutely at everyone, including the fascistizing champions of territories' national purity. It is estimated that compensation outlays per working refugee would constitute approximately 56,000 rubles [R]. If it is assumed that, as a result of forced migration to Russia, just half the Russians currently living in other regions were to make the move, this would immediately sharply destabilize the whole situation and inordinately complicate the solution of many urgent social problems. After all, the unforeseen expenditure would run into hundreds of billions of rubles. Merely those on the housing list would increase from 8 million to 20 million. And what charge of enmity, grievances, and hatred would be stored up for years and centuries to come! Would posterity forgive us this?

And to what losses would the severance of the long-standing economic and cultural ties lead! Are the hopes of moving onto the foreign market alone justified? It may be said with confidence merely that no republic, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic included, is in itself in a position to make its economy so dynamic as to be comparable with developed countries. The collapse of the Union would mean also the interment of the system of international agreements in all spheres of the economy, security, human rights, the environment and information science and the burial of the peoples' hopes for peace and harmony.

We again recall Vilnius and the square in front of the Supreme Soviet building thronged with people. People appear from time to time at open, darkened windows looking down from above on the crowd bunched around posters, caricatures, and inscriptions insulting the president of the country and politicians not to its liking. Effigies in soldier's and sailor's uniform have been hung on a plain concrete wall, and passports, military ID's, and Soviet money have been stuck on the protruding iron pins here.

The forces in power in Lithuania currently have many supporters, the opposition has many also. Their differences are serious. But emerging on both sides are people who understand the kind of tragedy to which the confrontation could lead, people who have no desire to play politics but to work, go to the theater in the evening and visit friends, and tranquilly see their children off to school. And there is an emerging hope that these people will be able to extricate the republic from the crisis.

Latvia

Gorbunovs 14 Jan Appeal to People of Latvia

91UN0784B Riga BALTIYSKOYE VREMYA in Russian No 2, 14 Jan 91 p 2

[Appeal by the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia to the People of Latvia]

[Text] In the early hours of the morning of 13 January, the CPSU and militarists committed yet another bloody crime—they carried out aggression against the people of Lithuania, its Supreme Council, and its legitimate government. Peaceful citizens of Lithuania died under the tracks of Soviet tanks and bullets from the automatic weapons of Soviet paratroopers.

The victims of Lithuania and reports of anti-Soviet coups in the other Baltic States being prepared by the militarists show that in the Soviet Union the administrative command system which is in agony has resorted to the final means of its salvation—the open use of arms against peaceful citizens. The most reactionary forces, which have lost power in elections, are attempting to regain it through the use of weapons.

The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia PROCLAIMS:

—Pursuant to Article 2 of the Constitution of Latvia, the Soviets of People's Deputies embody state sovereignty. On the territory of Latvia, nobody is authorized to exercise the powers of state authorities circumventing the soviets or in parallel with them. The organizers of unlawful power structures will be tried under the law sooner or later.

—All armed formations and structures of alternative power which are not under the control of the legitimate Government of Latvia are outlawed; their instructions and orders are not to be carried out.

The Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia appeals to the people of Latvia—Latvians, Russians, Belorussians, Ukrainians, Poles, Jews—to all ethnic groups that call Latvia home:

—Obey only the laws of the Republic of Latvia, decisions of the Supreme Soviet, the legitimate government, and self-government bodies.

—Paralyze the activities of the Communist Party by all possible means; protect your families, especially children and the elderly, and your homes against all attacks by armed gangs.

A reminder: Article 13 of the Criminal Code gives us the legitimate right to defend ourselves by all means if our state and public interests, life, health, or property of the people are in danger.

Avoid instigative clashes with members of the USSR military.

—Explain to servicemen that Russia is going to be the next victim of a military dictatorship by the Communist Party.

—Collect documentary evidence—pictures and testimony regarding all crimes by the militarists and the Communist Party.

All peoples and democratic movements, unite in a struggle against resurgent Stalinism! The same verdict of all peoples that was rendered on Brown fascism in Nuremberg unavoidably awaits Red fascism!

[Signed] Anatoliy Gorbunovs, chairman of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet
Imants Daudiss, secretary of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet

Rubiks Sees Presidential Rule as 'Essential'

PM1902134391 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 9 Feb 91 p 1

[I. Karlanova report: "CPSU Central Committee Plenum: 'A Conclusion Already Tried in the Baltic...' Meeting Between A.P. Rubiks, Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and First Secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, and the Republic's Party Aktiv and Communists"]

[Text] The Latvian Communist Party is preparing for a routine Central Committee plenum. This time it will be devoted to the results of the CPSU Central Committee January (1991) Plenum and the evaluation of the present moment in Latvia. As part of the preparatory work for it, A.P. Rubiks, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, in his capacity as participant in the CPSU Central Committee plenum, intends to hold a series of meetings in primary party organizations and with the party aktiv in the republic. On 7 February he held the first two such meetings with secretaries of the primary party organizations of the Riga "Radiotekhnika" production association and with the party aktiv of the Latvian capital's Oktyabrskiy Rayon.

"The main result of the recent CPSU Central Committee plenum is, in my view, its conclusion that political forces have appeared in our country which are bent on changing the existing social system," Alfreds Petrovich stressed in particular at both meetings. "And also the conclusion which stems from that principled premise, which is that in these conditions the party sees no solution other than to accept the challenge and enter into open political struggle with those political forces. It was extremely important to state this firmly and unambiguously not only before the country but also the whole world..."

As A.P. Rubiks subsequently noted, the fundamentally new conclusion on the existence of a real opposition to Soviet power in the country found expression long before the plenum, earlier than anywhere else in the country, in the concrete sociopolitical situation which came about in the Baltic republics. The Founding Congress of Supporters of the Protection of Citizens' Rights and the Constitutions of the USSR and the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] was a landmark in the realization by Latvia's progressive forces of the impending danger to the social system. The date of that congress—20 May 1990—was no coincidence because it came immediately after the proclamation by the legislative majority in the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet of the Declaration on 4 May last year which marked the beginning of the consistent betrayal of the constitutional gains of Soviet power and the revival of the former bourgeois setup. The congress brought together under one "roof"—the Committee for the Protection of Citizens' Rights and the Constitutions of the USSR and the Latvian SSR which it elected—various sociopolitical forces which cherish the ideals of socialism, forces united in their intention to purge these ideals of all deformations but on no account to sweep them away at a stroke.

"That is the history of the birth of the united front of socialist forces for struggle against the opponents of Soviet power in spring last year, long before the present CPSU Central Committee January Plenum realized this need, and has nothing to do with the Lithuanian committee which was produced one night by certain dramatic events," A.P. Rubiks said, summing up. "It is in its real opposition that one should seek the cause of all the political speculation launched by the opposition around our committee. In particular, the opposition is trying to portray the committee as a bunch of conspirators lusting after power. In this regard the committee is being accused of adopting a political statement which declares its readiness to take over power from the Latvian legislature. I can state with the utmost responsibility on the aforementioned committee's behalf that this concerned the temporary assumption of functions of power in conditions of the obvious crisis at the 'top' caused by the policy of raising prices for foodstuffs and services because when this decision was adopted hopes were naively pinned on the experience of civilized Western countries where in similar conditions parliament resigns. The issue here was of assuming the functions of power until a new parliament is formed by democratic means. Therefore there is no reason for the committee to curtail its activity on the grounds that it has allegedly compromised itself, it has existed and will go on existing while there is a real threat to the present social system!"

The Latvian Communist Party leader backed up his words by exposing the bankruptcy of the other side's political speculation. Skillfully using the classic method of "turning the enemy's guns on himself," he reminded participants in the meeting that the anticommunist forces that are on the other side of the political struggle front and were spawned by the Latvian National Independence Movement announced rigid and unambiguous claims to power last summer long before the political statement. Alfreds Petrovich had in mind the citizens' committees which were regarded by the last convocation of the republic's legislature as anticonstitutional formations but with which the present legislature has concluded an alliance in the pursuit of a single policy thanks to the Latvian People's Front [LPF] majority. It was this metamorphosis which prompted the "Equal Rights" faction, which viewed this action as a legislative coup, to quit the legislative building.

But the LPF majority maintains that nothing has happened and that it has no intention, apparently, of satisfying the minority's demand to break up the alliance, thereby proving a commitment to the position of the republic's right-wing radical forces.

"The propaganda fuss kicked up in the West in the light of recent events in Latvia and the Baltic region as a whole is symptomatic," A.P. Rubiks went on to note. "The events in Central Asia, which were incomparable in terms of the scale of bloodshed and brutality, were essentially greeted with a deathly silence by the foreign mass media, which now however cannot stem their tirade of bogus rage at the 'Red fascism' in the Baltic. This shows once again that the Baltic card has been and will long remain a trump card for many political forces in the West. In time we shall learn who precisely financed the anti-Soviet forces in the Baltic and who directed their well organized actions.

There was a trusting exchange of opinions at both meetings on what the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee should also pay attention to in order to appreciably increase the effectiveness of the fight against the opposition. In particular, it was noted that the party underuses its mass media: It is essential to use the mass media more vigorously to show that its opponents stop at nothing to portray the forces championing the socialist choice as the enemy. Thus television broadcasters daily fabricate one piece of false evidence after another to unambiguously pin responsibility for recent terrorist actions on the special purpose militia detachment and do everything to implicate the Communist Party in this too without waiting for the appropriate investigation of them. However, such "journalistic" extremism has not been properly countered.

While admitting that the criticism was on the whole fair, Alfreds Petrovich did at the same time appeal for understanding of the difficulties which those working at the Press House are now experiencing. While the political opponents have left its premises, they have not, on the other hand, abandoned their intention to crush the morale of those who did not succumb to their appeal to boycott work at the Press House. There is a case, for example, where a young man who had agreed to work at the party publishing house was fired on when crossing the bridge. You can also imagine the feelings of women print workers who have remained loyal to the Press House when they set off for work in the morning and see one door after another of their apartments daubed... And the list of such outrages can be be long continued...

At both meetings, as if by agreement, its participants expressed a desire that the party aktiv, including its own press, be supplied more promptly with counterpropaganda information and analytical material. It has long been said, for example, that the republic parliament has adopted a host of laws which flout human rights, but one would like, in addition to such declarations, to obtain well argued material on the topic. The All-Latvian Public Salvation Committee is currently carrying out the final expert analysis of the anticonstitutional decisions of the Latvian parliament in comparison with international legal standards, after which the material which the party aktiv is waiting for will be published, came the response.

Another group of questions returned to time and again in both conference halls touched on the problem of presidential rule.

"Prior to the CPSU Central Committee January (1991) Plenum I was reluctant to see it introduced," A.P. Rubiks observed, "because I appreciated that it involves the restriction of the rights and freedoms of everyone living on the territory of Latvia, and I therefore consoled myself with the hope that it was possible to do without this extreme measure provided reason prevailed among the different social and political forces in the republic and the long-awaited concord in society arose on its basis. But as a result of my participation in the CPSU

Central Committee plenum, which afforded the opportunity to look at what is happening in Latvia from the perspective of the processes taking place in the country as a whole and the perception of them around the world I came to the conclusion that presidential rule is essential, because it is naive to suppose that the open opponents of Soviet power who appeared on the wave of perestroyka, but who existed clandestinely long before its declaration, cherishing the hope of social revenge, can be persuaded by, as it were, democratic methods to renounce their plans."

Latvia's Rubiks on Talks With Gorbachev

PM1102151191 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 29 Jan 91 pp 1, 2

[Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Press Center "abbreviated transcript" of news conference by A.P. Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee; place and date not given: "News Conference by A.P. Rubiks on the Results of M.S. Gorbachev's 22 January Meeting With Latvia's Representatives"]

[Text] Many people telephoned the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, asking about the results of the meeting which A.P. Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, and A.V. Gorbunovs, chairman of Latvia's Supreme Soviet, had with the country's President M.S. Gorbachev. A news conference given by A.P. Rubiks for Soviet and foreign journalists a few days ago was devoted to this topic.

We offer our readers an abbreviated transcript of this news conference.

A.P. Rubiks: I can understand the great interest generated by this meeting, in parallel with the numerous other meetings which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev is holding nowadays. The meeting took place on the initiative of our country's president. Comrade Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was at the meeting together with Comrade Gorbachev. The meeting's topic was the situation in the republic and the quest for ways to democratically resolve the conflicts, the quest for accord between the republic's political forces which are confronting one another. It was M.S. Gorbachev who said that the situation in the republic has led to the point where the people here are split.

Following a brief introductory speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich, Anatoliy Valerianovich Gorbunovs was the first to speak at the meeting. He attempted to shift responsibility away from the republic parliament and to single out two factors as having caused the exacerbation of the situation—the presence of a special purpose militia unit in the republic and the creation of public salvation committees. We arrived at the joint conclusion that the conflicts which occurred 20 January between the militia and a guerilla detachment, the exchange of fire in which people lost their lives, should have been avoided. But this is not the cause of the events occurring in our republic. It is rather the effect. I would name other factors as the cause of the confrontation. One such factor is the policy pursued by the majority faction in the Supreme Soviet, the faction obeying political orders by the Latvian People's Front. It is the efforts by this faction that result in the adoption of laws infringing human rights, it is its efforts that disregard any dissidence, let alone the need to study and constructively consider differing opinions. To this day, the efforts by the "Equality" [Ravnopraviye] faction to achieve the adoption of a law protecting the minority's interests in the Supreme Soviet have not been crowned with success. These efforts are rejected by the selfsame majority. This leads to dissatisfaction among the sizeable proportion of the population which elected the deputies making up the minority faction.

The second factor which creates destabilization in the republic is the fact that the USSR Constitution has been proclaimed ineffective, while the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution is effective only to the extent to which it does not run contrary to the four basic articles of the 1922 Constitution, as declared by the republic legislature in its declaration of 4 May last year. Numerous such documents are adopted, complying with neither the USSR Constitution nor the Latvian SSR Constitution; laws and resolutions are adopted proclaiming that decrees by the country's president are ineffective on Soviet Latvia's territory. This engenders not only a war of laws but also legal chaos, thus enabling forces, which have set themselves the aim of changing the social system prevailing here, to gain temporary successes as regards the republic's unconstitutional separation from the USSR. All this gets entangled with abundant sundry nationalist actions, blackmail, and political suppression of dissidence. Any actions which diverge from the Latvian People's Front actions or interpretation of events are denigrated, suppressed, and proclaimed nonmandatory as regards implementation by citizens.

Let me say this bluntly, A.V. Gorbunovs did not comment on this part of my speech. M.S. Gorbachev agreed with this appraisal, and this is evident from his 22 January statement which was published by the press and read out on Central Television. I perceive this statement as being largely a result of our meeting.

During the meeting I said that Latvia still retains the status of a Soviet republic. This was accepted by all participants in the meeting including Gorbunovs who, commenting on the question whether a given social system should prevail here or not, said that his perception of the situation does not rule out the holding of a referendum. If the referendum produces a negative result—which, in his view, would mean a decision by Latvia's people to remain within the Soviet Union—then the government should resign. I think that this statement straightaway reveals the mood of the Supreme Soviet, its chairman, and the government. In other words, what they are preaching is certainly not the socialist choice. Hence the perception of the essence of the policy pursued by them. But if, in Gorbunovs' opinion, the referendum's result is positive, the withdrawal must be effected stage by stage, by means of a review and separation of powers.

My own viewpoint on this matter is different, and it also coincides with Gorbachev's opinion. What it boils down to is this: If, as a result of a referendum, the people express a wish to have the republic withdraw from the USSR, this question must be resolved by constitutional means. It is well known that there is a law on the procedure for members' withdrawal from the federation, and it is necessary to act on the basis of this document, not via some stages and redistribution of powers.

The meeting considered the question whether the republic would be capable of extricating itself from the prevailing situation on its own, without help from other republics in the Soviet Union, including help from Moscow. Different points of view were expressed. Anatoliy Valerianovich said that this is a very tough question, because it is not clear how the republic will develop in the future and what its state system will be. Here is my point of view: Processes have gone too far, laws which infringe upon human rights are dividing the population into those who can and those who cannot do things to such an extent that we will be unable to cope on our own under the present government and the present legislature. Since we are still members of the Soviet Union and a series of law enforcement organs are union-republic organs—in other words they have their own subunits in the republic and are set up according to procedures specially instituted by the Constitution—we need help from Union organs. This help must be aimed at ensuring the effect of the USSR and Latvian SSR Constitutions and laws on Soviet Latvia's territory. All these laws must operate until a decision is made on the referendum's results, until a decision is made on amendments to the Constitution.

My point of view coincided with the opinion of the majority of meeting participants, who also believe that organizations like the Prosecutor's Office, the USSR and Latvian SSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], the court, the Board of Arbitration, and other union-republic organizations must ensure legal order, and therefore stabilize the situation.

The question whether talks between Latvia and the center are possible was also raised. It was said in this context that Latvia must first terminate the effectiveness of its 4 May 1990 declaration. And the talks should be conducted not as if with a foreign state but as with a republic belonging to the Soviet Union. I fully share this view.

As for the All-Latvian Public Salvation Committee, its activity was not specifically discussed but the following was said in rejoinders. A.V. Gorbunovs remarked that, generally speaking, such a committee does have the right to exist but it must repeal the paragraph about taking over power. This point of view was also expressed by M.S. Gorbachev. It does not run contrary to the way we in the committee perceive our position in the prevailing situation. This is a public organization which has taken on the protection of citizens' infringed rights and interests because the political parties cannot do this, and it is also beyond the Supreme Soviet as personified by the "Equality" faction. This is why people demanded the union of left-wing forces and organizations in the form of the All-Latvian Public Salvation Committee as a special form of protection for their trampled rights and interests.

I was very gratified when, at the end of the conversation with M.S. Gorbachev, everyone arrived at the unanimous opinion: It is necessary to try and set up a similar organ—something along the lines of the Public Accord Committee. Gorbunovs objected to the word "committee," and it was then agreed to let it be called the National Accord Commission. There is still no final decision, agreement was reached at discussion level that such a National Accord Commission should be ratified by the country's president, that there must be a representative of the president who would not be a member of commission but would provide liaison with the president. Since the Supreme Soviet itself does not have the heart, as the saying goes, to repeal everything that has been adopted contrary to the Constitutions of the country and the Latvian SSR and to international legal norms, this will actually be done by the new structure. There you have the main essence of the meeting, about which Anatoliy Valerianovich—judging by the video recording—kept silent when addressing the Supreme Soviet yesterday.

I must say that I felt outraged when I watched this video recording. The head of our republic demonstrated yet again how much of a "democrat" he actually is. He even felt awkward, or deemed it beneath his dignity, to say that the person sitting next to him was the leader of the Latvian Communist Party from which he has resigned. I think that this says a lot. Such behavior by a major politician hardly promises cooperation in the establishment of pluralism in the republic. Such actions benefit only those who dream of a return to the totalitarian regime, which we in our country intend to cast off along the path of perestroyka launched by M.S. Gorbachev. That regime is being more and more noticeably replaced by a different totalitarianism, maybe an even more frightening one, akin to that which people on Latvia's territory have already experienced. Just as it happened at the time of the nationalist bourgeois totalitarian regime which later evolved into a profascist one, the slogan "Down With the Communist Party!" is being promoted in Latvia today. In which other democratic country can this happen? Here it is permissible to print in large numbers and stick onto buses and walls the portraits of people who, in one case, ought to be tried on the spot and, in another case, ought to be pressured to resign from the Communist Party as quickly as possible...

The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau examined the results of our meeting with M.S. Gorbachev, agreed with the basic conclusions, and is prepared to take part in setting up the organ meant to organize public accord. It fully agreed with the conclusions made in the 22 January statement by M.S. Gorbachev, our country's president, regarding the appraisal of the situation in the Baltics and throughout the country.

We will do everything to ensure a solution to the questions raised by M.S. Gorbachev within the framework of our party's program, by democratic means, by creating different committees and, of course, by making use of the parliament.

Question: When naming the center's forces necessary for stabilizing the situation in the republic, did you also have the Army in mind? And what is your attitude toward presidential rule?

A.P. Rubiks: First, I did not talk about the center's forces. I listed the law enforcement organs under union-republic jurisdiction, having in mind their coordinated actions as the center's assistance to stabilize the situation here. There was no talk about the Army.

As for presidential rule, I believe that everyone will be hurt by such a measure. This is because certain freedoms will be infringed upon and sundry activities will be restricted for everyone. Regardless of the party to which you belong, your nationality, and so on. This is, therefore, an extreme measure. If all the means are exhausted and nothing more can be done to prevent bloodshed and clashes between people, there is need for a strict regime in the form of presidential rule.

Question: We are aware of your involvement in the creation of the All-Latvian Public Salvation Committee. Is this not an attempt by the Communist Party, as represented by you, to exact revenge following its losses at the last elections to the Supreme Soviet and local soviets?

A.P. Rubiks: It was not I who created the committee. I came to head it as a result of the election of chairman from among many candidates, which took place at the constituent congress on 20 May last year. The committee has now been renamed and its leadership has been changed.

Why did the Latvian Communist Party lose the elections? In order to answer this question we have to turn time and again to the situation in which these elections were held, when the Constitution was being unprecedentedly breached. At the first sitting of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, our Deputy Alksnis publicized facts testifying to the weighted election of deputies in different districts. For example, my own electoral district had 127,000 voters while many of my colleagues in other districts had between 20,000 and 25,000. It was in those districts, with 20,000 and 25,000 voters, that the People's Front put forward its candidates. This was how the People's Front majority in parliament was secured. At the time when the election campaign began, the party was in quite a dispirited state because perestroyka had been under way for several years already and the party was being blamed for all the sins of the past, including those which had nothing to do with it. The people believed that a society that was far from perfect would be replaced by a different, a civilized one, that bureaucratic rule would yield to democratic rule. This is how the People's Front came to power at the expense of the Latvian Communist Party.

When the minority "Equality" faction was formed in the legislature, we expected that a dialogue would be conducted and questions would be resolved democratically, via talks. After all, the Latvian Communist Party also advocates that the Union is no longer suitable in its past form, when management was conducted from the center and all initiative was stifled. But communist deputies never advocated an immediate separation from the Soviet Union, they never advocated the building of a nondemocratic society here. And what do we see today? A system that is far from democratic is rising from the ruins of perestroyka. A system which intends to live according to laws which infringe people's rights.

And people whose rights are being infringed upon, when they perceive this happening, themselves unite in sundry similar organizations. This is how the veterans united, because they are perturbed by the lack of housing being built, by the shortage of stores where they could buy the products they need, by the fact that their pensions are small and prices are rising. Members of the Army community have united, having declared—beyond the barrack compounds and the boundaries of places where units are stationed—their dissatisfaction with the fact that their families' elementary rights to housing, acquisition of foodstuffs in stores, and receipt of medical assistance are being trampled. People have united within the International Front of Working People, including many who had initially joined the Latvian People's Front, when they realized that the Latvian People's Front protects the interests of the Lettish population alone, and when its slogans started openly proclaiming "Latvia for the Letts" and "The Nation's Rights are Superior to Human Rights." This was the logical origin of the International Front, upholding the interests of those who are not native Latvian speakers and comprise 48 percent of the republic's population.

The People's Front also united under its wings the Movement for Latvia's National Independence and other political groups, right up to political parties like the social democratic ones, for example.

And the second bloc of political forces, with the Latvian Communist Party a part of it, united within a different movement since they found themselves without their own legislature. After all, the legislature is unwilling to listen to this movement's representatives and they cannot achieve what their voters wish. This was how a form like the Public Salvation Committee was chosen.

Under the Latvian SSR and the USSR Constitutions, there is no ban on union within various organizations, there is no ban on criticizing the government, and so on. There is, however, a ban on calls for violent methods to overthrow the authorities. If the Public Salvation Committee's Political Statement had said that we called upon the Army and the MVD to join our ranks and march to overthrow the authorities, we could have been locked up.

Question: But the committee proclaimed that it was taking over power from the present political structures?

A.P. Rubiks: I perceive nothing unlawful here. Declarations can be made. In the same way as free Latvia was declared by a parliamentary majority on 4 May last year, even though the current Constitution does not allow this. The declaration of the committee's taking power is not a violent call, it is a temporary political slogan and, if a Public Accord Commission is created, you can take it that our form has proved viable and has gained victory. The commission will be above the legislature and the government and will ensure legislative compliance.

Question: How do you envisage Moscow's control over events in Latvia?

A.P. Rubiks: Let me repeat once more: Moscow has nothing to control. It must ensure that the appropriate law enforcement institutions are operational. How? At least in the way that the Prosecutor's Office and MVD of the country have taken on the investigation of events involving the exchange of fire here. Otherwise there can be no objective investigation. The Public Accord Commission ought to investigate as a more neutral and higher-ranking organ exercising greater powers, it has been brought about by the need to ensure that the USSR and Latvian SSR Constitutions are in force here.

Question: Do you believe that the situation can be normalized with help from the accord commission? Is this not yet another betrayal of the dissidents' interests by Moscow, at a time when they are expecting more resolute actions?

A.P. Rubiks: I assume that, to a certain extant, it offers us a chance which we must not miss. If time were to prove that this is another ineffective measure, the we would have to think of more forceful methods of coercion [boleye silnykh metodakh prinuzhdeniya]. Presidential rule, in other words. In order not to resort to that, everyone must realize that we have to live together. It is necessary to abandon political ambitions, there must be greater tolerance toward each other. For the time being, we respect other people's views only in words. Your views might be excellent—but you won't appear on television, you'll be torn apart on radio... Therefore I do not believe, nor have I ever believed, that Moscow would betray the interests of the majority of the republic's population. Moscow is offering a fresh opportunity to normalize interethnic relations by truly democratic means.

Latvian Foreign Minister Expects Dictatorship

AU0502125791 Berlin NEUE ZEIT in German 30 Jan 91 p 4

[Interview with Latvian Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans by Malte Zeeck in Bonn; date not given: "Protect Gorbachev From His Military"]

[Text] [Zeeck] Mr. Minister, in Bonn you had talks with Willy Brandt, chairman of the Socialist International; Otto Count Lambsdorff, chairman of the Free Democratic Party of Germany; Alfred Dregger, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union Bundestag group; and with your German counterpart Hans-Dietrich Genscher. What is the result of your talks in Bonn?

[Jurkans] I am glad to be able to say that in Bonn I learned that German politicians do not consider the events in the Baltic states as just a domestic affair of the Soviet Union but as an international problem, which should be solved at the international level. The Germans and their politicians understand very well that this is not an attempt to oppress nationalists in the Baltic states. This is an attempt to destroy the process of democratization in the Baltic states, in the entire Soviet Union, and in all of Europe. This is the reason why Western politicians are now willing to consider it to be an international matter, which is to be settled both in political and in economic terms. This is how the issue is generally seen in Bonn today.

[Zeeck] What demands do you have of West European states and Germany? How can these states support the independence movements in the three Baltic states?

[Jurkans] If the European states support the independence movements in the Baltic states—which are the moving force in the entire Soviet Union—then they help Gorbachev, because today Gorbachev is a puppet in the hands of the militarists. If the West suspends or cuts back economic and financial aid for the Soviet Union, this may make Gorbachev argue with the militarists that the West takes the events in the Baltic states seriously. The West has not permitted itself to be distracted by the Gulf conflict, but realizes that the Baltic crisis is equally serious—if not more serious. Therefore, we have to stop this bloodshed. If we do not do that—Gorbachev can argue—then we will not get any further aid from the West, and without this aid we will not be able to overcome our serious economic difficulties.

[Zeeck] Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev has stated that he learned about the violent acts in Latvia and Lithuania only after the event. Is this credible?

[Jurkans] What is happening in the Baltic states is a planned pattern, worked out and controlled by Moscow. When Gorbachev said that he did not know anything about the excesses committed by the Black Berets, he was either not informed or was misinformed, or it shows that he does not have developments under control. If a state president does not have things under control, he cannot be a state president. Another thing is that the events that followed the military interventions, the bloody deeds in the Baltic states, show that this was calculated, this was part of the plan. They did not stop this but they continue it with other means and with other tactics. The final goal of these efforts is to overthrow the democratically elected governments, because they want to crush democracy and to return to the system that led the country to political and economic collapse.

[Zeeck] In view of the current circumstances and developments in the Baltic states, what do you think of a summit meeting between the presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union?

[Jurkans] For politicians it is very important to meet and to talk to each other. It is one thing to impose sanctions or to suspend aid, but there must always be room for negotiations and talks. Therefore, I believe that, if President Bush has the time and a date can be agreed upon, they should meet and negotiate. I am not in a position to give advice to others or to propose time limits. I think that they have to negotiate and the earlier they do so the better; it is the business of the two statesmen to decide when and where they will meet.

[Zeeck] How much time do you think that the three Baltic states have to develop? Here there is concern that the difficulties for the Baltic states are steadily increasing and that the liberal mood, which might have dominated in the summer of 1990, is over.

[Jurkans] You should have seen the enormous demonstrations after the bloody Sunday in Vilnius and Riga. There the people gathered to support their freely elected governments, although these governments had meanwhile raised prices. About 700,000 Latvians and people who live in Latvia gathered to support the democratic government. These people will never give up their hope to achieve independence. The military interventions and the bloody deeds mobilize the people to strive for their goals with even more energy and give us the conviction that we have the right goal in wanting to live in an independent state, because we have nothing to do with this dictatorship. As regards our expectations for the future, we fear that we are facing dictatorship. My prediction is that this will be the case in the near future. Yes, dictatorship is just around the corner.

[Zeeck] In the entire Soviet Union?

[Jurkans] I assume that things will start in the Baltic states, because we have always been at the head of the process of democratization. One has to wait and see what will happen later, but there is a trend toward crushing democracy, and this is the case in the entire Soviet Union.

[Zeeck] Do you still see a chance to avert this process? Or is it an unavoidable trend that we all in the Soviet Union are moving toward a military dictatorship?

[Jurkans] If the democratic forces in the Soviet Union were considerably stronger than they are and, above all, considerably better organized and if, at the same time, Western aid were to be given generally quickly and effectively, then one could prevent bloody deeds, but I do not believe that they could save us from dictatorship. Things will get worse before they will get better.

[Zeeck] When will this development have reached its climax?

[Jurkans] Well, this is still ahead of us, but it will happen soon.

Communists Call for Government Resignation

PM0102144191 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 17 Jan 91 p 1

["Resolution of Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum on Situation in Republic and Actions of Latvian Communist Party To Restore Constitutional Procedure in Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum notes that the policy pursued by the republic Supreme Soviet and the government it formed has brought Latvia to political crisis and economic chaos. Antipeople and anticonstitutional decisions flagrantly violating human rights have caused critical opposition in society which threatens the maintenance of civil peace. The republic's present leadership is exacerbating the situation all the more by its latest actions, has lost control over the development of events, and is seeking to shift responsibility onto the parliamentary opposition and the Latvian Communist Party.

With the aim of preventing tragic sociopolitical conflict in the republic the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum resolves:

1. To support the demand of the strike committees and assemblies of labor collectives for the dissolution of the republic Supreme Soviet and all local soviets, the resignation of the government, and the calling of early elections.

Party committees are to begin preparing for early elections of soviets at all levels.

2. To support the demand of strike committees and numerous labor collectives for the repeal of laws and resolutions adopted by the Supreme Soviet and government which are not in accord with the USSR Constitution, the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution, and decrees of the USSR president.

3. To demand suspension of the execution of the Latvian Council of Ministers' resolution raising retail prices for goods and services until the adoption of a law on indexing the population's current income and compensating inhabitants for the cost of living increase, and on protecting the labor market.

4. To demand that the All-Latvian Social Salvation Committee assume the full responsibility of state power and government in the republic until the election of a new Supreme Soviet if the Latvian Supreme Soviet refuses to dissolve itself and the republic government refuses to resign.

5. To support the demand of numerous public organizations and labor collectives for the introduction of presidential rule on the territory of the Latvian SSR. To submit this proposal to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev.

6. To support the proposal of the strike committees to hold a general political strike. Party gorkoms [city party committees] and raykoms [rayon party committees] are to assist the strike committees.

7. To demand the immediate dissolution of the "Aizsarg" organization [name of prerevolutionary Latvian paramilitary], guardians of order, and other formations in accordance with the USSR President's Decree of 25 July 1990.

8. Rayon and city committees and primary organizations of the Latvian Communist Party are to send the best-trained and staunchest communists to work in the Social Salvation Committee.

9. All communists are to carry out organizational, information, and propaganda work to prepare and carry out referendums on land and the Union treaty in accordance with the decisions of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress and the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

10. To secure access to 50 percent of television and radio airtime in official, political, and news broadcasts.

11. To condemn the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium Statement of 12 January 1991 and the speech by Russian Supreme Soviet Chairman B. Yeltsin as one-sided and detrimental to the development of the political processes of democratization in the Baltic and the country.

12. To accept Latvian Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Gorbunov's proposal for talks with him on 14 January 1991. The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee representatives authorized by the plenum are to be guided at the talks by the present resolution.

Riga Gorkom's Klaucens Views Latvia Tensions

PM2801165791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Jan 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with A. Klaucens, first secretary of the Riga Latvian Communist Party Gorkom, by special correspondent A. Orlov—place and date of interview not given: "Common Sense Must Prevail"]

[Text] The old-town quarters of Riga are still surrounded by the same concrete barricades and steel mesh barriers. There are the now habitual groups of people sitting around bonfires. Home-made placards brand the "occupation" Army and the special purpose militia detachment and do not even spare the president. I saw all this as I went to meet A. Klaucens, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and first secretary of the Riga Latvian Communist Party Gorkom [City Committee].

[Orlov] Arnold Petrovich, you only have to walk around the city to realize that it is not easy for the Latvian Communist Party. It is being accused of all mortal sins. What is now the most important thing for the Latvian Communist Party? What is the "task" of the moment?

[Klaucens] You are right, conditions are complex. Extreme. The only thing is that perhaps the slander against us does not sound as spiteful as it did a while back. The situation here is gradually changing. The main object of attacks in Riga is now the special purpose militia detachment; and the party is "attacked" through that. But it seems to me that the republic party organization is now in a more positive situation than some other republic party organizations. I also have in mind the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party. We have survived the period of disorder and vacillation when an attempt was being made to unite what cannot be united, when there were even people in the party who expressed anti-communist views. Now the Communist Party has made it clear where it stands. A clear action program has been elaborated and in my opinion clarity in program statements and in actions will enable us to gradually not just gain new experience in work, but also to regain our prestige among the people.

The tasks of the day stem from the situation in Latvia. The main one of these is how to counteract the campaign of lies and slander with which the population is being assailed. Attention is centering on the tragic events that took lives of people who were for the most part not to blame for anything. These events were clearly provoked. I have in mind the shooting on the night of 20-21 January and, before that, the death of the driver of a vehicle. Now the mass media are presenting this as the action of evil forces of "bandits," which they are trying to call the special purpose militia unit. Our channels are the party press, which has also gone through a difficult time, the "Sodruzhestvo" radio station, and meetings with working people. For instance, after the events of that memorable night, we gathered the city's party aktiv in the morning and informed it of what had happened, a video film was shown, and evidence from the thugs detained by the special purpose militia detachments was heard. This, more than anything, puts everything in place.

[Orlov] In this complex situation, you get the impression when the tension is at its highest that some people will now get involved in actions against the communists. Or are these impressions groundless?

[Klaucens] Let us judge by the development of events in Lithuania. In general the "scenario" is the same: There it also started with threats, and now there are direct attacks on communists. We can expect this too. It is now particularly difficult for communists in the countryside. For instance, in a rayon where there are 200-300 communists and the Latvian People's Front's positions are very active and Aizsargi [members of paramilitary organization] are operating, and given the weapons that are around in the republic, you need a great deal of courage to work. Unfortunately not everyone can stand it. Among others, A. Kaults, chairman of the "Adazhi" kolkhoz, has announced his departure from the party... We are continuously being threatened. I am included among those "whose days are numbered."

[Orlov] By whom and how have you been condemned?

[Klaucens] Among the papers that the special purpose militia detachment confiscated from the thugs in the "Latvia" minibus there is a document that clearly shows the system for the shadowing and "isolation" of around 30 people. The documents are now in the Latvian prosecutor's office. In these documents all of us have our owncode names, nicknames. There are also actions coded for X hour there.

[Orlov] What is your password?

[Klaucens] For some reason, "lakstigala." This means swallow.

[Orlov] Do you have any protection?

[Klaucens] No. And anyway that is not really the point. We have thousands of activists in Riga and our deputies from the rayon and city soviets and the Supreme Soviet are always in the public eye. Deputy S. Dimonis, chairman of the "Equal Rights" faction, among others, has already been attacked. This happened last week when he was leaving the Latvian Supreme Soviet building. Luckily, he was all right...

In a word, if it were not for the moral support of labor collectives, it would be impossible to work. We do have this support. Here is an example. We only lost the last elections in one district—and there were city soviet elections in two districts, rayon soviet elections in four districts, and Supreme Soviet elections in one district. That means that the communists' rating is high and the people have started to understand who represents what.

[Orlov] How has the pressure on the Latvian Communist Party affected its ethnic makeup and its numerical strength?

[Klaucens] Before, when the party split, people yelled at us that the party would be mono-ethnic. I would like to say that this has not happened in reality. For instance, whereas we had around 75,000 communists in the city party organization, there are now 61,000. Whereas around 24 percent were Latvians, now 21 percent are. The ethnic balance in the city, you know, is such that most of the population is nonindigenous. So that this mono-ethnic "idea" fell apart too. The interests of a working person are the same regardless of whether he is Latvian or non-Latvian...

[Orlov] Today attention in the Baltic republics is centered on the Army. But in Latvia, apparently, the situation concerning the Army is slightly different from in Lithuania.

[Klaucens] The tactics of the People's Front and the republic's leading organs have changed here recently. Perceiving the situation and no doubt analyzing various options, they arrived at the opinion that pressure on the Army must now be reduced. For instance, the Supreme Soviet resolution dated 14 November has been suspended. Although events have reached such a point that in my opinion the situation is irreversible. Another military unit was fired at during the night of 21-22 January. And there were similar incidents during all the preceding nights. These cases are not being particularly publicized now, since the events concerning the special purpose militia detachment and fights in the city center have overshadowed everything. In this situation the military units are observing clear neutrality.

[Orlov] And how would you answer the assertion that the Communist Party has only preserved its influence and only exists at all because of the Army?

[Klaucens] I consider this assertion to be absolutely unfounded. Of course we have ties with communists in military collectives, but this is not where our strength lies. It lies in the fact that today the party is the only real force that stands for the protection of the interests of the working people and the republic's inhabitants.

[Orlov] Can the Latvian communists now defend people's rights, their own positions, and soviet power without presidential rule?

[Klaucens] If common sense does not prevail in the situation we are in today, if we do not find a point of contact between all the forces involved in the confrontation and a real threat of the mass killing of people arises, a threat of civil war, then where are we heading? Then I cannot envisage anything apart from a state of emergency or presidential rule. I think that the task now involves finding a compromise, a way out of this very dangerous crisis. Common sense must prevail.

[Orlov] Arnold Petrovich, there is as much talk in the republic about Russia as there is about Latvia's affairs. The progress of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet session which dealt with the tragedies in Lithuania and Latvia is being discussed.

[Klaucens] Last week a group of deputies from the Moscow City Soviet were in Riga. We spoke to them. What was it that struck me, and not me alone? They came, as they put it, to study the situation. But they brought with them a Moscow City Soviet decision in which assessments had already been made. This is how I understand it: If the Moscow City Soviet wants to adopt some kind of decision on a subject it is not familiar with, it should first of all come and study the state of affairs. But they did not consult our city soviet. This seems to be symptomatic when our questioned is being answered. It is immediately obvious from what angle people approach our problems. And listening to Boris Yeltsin's address and the addresses of a number of deputies at the session, I thought that the events in the Baltic republics are being used to somehow inflame the situation in Moscow, in Leningrad, in Russia. It seemed to me that everything that is happening here is being used to suppress people who think differently, to achieve individual political aims, and primarily to oppose Gorbachev. This is rocking the common boat when it is already leaking. This is placing everything on the brink of a new and immense disaster.

[Orlov] And what is stabilizing the situation in the republic?

[Klaucens] Certainly not the attempts to hold strikes in Moscow, Leningrad, the Kuzbass, and other places. And we are not being helped by rallies against the center. We are realists and we continue to talk about the Union, the Union Treaty, and about the fact that we need to strengthen this Union, without which no one can survive. And the people who support these values are primarily supporting Latvia.

Two Views on OMON Blame for Riga Events

91UN0777A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 4, Jan 91 p 3

[Article by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent V. Savichev: "OMON Conducts Crackdown"]

[Text] Riga—**After the Republic's MVD building was attacked and seized on the night of 19 to 20 January, subunits of the OMON [Special Purpose Militia Unit], whose forces conducted these actions, became the main character in the events that occurred in the Latvian capital of Riga.**

NOTE: The Riga City OMON numbers about 100 troopers—in the past these were the best trained employees of the Latvian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]. It was established about two years ago to fight organized crime. It uncovered about 60 murders. About a year ago, it was removed from under the Latvian MVD and subordinated directly to the USSR MVD. On the basis of the detachment, the cooperative "Viking" was organized—it does not exist today—which, according to agreements, guarded buildings and establishments that belonged primarily to the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party. The command authorities of the unit hold a position close to the position of the so-called All-Latvian Committee for Public Salvation, whose leaders, as is now known, are the leaders of the Communist Party of Latvia.

Executives of the USSR Procuracy and the MVD have arrived in Riga, and definitive findings will be made after an investigation is concluded. The investigation should give the final answer to the overriding question: What forces are destabilizing the situation in Latvia? For the time being, only the versions put forth by the different sides can be talked about.

As is known, during the conduct of the operation, four persons died and 10 persons were injured, among whom were journalists and civilians who were witness to the events, and employees of the Latvian MVD who tried to prevent the seizure of the ministry. The commanders attribute the absence of casualties on the part of the OMON to their high professional skill.

Replying to questions of journalists, J. Skrastins, the procurator general of the republic, emphasized that the indicated tragic events were not an accident.

The investigation, which is now being conducted by republic organs of the procuracy and the KGB, has just started, and it is early to talk about results. However, there is reliable information that, up to and after the actions executed by OMON members, their subunit spent a rather long time at the building of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. The investigation should clarify whether this was a coincidence.

On those days, a delegation of the Leningrad Soviet of People's Deputies was in Riga. The head of the delegation was A. Sungurov—one of the many witnesses of what occurred—who visited the location of the OMON subunit and talked with its troopers.

"The meeting," says A. Sungurov, "left me with a distressing impression. These are young lads who, it seems, today do not believe in anyone and anything, other than that they are on the last line of defense of socialism, facing the national fascism that has seized Latvia. We met the troopers at the moment when so-called party political work was being conducted with them. Several officers from the political academy were talking with them, and also about a dozen women, from all appearances, representatives of the army community who assured the troopers that they are their only defenders.

"The personnel were fully armed, and, as it became clear afterwards, they had not slept for several nights, expecting an assault on their base. I tried to talk to them to explain the root cause of what is happening in the republic, but the political instructor interrupted me and told everyone to leave.

"I feel sorry for these boys—they have been in a state of psychological exhaustion for a long time: They are threatened, and they are shot at. Information is being disseminated continuously that they are being provoked. But, take notice of this: As far as I know, they do not have one casualty. But where they appear, there are criminals everywhere.

"It is absolutely obvious at the present time that the OMON got out of some kind of control. I cannot characterize the action taken in the seizure of the MVD as anything but banditry, even taking into account that this was a reaction for some kind of action with respect to their relatives."

USSR Deputies Assess Situation in Riga

91UN0794A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Untitled interview with USSR People's Deputies A. Denisov, Yu. Gninenko, and S. Shuvalov at the IZVESTIYA editorial office upon their return from a Latvian trip from 17 to 20 January, by S. Chugayev and V. Shchepotkin]

[Text] [IZVESTIYA] What did you see when you arrived in Riga? What is the situation in the Latvian capital?

[Shuvalov] We are accustomed to seeing Riga's pretty silhouette. Suddenly now, as we approached the old town, we saw K-700 tractors and heavy vehicles with noncity registration numbers, all from the rural areas. There were trailers loaded with reinforced concrete spans, panels designated for housing construction... This is what confronted us upon our arrival.

[Gninenko] It is a city with a thousand-year-old history. And here you see bonfires, smoke, soot, but the main thing is—all of this is window dressing. If there were any sense in protection, that would be one thing—but this is done only to stir up hysteria. From morning on around the bonfires you see tea and eggs, they deliver bread and butter. Then towards evening the drunks start appearing.

[Shuvalov] And another thing in the backdrop—there are lists hanging in the old town of whom to exterminate. First among them are the names of communists, as if they were the chief culprits with respect to what is going on.

[IZVESTIYA] Suggestions are appearing in the mass media to the effect that this is the work of those same communists, people from the Committee for Public Salvation.

[Denisov] Generally speaking, the people on that committee are deadly serious. It seems to me they are just not crafty. Perhaps they take themselves more seriously than they should. However, I do not think they are scoundrels—no, these are honest people.

[Gninenko] We have the impression that society is split, and each side hears only what it wants to hear. But if you want to understand one another, if you want a constructive dialogue, you must meet each other half way. Now some of the people want to chop up the mess, but it must be untangled.

[IZVESTIYA] Conversation today centers around recent events, events of recent days and weeks. Or they talk about events half a century old. As if to say that the roots of the tension we see today spring either from way back or from recent days. But we can recall the election campaign and the flow of letters from the Baltic republics, including Latvia, on violations of the electoral law—when the size of electoral districts was consciously distorted. As a result, fewer deputies from the city electorate would wind up in the highest organs of power than from the same number of rural electorate. But a third of the population lives in Riga—and a significant portion are Russian-speaking, whereas the population in the rural regions is of the indigenous nationality. We all remember when the question was raised at the First USSR Congress of People's Deputies regarding a serious assessment of such elections. But at that time neither the country's leaders nor the press fell in line behind the USSR Constitution and existing laws at the very outset to nullify the elections, and therefore the blame for this must today be placed upon those who could have taken measures, but did not do so.

[Shuvalov] True. When you violate the law, the Constitution, just one time, a chain reaction begins. People begin putting the blame on others—well, you violated the law, why can't I?

[Denisov] The law cannot satisfy everybody completely—it is a certain middle line, a consensus of society. Therefore, attempts to make exceptions for those who find the present law inconvenient lead to massive lawlessness. The law must be unswervingly obeyed. And we mean the law currently in effect. And if it does not suit some portion of society? That is entirely possible, but you must strive to change it through constitutional means. Today, in general, we see a great laxness with respect to the law. We relate to it thus: If I like it, we execute it; if I do not, we do not. One can really sense this in Latvia. When it is convenient to use Union law, they use it. When it is more convenient to use republic law—which contradicts Union law—they use that. But what kind of way is that to live? That is strife, anarchy.

[Gninenko] Struggle must be accomplished to change the law, but not as this took place some time ago, when deputies from the Baltic republics demonstratively decided not to attend the Union parliament.

[Denisov] This is very effective. But it leads not to accord, not to seeking a compromise suitable for all, but to a loss of the last points of contact. This is what is taking place in the Latvian parliament.

[Gninenko] When I was in Riga, I constantly got the impression that they allowed us to speak, but no mention was made of the fact that it is also important to listen. Unfortunately, I perceived no desire to listen—on the part of either side.

[Denisov] In essence, we see there the opposition of two equal forces. One gets the impression that these forces—let me for the sake of brevity call them separatist forces, although there are various shades here, and forces favoring integration into the Union—are often divided on ethnic grounds, but far from precisely. No matter who we met—and there were many meetings—we saw mixed groupings everywhere. I would even say that the opposing sides were of diverse ethnic composition. It is precisely this circumstance that compels you to think that compromise is not only possible—it is simply necessary! And you see some interesting things there in this regard. An exchange of positions and slogans of the two opposing forces has taken place, for example. At first the People's Front, as you recall, proceeded—as we all did—under democratic slogans, and it enjoyed the support of the Latvian as well as Russian population. Separatist sentiments were even shared by many in this regard. There was a high standard of living, the promise of freedom, democratic rights, etc. They came to power on this wave in a relatively democratic fashion, if you disregard the violations we spoke about earlier. But the fact is that, like many of our democrats, when they come to power they turn out in actuality to have no substance. Both the Latvian and Russian populations have begun leaving the People's Front, and in order to retain them the Front has espoused nationalist positions. At the same time, social conditions have changed sharply, the standard of living has dropped, and the government has increased prices. The Communist Party—which earlier attempted to split off the Russian-speaking population from the People's Front on nationality grounds, because in struggling against Latvian nationalism it was essentially stirring up Russian nationalism—has now taken up purely social positions, defending the interests of the workers, for whom things are difficult indeed, and of the Russian-speaking leadership who are threatened with universal replacement because they do not know the language. In this fashion, the Communist Party has shifted over to those positions formerly espoused by the People's Front, and the People's Front is now stirring itself up with nationalism.

[IZVESTIYA] You say that the opposing forces in Latvia are approximately equal. How are these forces reflected in the press?

[Denisov] Here is the most alarming question, we can say. One clearly observes a skewing in favor of the People's Front in the mass media. This is true of the local and central press, as well as of the foreign mass media, whose representatives we saw in Latvia. It is not just that they sympathize with the People's Front—their sympathies are their personal business—but they are acting unjustly. Their prejudice is entirely manifest.

[Shuvalov] And something else is alarming here. The chief goal of the mass media in Latvia is to assert priority of national values over common human values. But in any democratic society such goals are sharply rebuffed. Just try to state somewhere that the rights of Russians, for example, or of Ukrainians, of French or British, are higher than the human rights of another nationality. A storm of protest would arise. That is what should be happening here.

[Denisov] In addition to everything else, we are compelled to stress at all press conferences that this ill-fated OMON [Special Missions Militia Unit] is itself the product of the Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Union did not send anything there. The Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs created this unit out of Riga residents. But then a new republic internal affairs minister arrived, had a falling out with the unit, and of his own will transferred it to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The matter is always presented in such a way, however, as if to show that the central authorities sent OMON to Riga.

[Gninenko] Very recently OMON was guarding the parliament, but today they are literally under siege. As Latvian Minister of Internal Affairs Vaznis explained to us, he issued an order on de-partyization of the republic internal affairs organs but OMON refused to subordinate itself to this order.

[IZVESTIYA] Are they all communists there?

[Gninenko] There is a small party organization there—12 people out of 120, but they have refused to disband their party organization. Hence the conflict.

[Shuvalov] A great deal of pressure is being exerted on them. We are always hearing that they are scoundrels. But these are ordinary people and it is very easy for them to fly off the handle in such a situation. This situation is entirely abnormal—it cannot remain in existence for long.

[IZVESTIYA] Tell us, has the "Equal Rights" [Ravnopraviye] faction and forces standing behind it agreed to making contact with the other side? Are they meeting them half way?

[Shuvalov] Well, we have already stated that the "Equal Rights" faction promotes universal human values and defends the interests of all ethnic groups. It demands only that the laws of the Latvian parliament not diverge from the laws of the Soviet Union. But the other half is very unwilling to make concessions. On the eve of our trip to Latvia, a correction was made with respect to suspension of the Latvian parliament resolution on registration of military servicemen. But these are very timid steps.

[Gninenko] I have already spoken about the fact that the opposition, having become the authority in power, continues nonetheless to conduct itself like an opposition. A resolution is being adopted, for example, on illegal and criminal acts of OMON and the Soviet Army. But from a legal point of view, only a court can determine whether these actions are criminal or not.

[Denisov] But, to continue the discussion about factions, I would like to state that these factions are quite heterogeneous. We see extremist groups there that allow nothing to get done—they just impede matters, primarily terrorizing their faction. Somewhere closer to the center, there are people who would long since have come into agreement with one another. And this constitutes the main bulk. But it is the terrorist activities of these extremist groups that split the rest of the people wide apart, forming them up behind barricades. And this is the main thing that must now be done—cut off these extremes. This is why I have stated all the while that it would not hurt to introduce presidential rule. Incidentally, there are a great many on both sides who agree with this, and everyone in both factions closer to the center agree with it.

[Gninenko] We have come to believe that there are forces that have no political future under conditions of accord.

[Denisov] Those who are provoking the tension would like to see Army intervention. But not only to fire up the local population. Their efforts are directed more towards obtaining support from the West. We are seeing a reaction entirely incommensurate with the events in Latvia.

[Shuvalov] I would like to thank IZVESTIYA journalists and the newspaper itself for affording us such an opportunity to make an objective presentation. We did not get such an opportunity in Latvia. I was unable, for example, to utilize my right as deputy—I was given an interview but it was never transmitted. This is direct evidence of the lack of objectivity in the mass media.

[IZVESTIYA] And how is the Army provoked?

[Gninenko] Fourteen soldiers were wounded on duty during the year. Not on the street, but while guarding a facility under arms.

[Denisov] One army officer from the "Equal Rights" faction of deputies donned his uniform and stood on a street corner, just to show how things were. He stood there for an hour, during which period he was called "fascist," "pig," or "occupier" 46 times—I cannot elaborate further on what they called him. They spat at him, etc. Once a minute this went on. He was standing there for a special purpose—but people have to communicate on the streets and families live here. How are they supposed to endure this? Where did this acute confrontation between the militia and OMON originate? It seems several leaders have reached the conclusion that it would be simplest of all to drag in the Army, causing OMON and the militia to collide. Because then no one will restore order. All law enforcement organs are tied up in internecine strife, and just the Army remains. Upon our return to Moscow, President Gorbachev told me during our meeting that when the shots began to ring out in Riga, he was called four times and asked to bring in troops for pacification. All three nights we were in Latvia, attempts continued to drag OMON out of their barracks and tie them up in some kind of involvement. On the first evening we met with Internal Affairs Minister Vaznis. He came to see us at our hotel and we discussed things. The discussion ended, but he did not leave. We got the impression that the man was waiting for something. Then suddenly someone came running in between midnight and one in the morning and, instead of speaking to the minister in Latvian, as they usually do, or saying something quietly in his ear, this person announced loudly from the doorway that OMON was now breaking down the doors of the Krastynsh apartment—this is A. Gorbunov's first deputy. I said—"Let's go there right away!" It appeared that this caught them completely by surprise. They started talking me out of it, trying to convince me this would be dangerous. I already understood what was going on and so continued to insist. No sooner had I put my coat on than they informed me it was a mistake, that there was no OMON attack against the Krastynsh apartment—it was just that some hooligans had knocked over a telephone booth near the Krastynsh house the day before and now the residents were being asked whether they saw what happened.

[Shuvalov] I phoned OMON and told them of the report we received from the Latvian minister of internal affairs to the effect that OMON people were banging down the door of an apartment. They responded that down to the very last soldier they were all in the barracks.

[Denisov] But prior to this incident we met with Rubiks. A general came up to me, a member of the Public Salvation Committee, and told me that according to his information, an operation was being readied at night to destroy OMON. For this Vaznis had issued about 700 automatic weapons from internal affairs assets to civilian fighting personnel. My assistance was requested in averting this. At first I treated the information as fabrication, but evaluated it differently after what happened concerning the feigned OMON attack on the apartment. Someone was persistently attempting to provoke OMON so as to justify actions in response. The next night, the Riga Press Building, which is guarded by OMON personnel, was fired on from a motor vehicle. OMON people are quite clever fellows. They did not begin firing in response, but simply darted out, set up a chase and caught those who had done the firing. It was a "Rafik" [Riga Bus Plant vehicle] with five persons in it. While moving they managed to throw out their weapons, but were unable to get rid of their cartridges and documents. At this point they were interrogated and confessed to everything, stating specifically that they were from the "guardians of order" organization.

[IZVESTIYA] If service in OMON is so severe, why in your opinion are people not leaving it? What keeps them?

[Gninenko] There are people who leave—one even left while we were there—after all, it's a scary situation. But six new people came in the same day, ready to serve with OMON.

[Denisov] There are Russians and Latvians serving in this detachment. So again you see that this is not a problem of nationality.

[IZVESTIYA] There was a report in the press to the effect that OMON is subordinate to the Communist Party.

[Gninenko] We cannot say that.

[IZVESTIYA] You have stated that you relayed all this information to representatives of the authorities both in Riga and at a press conference here in Moscow. Are your positions being fully represented in the mass media?

[Denisov] Of course not. The most interesting thing is that one portion of my television interview was cut out in Riga, while Central Television in Moscow showed only the part Riga had cut. So what you get is my saying one thing in one instance, and another thing in the other. But this was one and the same press conference. I do not wish to say that absolutely all members of the deputy group were in agreement on all issues. No. And each expressed his point of view at the same press conferences. Pluralism reigned supreme here. But nothing close to pluralism was reflected in the mass media. And this is quite dangerous. Today people should listen to various points of view and draw their own conclusions. So that a small group does not decide for the people what they need to know and what is impermissible.

[IZVESTIYA] What was the reaction of the Latvian authorities to your reports?

[Denisov] You must understand that the republic leadership finds itself under considerable pressure from extremist groups. There are sensible people in it. I might even say that I have a definite sympathy in general for Anatoliy Valeryanovich Gorbunovs. But all the different fronts and committees that are whirling around the republic leadership with their extremist demands are simply making it difficult to live there. Sensible people cannot think sensibly because they are simply afraid to do so. People must resolutely sever the extremism of fringe forces—on both sides. For these forces are thinking more about their own ambitions and less about their people.

Paper Explores Background of Riga Events

91UN0791A Riga ATMODA in Russian No 1, 15 Jan 91 p 2

[Article by A. Kesteris: "Today!"]

[Text] This question is evoking the greatest of interest: What happened in the House of the Press? Or what was the sense in what happened? Obviously it would not be correct to regard the action of the "black berets" as merely some whim of A. Rubiks to express his power or protect the investment interests of the Latvian Communist Party. The seizure of the House of the Press characterizes both our relationship with the central authorities and the state of the central authorities themselves. But one thing at a time.

After the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies, deputies could have expected that Gorbachev was trying to consolidate his own power by using force in the Baltics. It had become clear that at least five republics would not sign a Union treaty. Russia, which rejected the treaty on the conditions proposed by the center and regards it as impossible to pay into the Union budget 80 billion rubles, inflicted an immediate practical defeat on Gorbachev. The use of repressive forces to pacify the "disobedient" became inevitable. During the first week of the new year, according to unofficial information, it was envisaged that the "person whose human rights had been violated" would come out onto the streets. It was exactly in this context that we must regard the violent action of the "Black Berets." But several versions of an explanation are possible. The first is that because of tactical considerations the initiators of the use of armed force wanted to see how far the government of the Latvian Republic and the People's Front of Latvia were capable of resistance, and what defense mechanisms had been prepared and how successfully they functioned. (The reality of this suggestion is confirmed by the fact that there has been no other violent activity since the seizure of the House of the Press). An alternative was to ascertain how much effort would be devoted at the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and before that, to showing that the military in Latvia were in an "illegal" condition. Much was made of the 14 November decision of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet. The consciousness of the population of the USSR was prepared to show that the military had no other choice except intervention in politics. (The series of explosions was also designed to show that without a curfew along the lines of Klaypeyda, people could not feel safe). And the military formation seized the House of the Press. If this is so, then this question arises: Why have they still not become involved in large-scale activity? First, we should unconditionally thank E. Shevardnadze. Following his warning about the threat of possible dictatorship, the entire world waited with bated breath, watching the USSR and waiting to see where the first acts of political violence would occur. And the place was Riga. This was why a bold call was made by the Danish foreign minister not to give economic assistance to the USSR if military force were used in the Baltics. It was the reason for the warning issued by the U.S. State Department and Matlock's meeting with the chief of the Committee for State Security. It had to affect a Gorbachev who depends so much on the West.

Second, the need for the use of force to preserve Gorbachev's power diminished after the 3 January session of the Federation Council, at which it nevertheless achieved a compromise with the republics (which was not the case in December). It is clear that the president of the USSR softened his own position. But it is also clear that the republics (even the most compliant) have also taken a step in the direction of preserving the USSR.

There is no information about what this step was (or could have been) on the part of Latvia and the other Baltic countries. The abated contradictions between Moscow and Latvia will inevitably flare up anew. So we are maintaining our readiness to act as we did in January.

Article Stresses Need for Compromise in Latvia

LD2401213291 Moscow TASS in English 1921 GMT 24 Jan 91

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga January 24 TASS—Now mountain-climbers are the only ones in Latvia who have concerns higher than politics. They are still full of resolve to climb the peak of communism in the Pamirs, whose height exceeds 7,000 metres. Everyone else is concerned with principles and efforts to defend them.

An article published by the SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA newspaper on Wednesday [23 January] came as a surprise. For one thing, it was signed by two people—a Communist and the chairman of the Popular Front Council of one of Riga districts—who represent two conflicting groups. TV journalists also noticed this unusual circumstance and invited Anatoliy Nuzhniy and Ludis Pavilonis to appear together on television.

"Why is tension running so high in society, ready to explode at any moment?" the authors of the article asked themselves. They recalled the saying, nearly forgotten today in Latvia: "Freedom is the right to do anything that does not restrict the freedom of others." According to Nuzhniy and Pavilonis, the way suggested by this phrase is that of compromise. Everyone should try to understand his opponent in the way a friend, a like-minded person would.

They offer a programme of actions to reduce confrontation. "It is necessary to balance the composition of the government in accordance with the norms, existing in any democratic country. All parties and movements should be represented in it, depending on the number of votes received in elections," the article says. It urges both the government and the parliament to realise that they represent all residents of Latvia, all sections of the population.

The authors of the article believe that there are a number of issues on which the stands of the two groups can be brought closer together. A law on private property should be adopted in order to stabilise the situation. The need for it is understood by all, they believe. A privatisation law should be drawn up without fearing that shares will be bought by the wrong people. It is no accident that the article describes the things that should be obvious to all. The adoption of the law on joint-stock companies, which included residence requirements, is still fresh in the public memory.

Nuzhniy and Pavilonis both support the idea of a referendum, suggested by the Soviet president. They believe that this is the best method to pave the way to sovereignty. They think that it would be just if people of different views had access to radio and television. "Only a compromise and concessions can help us avoid the black days that might be in store for our people, avoid the flows of blood with which they might pay for rejecting common sense," the article says.

Speaking on TV, Nuzhniy and Pavilonis added: "We are tired of waiting for the leaders of the Popular Front and the Communist Party to approach each other. We decided to start the rapprochement process from below."

Unfortunately, only those who watch programmes in Russian could hear those words. Nuzhniy and Pavilonis were not allowed to speak in the Latvian programme.

A joint meeting of Communists and Popular Front members was planned for today at the Riga amalgamation producing building materials, at which one of the co-authors of the article works as the director and the other as a designer. So, the trend is continuing.

Estonia

Sillari Interviewed on Talks With Gorbachev

PM0102145191 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 19 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Enn-Arno Sillari, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; first paragraph is introduction: "Enn-Arno Sillari: The Tension Must Be Lifted"]

[Text] The first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee gives a lightning interview to SOVETSKAYA ESTONIA after his return from Moscow.

[Correspondent] Enn Augustovich, it is well known that in these recent, difficult days, which have been full of dramatic events, you have been to Moscow, attending the USSR Supreme Soviet session and meeting and talking with the country's president, and have just returned to Tallinn...

[Sillari] ...I was immediately attacked by journalists, not only ours, from the republic, but also foreign journalists—Finns, Germans, and so forth. And I have to say that the questions were blunt, often with an unexpected and even cunning subtext.

[Correspondent] For instance?

[Sillari] Well, for instance, one foreign female journalist asked whether I had been offered the post of "Kremlin sheriff" in Estonia.

[Correspondent] And what did you reply?

[Sillari] That no, I had not. As far as I remember, no one had any such intentions. I would say that I have a sense of human dignity and the dignity of an Estonian, if you like. And I think that our CPSU Central Committee general secretary is aware of this. Incidentally, many questions of the order "You have been to see Gorbachev? Why?" followed. I had to explain that there was nothing unusual or extraordinary in this. After all, I am a member of the Politburo. There have to be working meetings. Although, of course, M.S. Gorbachev is immeasurably busy, weighed down with the affairs of the country and the party, and the problems of international life (which have become so critical in recent times) that he really does not have a minute to spare. But nevertheless we spoke at length and in considerable detail.

[Correspondent] What were the main lines taken by the conversation?

[Sillari] I would say that it consisted of two parts. First, the exchange of opinions about the situation in the republic, and second, preparation for the forthcoming 21st congress of our party.

[Correspondent] What did Mikhail Sergeyevich say on the subject of the situation in the republic, in the Baltic region in general?

[Sillari] It was a frank conversation. I will say straightaway, I could feel how concerned he is. The main idea on which he insisted in this conversation is the following: All the most contentious issues can and must be resolved through dialogue, by political means, but at no event by conflict, with blood, by shooting... This goes for relations between the center and the republic. This goes for relations within the republic itself.

[Correspondent] Much has been said recently about the country, and the president himself, retreating to the right, about the offensive of reactionary forces, and the danger of dictatorship...

[Sillari] By the way, I asked him jokingly whether I was now talking to a dictator. But seriously speaking, you are obviously aware that the president categorically refuted such talk at the country's congress of people's deputies. He again repeated these thoughts in conversation with me. There will be no retreat from the course which pursues democratic renewal of the country. He confirmed that he does not support the introduction of presidential rule, that he opposes the use of military force in principal.

[Correspondent] But what happened in Lithuania? Tanks on the street, shooting... Now even the television is showing a lot of documentary footage that was filmed that tragic night...

[Sillari] We talked about this too. Mikhail Sergeyevich said such an order **did not** come from the center. Moreover, at the Federation Council the day before—and this is well known, it was widely discussed in the press—a delegation, consisting of people who are well known in the country, widely known figures—was determined, which was to travel immediately to Lithuania and to study the situation at first hand, and stabilize the situation. It did set out... But...it arrived too late. Gorbachev said that it was difficult to foresee this turn of events. He believes that even the day before there were no signs that shooting would begin that very night. The contradictions, obviously, had become so pronounced, that...

[Correspondent] It was like a boil bursting?

[Sillari] Possibly. Events unfolded at lightning speed. The members of this commission and employees of the Union prosecutor's office worked there later. We have to investigate in detail what happened there, and how. The commission members, incidentally, reported on their return to Moscow that they had managed somehow or other to bring the sides together and begin dialogue. This is already an important step. In the opinion of the commission members it is not yet necessary to adopt any drastic measures which might somehow cause the situation to shift, be shaken up, and thereby provoke a further, unpredictable, even more tragic current of events. As I understand it, it was decided to heed the opinion of commission members, who had experienced the situation on the ground. You have obviously heard the report that Tarazevich, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Commission for Interethnic Relations, went to Lithuania and held a constructive talk with Landsbergis. He will remain there—for regular liaison.

As for Estonia, Mikhail Sergeyevich repeated that additional military forces would not be used here. Presidential rule will not be introduced. Dialogue is essential. Gorbachev asserted that he considers it essential to meet with republic leaders and discuss problems, including intrarepublican problems. At the same time he voiced an opinion with which it is impossible not to agree: The fact that the deputies from Estonia have stopped working in the country's Supreme Soviet is bad, and does not help matters at all. The opportunity for mutual understanding and joint solution of problems is being lost. We, by the way, I mean the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, have raised this question many times, and have voiced the opinion that this is not only advantageous, it is essential for Estonia.

[Correspondent] The situation has deteriorated in Estonia too...

[Sillari] Yes. It was after the rally that took place 15 January in the square in front of the government building that I got back from Moscow. I know how it went. I know about the demands presented by the participants of the rally. I have been told that women were very actively involved in the rally. Their alarm, their concern, and pain are understandable. Just as the alarm and concern of the Russian-speaking population is on the whole understandable. It is difficult to live, prices have grown incredibly. The future looks dark to many people. Mothers fear for their children: How to feed them tomorrow?

All the same, I cannot but say: Prices are increasing all over the country. You don't have to read the papers to realize this. I spoke in Moscow with representatives of many regions of the country. It is difficult in these regions too. An increase in wholesale prices has already taken place. This will undoubtedly affect, and is already affecting, retail prices. But the main thing here is the compensation mechanism, the social protection of people, primarily those who are less well off. This is what we must fight for. We have talked about this too in all our program documents and statements. And we intend to strive for this. Our stance is that it is essential to preserve the achievements which were made and still exist: free education and medical service. It is essential to strive for **equal rights** for all who live on Estonian soil. This is our principled position, and we will stand up for it.

But we will defend it by political methods. Without shooting, without killing people, without bloodshed. I think that we **all** should calm down, and look at the situation with sober eyes. Surely no one wants to bring things to the Lithuanian fever pitch? Surely we do not want blood? How would we live after that? How would we be able to look our children in the eye, our children, whom we would be teaching to be one another's enemies? What kind of life would they have?

It is easy to embark on confrontation. No special efforts or special intelligence, let us put it bluntly, are required for this. It is more difficult to establish dialogue, to look for joint solutions.

The main thing now is to prevent the escalation of tension. After all, we are all grown up people, and we all understand: Each step produces a counteraction in response. I might call to the mind the Russian saying too: Fear has big eyes. Who knows what accidents are possible in such a heated atmosphere, when, of course, reason does not operate.

I would like to draw the attention of the newspaper's readers to an article by Otto Latsis, published in IZVESTIYA. It was reprinted in SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA. The law is the law—this thought is voiced very clearly in it, and it impossible not to agree with it. There are **lawful** battle methods and weapons. And they should be used. These lawful methods do not include bullets, bayonets, and stones. These are the weapons of lawlessness, these are the weapons of civil war. If calm, peace in our home, the future of our children are dear to us, can we cast them under the feet of crazy confrontation? With whom? One another?

We cannot fail to be indignant when we hear about attempts to persecute communists. This contravenes both democracy and the law. These are not civilized methods. Such hysteria is immoral, its consequences hazardous. But something else too must not be allowed: that the lofty word "communist" be connected with blood. Surely people are not asking for this?

[Correspondent] The 21st Estonian Communist Communist Party Congress is due to take place in about a week's time. It will be fine if the situation by then has been defused, has become calmer. You said that you spoke to Gorbachev about the forthcoming congress...

[Sillari] Yes. I told him what the situation is like in the party at the present time. I told him about **the aims** with which we are going to congress, and how we are preparing for it. We have draft program documents concerning the economic situation of the republic and on getting it out of the impasse it is in. In this context we have especially focused attention on agriculture. After all, the position of the republic, the people's standard of living, and their food supply are heavily dependent on the state of agriculture.

Incidentally, we have declared many times that all communists, and all who wish to do so, can come to see us **on Wednesdays.** They can familiarize themselves with the material in preparation for the congress, and voice their opinions, wishes, and proposals. One Wednesday recently V. Vyalyas met communists in just this way, and another Wednesday it was H. Roots. The conversations were serious and businesslike.

Next week we plan to hold a press conference for journalists. We will talk about the progress of preparation for the congress and the problems which will be raised at it. You will be able to inform your readers in detail about it.

[Correspondent] We will undoubtedly make use of this opportunity.

Estonian Communist Publishers Plan Stock Issue

LD1902134891 Moscow TASS in English 1334 GMT 19 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan]

[Text] Tallinn February 19 TASS—The Estonian Government has been offered to become a stockholder in a company to be set up on the basis of the Estonian Communist Party publishing house.

The publishing house, editorial offices of the RAHVA HAAL and PAEVALEHT newspapers and the Central Committee of the Independent Estonian Party will be among other co-owners.

It has not been decided what share each will have. It is also unknown how the new joint-stock society will build its relations with editorial offices of newspapes and magazines included in the current system of the publishing house.

The creation of the joint-stock society will partly prevent this property of the Soviet Communist Party and the Estonian Communist Party from going to republican authorities, as the Estonian Government insists it should.

However, there are now two Communist Parties in Estonia, and the Independent Party—the potential shareholder in the proposed society—has only a small percentage of the communists.

Estonian Defense Chief on Paratroops Appeal

PM0102151491 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 19 Jan 91 p 1

[Interview with Toomas Puur, chief of the Estonian Government State Chancellery Defense and Borders Department, by L. Turpakova; place and date of interview not stated: "God Helps Those Who Help Themselves"]

[Text] News of the registration of former paratroopers has been perceived in various ways. Central Television stated that such action runs counter to the USSR Constitution. So what has actually happened? I asked Toomas Puur, chief of the government State Chancellery Defense and Borders Department, for more definite information.

[Puur] I think it was necessary to announce the draft. Given the complexity of our present situation, we must be ready for anything. I would like to believe that in our republic everything will be resolved peacefully and without extremism of any kind.

[Turpakova] What is behind the allegation that an "armed formation" is being organized by the Estonian Government? Is it pure conjecture or....

[Puur] The meeting which took place 17 January in the House of the Economy was misunderstood and evaluated accordingly. As a result, distorted information was put out on the air. I'm thinking in particular of the "Vremya" program. There is no question of any kind of armed formation. We, the government, have only one weapon—words. From our point of view, it was a simple request for all who have served with the paratroopers to register.

[Turpakova] Register for what, and why the paratroopers specifically?

[Puur] By taking the trouble to analyze events in Lithuania, we can see quite clearly that the paratroopers played a leading role in Vilnius. We do not want a repetition. Should the "Lithuanian scenario" be repeated in our republic, the government considers it best to follow the path of talks. But in order to conduct talks, there must be participation on both sides from people who have undergone identical training.

[Turpakova] Something like this: A paratrooper for a paratrooper—friend, comrade and brother?

[Puur] Exactly. Acquaintances and friends of those who register at the state chancellery may turn out to be among the unexpected and uninvited guests.

[Turpakova] So who has registered?

[Puur] We have in our hands 175 cards displaying information about the guys: surname, forename, address, place of work. If the need arises, it will be possible to round up former paratroopers quickly.

[Turpakova] Is this a voluntary act?

[Puur] Absolutely voluntary, and it is not to be a regular event. There was a multitude of telephone calls with callers attempting to establish whether it was compulsory to show up. No, it is not compulsory.

[Turpakova] What is the nationalities ratio for these 175?

[Puur] For the most part, they are Estonians. Only eight people have a different nationality: Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Russians.

[Turpakova] How have the guys themselves reacted to your request?

[Puur] You know, they have taken it very seriously. At a meeting they asked every question imaginable. In fact, clarifications were demanded since the preliminary information was missing. "What will we be, and which army will we be representing?" Those were probably the main questions.

[Turpakova] So what are they now?

[Puur] Ordinary citizens. This is not an organization, it is not an armed formation, we do not have our own armed force. All those who answered the call have gone back to their homes and are working peacefully.

[Turpakova] If in fact the "Lithuanian scenario" does suddenly materialize, then how do you picture the talks?

[Puur] This is quite difficult to predict. There is no way of asserting with absolute certainty that talks will take place. But I am sure that any conflict can be resolved through dialogue. It is a small step, I would say an option for the worst-case scenario. But it would be better if such options were not necessary. [Puur ends]

Our interview finished at 1230. I emerged onto Lossi Square. Four monsters on wheels, piled high with huge boulders, came into sight and drew dashingly to a halt at the approach to Toompea Palace. Shortly after, the unloading began.

"What happened?" I approached a young guy from the "Kodukaitse" [defense force] who was taking photos of this laborious process.

"It's just in case. There's an atmosphere, you feel it yourself. Barricades. But don't be afraid, don't be afraid..." He patted me amicably on the shoulder.

The time to cast away stones has come. Well, God helps those who help themselves... All the more so as Aleksandr Nevskiy Cathedral is here on the square. [Turpakova ends]

Editorial Comment—Our correspondent telephoned P. Panfilov, member of the coordination council, and asked him: "Is there any specific reason for such defensive action?" This was his reply:

"We have not and do not intend to take any steps to storm or seize Toompea. As far as I know, the military think likewise.

"With regard to why this barricade is being built anyway, I can only judge from the words of one of the Supreme Soviet deputies, who explained in a private conversation with me that Lebedev and Petinov are on hunger strike in the palace, and the mere rumor that their health may be deteriorating would be sufficient to cause trouble on Toompea Hill. That is the explanation. You would do well to ask the 'architects' themselves..."

Estonian Kodukaitse Chief Details Aims

PM0702155191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with A. Eevel, chief of staff of the Kodukaitse organization, by Captain Third Rank V. Maryukha; first paragraph is letter from reader O. Palayev; second paragraph is editorial introduction; last paragraph is editorial conclusion; place and date not specified: "Politicians-...With Nightsticks. Who's Who?"]

[Text] I, like many KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers, first heard about the Kodukaitse organization of voluntary Estonian People's Front guards in connection with the events of May on one of Tallinn's main squares. We now see these detachments' fighters on our screens in uniform wielding nightsticks. What do they want and whom do they serve? Give them a chance to talk about themselves.

[Signed] O. Palayev, Chardzhou.

Our correspondent in Tallinn visited Kodukaitse's headquarters and met with the organization's chief of staff, A. Eevel. In publishing the ensuing conversation in somewhat abridged form, we hope that readers themselves will answer the question of what Kodukaitse's members want and whom they serve.

[Maryukha] What is your organization and what are its aims?

[Eevel] During last May's rally by the Russian-speaking population when an attempt was made to storm the parliament building and overthrow the legitimate government, which has set out to create an independent Estonia, thousands of people concerned about the republic's fate came to Palace Square within the space of 15 minutes in response to the prime minister's call. (That is A. Eevel's view of the events of 15 May 1990 when disturbances were provoked during a demonstration and rally held by the Russian-speaking population and demonstrators were ousted from Palace Square—V.M.). Then the idea arose of setting up a voluntary militia force comprising not only Estonians but also quite a lot of Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, and Russians to secure themselves and the government against such attempts in the future. We are not People's Front guards or a security service [sluzhba bezopasnosti]. There is no precise translation into Russian, but I can say that we are a safety service [sluzhba nadezhnosti].

We operate in areas where large crowds of people have to be controlled. The central press tries to depict us as a nationalist organization, however that's wrong. We are waging a political struggle and are equally unacceptable to both Russian speakers and Estonians who want to continue building socialism in Estonia. There are people in our ranks who want to create an independent state on the lines of the Nordic countries around the Baltic—Sweden, Finland, etc.

I was at one time a member of the USSR rowing squad. We took pride in what we were taught. However, more than 70 years of Soviet power have done us little good. We do not want to be ruled by people who will return us to building socialism—socialism as an ideological current. It is perhaps a very human trait, but man is made in such a way that he thinks about himself before thinking about society.

[Maryukha] Is there a guarantee that, after proclaiming the course of reviving bourgeois Estonia, those who come to power won't rush to get more perks for themselves?

[Eevel] There's no guarantee. There are very many Soviet people living in the Estonian Republic. Not Russian-speaking people, but Soviet people. If I may say this, we are against the Soviet way of thinking. We have a considerable number of Estonians, particularly within the Estonian Communist Party (CPSU), who are dying for power and think just like that. The struggle in our republic is against anyone who thinks that we live in a vast home. Everyone should have his roots where he lives and should feel responsibility to his forebears and descendants for retaining his national self-awareness.

[Maryukha] Don't you think that this policy is, in many respects, helping to fan tension in the republic?

[Eevel] From the very outset we tried to tell the Russian-speaking population that we want to live in a free state and that we have nothing against them. Today a very small proportion of the population support Intermovement and the United Council of Labor Collectives. They can only hold their rallies in worktime.

[Maryukha] In that case against whom are you building barricades?

[Eevel] They are not against people. If the Russian-speaking population wants to gather on Palace Square, they can by all means. Gangways have been left there. Let them rally there if the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] gives authorization. Barricades are put up against the Russian-speaking and Estonian population who come to attack the government palace with the help of the Soviet Army.

[Maryukha] But do you have grounds for saying that the Soviet Army intends to topple the Estonian Government?

[Eevel] Irrespective of whether we have this kind of information, the barricades are the only means of upholding the gains that we have already made. I realize that from the tactical viewpoint more important installations—the press, television, and telegraph—should be captured first. But the attackers will after all have to seize the symbol of power. The fortifications on Toompea have been set up to ensure that the man giving the order knows that he will have to get through thousands of people and there will be blood on Palace Square.

[Maryukha] Don't you think that, once independence has been secured and Soviet troops have withdrawn, destructive forces in Estonia will immediately initiate pogroms and physically exterminate dissenters?

[Eevel] We do not think that the Army is a stabilizing force. There is no need for additional troop contingents in Estonia. Their appearance can only have the same result as in Lithuania and Latvia. We do not need the Soviet Armed Forces at all—we need to set up our own armed forces.

[Maryukha] How do you see the creation of a national army?

[Eevel] We will set it up with you, with consideration for common strategic interests, reaching agreement on this basis, and enlisting your officers to train our Army. We have no armed organizations that could perform an army's functions if they emerge from the underground. [Eevel ends]

We parted with our interlocutor at one of the barricades where a guardsman in a brand-new uniform bearing Kodukaitse insignia saluted his chief of staff. A rubber nightstick swung from his saluting arm. On whose heads and arms will it descend tomorrow...?

Estonian Tartu Official Views Ties with Army

LD2301140191 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1000 GMT 23 Jan 91

[Interview with Viktor Korovitz, official responsible for relations between the Army and the town of Tartu, by correspondent Vello Laan; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Korovits] There are difficulties in that there is no lawful foundation for the relations between the Army and both the Estonian local governments and the Estonian Government, and these issues have not been legally regulated. Precisely at a time like this, however, it is necessary to explain our aims to the military and of course to listen to them.

[Laan] The top military man in Tartu is Airforce Major-General Dudayev, a Chechen by nationality [commander of Tartu garrison]. There has been much talk about him being expected back home in the Caucasus, to become the president of this autonomous republic. [passage omitted]

[Korovits] He has attempted to understand our people and evidently he has also succeeded because there is definitely some success in the development of our people in comparison with his own people. However, the important thing is for a person to try to understand. And evidently also some of his specific deeds have proceeded from this and from his general view of the Tartu garrison and his endeavor to iron out more acture problems. And indeed, one has to take into account that for an officer these matters are not quite as simple as for a civilian.

[Laan] Are you not left with the impression as you follow the events that somebody seems to be inciting the conflict between the Army and the civilian population? The Army itself would not aim at such acrimony, so it is as if somebody else's scenario seeks to exacerbate emotions, excite passions, and create enmity?

[Korovits] That is so. I do not seem to have heard a hostile expression from the military but indeed, there have been moments of anxiety, yes. This is, of course, connected with the general atmosphere here and, the Army has its own problems which are not proceeding not at all easily because, as we know, so far there have been political bodies and the direct relationship of subordination. [passage omitted]

Silayev's Economic Assessment Assailed

914A0441A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Feb 91 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Article by A. Melnikov, secretary of the RSFSR Central Committee Communist Party: "Whither Russia?"]

[Text] I would like to hear an answer to this question from the mouth of the head of the government. But, unfortunately, reporting on 1 February of this year to the Supreme Soviet "Results of the Economic and Social Development of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] in 1990, the Functioning of the Republic Economy, the RSFSR Budget and Pricing Policy in the Current Year," esteemed I.S. Silayev wholly avoided the sharp edges and provided no critical analysis of the current situation and the true factors which have brought the republic economy to the point of profound collapse.

The rapporteur or, rather, the authors of the text assiduously avoid statistical data, referring the readers and listeners to reference data of the RSFSR State Committee for Statistics, which, of course, no one has to hand, which insures against unpleasant questions given a serious economic investigation. On the other hand they thoroughly saturate the report with an enumeration of various innovations from the sphere of the shaping of market relations, naturally presenting them as big achievements of the government.

Yes, a "big step forward" has been taken in this respect! You bet: Over 1,000 commercial and cooperative banks with an army of highly paid employees has been formed. It is almost breath-taking how extensive and diverse the opportunities for operating unchecked with shadow capital have become. But the end result of the activity of any government (are people better off?) is mentioned in the report only in passing, although we are manifestly moving backward.

There has been a decline in the republic in the amount of industrial and agricultural production, construction, and foreign trade. Purchases of agricultural produce have diminished, the program of the introduction of housing and social and cultural facilities has failed, and there has been a deterioration in the food supply and the quality of services and the operation of transport. On the other hand, prices have risen, having lowered appreciably the living standard of the main working strata. National revenue has diminished 5.5 percent, productivity, five percent. Inflation has become a heavy burden for people. Whereas in 1988 it constituted 6.4 percent and in 1989 some 7.9 percent, in the past year it amounted to 18.9 percent.

Why? We have a right to obtain from the government candid and truthful answers. Instead, the authors of the report offer us some inventive formula: Russia worked no worse, better even, than the Union. But why, given better work, does it have the worst results! A different structure of the economy, apparently, from that in, for example, Belorussia, Latvia, and the Ukraine. A further argument as an excuse—rejection of the "500 days" program. And a "shift to the right" even!

Of course, all this is far removed from an objective appraisal of the situation in the republic's economy. We will attempt within the framework of this article to offer our economic and political evaluations of the government's work.

Structure. Truly, Russia's economy is saturated with raw material sectors, the defense complex, and production for production's sake. This did not come about yesterday. It is the objective result of the territorial division of labor—of such an ancient discovery of mankind as the market. However much we may wish it, a structure cannot be changed rapidly. It should be mentioned for fairness' sake that, even given this structure, the republic did not earlier have such failures, operated quite efficiently, and coped with the plans.

It is undoubtedly necessary to decisively raise the proportion of the production of the means of consumption in the industrial product, which, in fact, was envisaged by the republic's five-year and annual plans. But it is not pious expectations but persistent work on their realization that is needed for this. Unfortunately, things have been allowed to take their own course.

Of 70 manufacturing industry facilities, only 21 were made ready last year. Of the 20 medical industry facilities, 10 were introduced, and of the 12 Russian light industry facilities, four, and the capital investments allocation at enterprises of the Rostekstil concern was assimilated only 50 percent. Nineteen republic plants for the manufacture of consumer goods were not commissioned.

This is why, evidently, the rapporteur bypasses the most important matter of the critical state of affairs in **capital construction.** With the transfer of the most important construction ministries to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation there has been a sharp decline in the efficiency of the construction complex, it is literally falling apart, it is not being supplied with modern equipment, and professional core workers are leaving it. Two-thirds of government-commissioned construction projects were frustrated last year. The introduction of housing compared with 1989 declined 14 percent, of general schools, 21 percent, hospitals, 37 percent, and other social and cultural facilities, 16-19 percent. There had never before been such a failure, and this cannot be explained by the wrong structure of the economy. Nor, likewise, can the results of the work of agriculture.

The report does not evaluate the reasons for the reduction in the extent of the production and purchases of **farm produce** or the fact that, given an unprecedented harvest, supplies of grain to republic and Union stocks were not fulfilled, and the "Harvest-90" checks issued by the government were not backed by commodity resources. It should have been explained why in a short space of time a sector which had been operating steadily—poultry breeding—has been disabled and why from the former sufficiency of eggs and poultry meat we have come down to the most dire shortages. The gradual destruction of the traditional ties between outfits of industry and agriculture, on account of which the state and collective farms are left at harvest time to cope with the harvest alone, cannot fail to disturb us. Considering this the result of the slow "tenant-farmerization" of agriculture is naive, to say the least, nor is the reference to the rejection of the "500 days" program convincing either.

Belorussia and the Ukraine, incidentally, have not adopted such a program at all, but their results have been considerably better in many areas of economic activity. The Ukraine, for example, was in 1990 the sole republic to withdraw money from circulation, whereas the RSFSR permitted emission over and above the plan of 13 billion rubles [R].

It is a question of different methods of leadership, evidently. Some people get down to business, others, to politics. I am convinced that last year's results would have been totally different had the RSFSR Government, relying on the soviets, political and public organizations, and the work force, purposefully involved itself in production (the more so in that this was the final year of the five-year plan), the construction of housing and social facilities, the commissioning of new capacity, and the realization of contract commitments, and had it held more strictly to account the leaders of ministries and departments and local soviet executive committees, particularly where "democracy" prevails over responsibility for the entrusted assignment.

Having concentrated its efforts on criticizing and counteracting the center, the republic government embarked on 1991 without plans and without a budget and under the conditions of an increasingly intensifying crisis of administration. In addition, it became a hostage, as it were, to the political ambitions of the leadership of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and its chairman, B.N. Yeltsin.

I.S. Silayev's report points out that the Russian Federation exports consumer goods totaling R11.2 billion, but imports goods totaling R30 billion, that is, three times more. I would add to this that the RSFSR imports from the other Union republics 900,000 tons of meat, 4.5 million tons of dairy products, practically all its fruit, 1.7 million tons of vegetables, and approximately 1 million tons of potatoes, and also garments and knitwear, footwear, furniture and so forth.

Under these conditions it was politically short-sighted to declare that Russia feeds itself and maintains other republics. The retaliatory response has been a sharp reduction in food supplies to Union stocks and the major industrial centers of the RSFSR. Millions of people have suffered. The government's command measures in respect of Russian oblasts are not working since they cannot cover all the shortages, and the heaping of current business onto the leaders of the local soviets and the procuracy is reminiscent, unfortunately, of the worst times of our history.

In addition, the populist suggestion of the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet that the local authorities "swallow as much power as you can" has deprived the government of levers of influence on the "sovereign" republics, krays, oblasts, and rural soviets even.

The critical situation in the republic has been complicated by the rash decisions on the closure, allegedly in the working people's interests, of 40 enterprises of chemical, medical, and microbiological industry, which has made worse the provision of the population with consumer goods, drugs, and medical preparations and placed the entire economy practically in the most difficult position.

In this situation the words adduced in the report which say that "we are poor because people are making not what they themselves need" sounds odd, to say the least. This is very reminiscent of a person on a picket line who passionately wanted to acquire a "Zhiguli," but who was protesting against the construction of a sheet mill in Lipetsk. But even though the latter understood that sheet steel is altogether necessary for automobile manufacturing, he demanded that it be made anywhere but Lipetsk.

Formation of the republic government took 200 days—a considerable length of time by any standards. Just one thing is unclear: How much longer will Russians have to wait for this government to set about, finally, with all purposefulness the solution of vitally important problems of the present and future of our economy.

Unfortunately, playing up to their leader, many members of the government, ministers, and department leaders are engaging, instead of the business for which they are responsible to the people, in politicking: departyizing the administrative system, infringing the rights of employees who are members of the CPSU, and contributing to the ousting of the party organizations from enterprises and establishments, and some people have even embarked on the path of antistate activity. B. Denisenko, for example, deputy minister of health of the RSFSR, is an active member of the directive nucleus of "Democratic Russia." She tried to stir the miners of the Kuzbass to strike in defense of the pro-bourgeois regime in Lithuania. Having received a rebuff, she did not stop but began to campaign for a strike of teachers in Novokuznetsk. One wonders how long she would be in a job in the United States under these conditions, for example, were she to engage in such things there. I believe that even I.S. Silayev's idol, Russian Premier Stolypin, would immediately have expelled such a civil servant from office. I would like in this connection to wish that, before speaking, Ivan Stepanovich would think well about who is heading toward the right: the country or the Russian Government.

Of course, Russia's serious situation requires decisive action for its accelerated socioeconomic development and acquisition of the appropriate state and political sovereignty. Measures in this direction are warmly supported by the people, the Communist Party, and all progressive forces. The wise politician, if for him the interests of the republic and the people living in it are above all else, is required to seek and win for himself allies.

B.N. Yeltsin is not doing this. By his departure from the CPSU he counterposed himself to 9 million Russian communists, the most active members of society. Having essentially come to head the anticommunist opposition and enacting laws aimed at removing the CPSU from the political arena, he is not contributing to people's consolidation. Supporting the national-separatist actions of the leaders of the Baltic republics aimed at the disintegration of the USSR and the infringement of the rights of the nonindigenous population, the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers is counterposing his actions to the interests of 75 million Soviet citizens of Russian and other nationalities who live outside of their territorial-national formations and who have one motherland—a united Soviet Union. His counteraction of the laws of the USSR and the edicts of the country's president are putting the state and society in a fever and causing chaos in the economy.

No, it is not the needs of Russia and the concerns of ordinary people that drive B.N. Yeltsin but personal ambition and a struggle for power by any methods and means. The RSFSR Government is carrying out this social commission. It was not fortuitous that the report of the chairman of the republic Council of Ministers failed to reflect constructive measures pertaining to extrication of the economy from crisis. The main prescription is a return to the "500 days" program and the shaping in 18 months to two years of the foundations of a market economy. Although I.S. Silayev finally calls the main figure in society the producer, the measures pertaining to privatization, denationalization, sale, distribution, decollectivization, and so forth which he proposes would contribute merely to a multiplication of the number of new bourgeois and a variety of smart operators, speculators, small shopkeepers, and other "entrepreneurs" who are the class basis of the antisocialist forces that are springing up.

The selling off of Russian chattels, incidentally, has already begun. G.I. Filshin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, has offered, as is known, the "first sale" of R140 billion....

By and large, there are to be seen in the government's actions, I repeat, not real measures for the organization of the steady operation of the economy and the increased efficiency of the economic system but the manifestly political aims of the disintegration of the USSR and a change in its social system. The RSFSR Government and Supreme Soviet have become the instrument in this political game, and the people's deputies its hostages, inasmuch as the working people are lodging against them and the local soviets all complaints connected with the deterioration in living conditions, the price rises, unemployment, and the lack of social protection under the conditions of the forced transition to market relations.

The emergency situation in the economy is today worrying all honest, sober-minded people. The communists are well aware of this. For this reason they see it as their priority task to reinforce the measures proposed by the president of the USSR pertaining to a stabilization of the situation in the country by active political work.

More necessary now than ever is unity of action of the government and the leaders of ministries and departments of the republic, all soviet, party, and economic-management bodies locally and in the regions, and of sectors of the economy in order this year even to achieve palpable changes in food supply to the population, the filling of the market with consumer goods, and a reinforcement of the material base of the social and cultural sphere.

Members of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee, communist people's deputies, communist leaders of republic ministries, concerns, and associations, and party committees locally are called upon to ensure this unity.

The main emphasis should be put on the organization of the fulfillment of plans by all enterprises and the creation of the necessary conditions for this and, primarily, the conditions for the restoration of business ties, increased responsibility for the fulfillment of contracted supplies, and a strengthening of discipline and order in all components.

In this respect the Communist Party of the RSFSR Central Committee aspires to incorporate all local party authorities and the center in common work and orients the republic, kray, and oblast committees toward more efficient mutual contacts for establishing economic relations of regions and enterprises. The city and rayon party committees should engage comprehensively in political explanatory work and breathe life into the primary party organizations, particularly at enterprises of power engineering, transport, communications, trade, municipal services, and the social sphere, which cater for the steady functioning of the economy and the normal rhythm of people's life and everyday reality.

In our opinion, it is necessary by legislative measures to immediately support the major enterprises, putting free of charge at the disposal of their work force fixed production capital and resources and right of ownership and unrestricted use of some of the manufactured product, strengthen worker self-management, remove the unjustified limitations on pay in accordance with the quantity and quality of output, and do everything necessary to ensure that the industrial worker, specialist, and manager of the state-owned enterprise be aware of their real priority in our reformed society and obtain the maximum benefit from the economic transformations that are implemented.

It is necessary simultaneously to decisively tighten control of so-called free enterprise, the unthinking squandering of state resources and currency transactions, intensify the struggle against the shadow economy and industrial racketeering, and enact laws equalizing the opportunities of all forms of ownership....

The party committees must help the soviets and enterprises of the agro-industrial complex in the completion of the livestock wintering and preparations for the spring and help overcome the difficulties that have arisen in the countryside in the maintenance of agricultural equipment, seed provision, and the lag in construction, and prevent a reduction in the areas sown to vegetables and potatoes. It is the duty of the soviet and party authorities to strengthen the ties of town and country and link more closely on the basis of economic interest the work force of industry and agriculture. We cannot permit the forcible decollectivization of the countryside, for which certain hotheads are calling. It is necessary to consolidate the peasants' right to themselves determine the forms of management and ownership of the land.

It would seem that the integrating basis of all these far from full measures should be strict accountability and responsibility for the entrusted assignment in all echelons—from the worker through the head of the government and the state. Primarily for Russia and its present and future.

There have been many difficult periods in the millennial history of our motherland, but the Russian people have always emerged from them victorious for they have known how to unite in a single strike force, live by their wits, and display national pride and unbending character. Those who wish to understand Soviet Russia by a foreign intellect, measure it by a foreign length, and knock it from the path for which it opted 73 years ago are greatly deluded. I am sure that the people will soon understand this, pay everyone according to his desserts, and continue further along the socialist axis. The communists believe in Russia and will do everything for this to happen as quickly as possible.

Polozkov Views Perestroyka's Socialist Nature

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[Article by Ivan Polozkov, CPSU Central Committee Politburo member and first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party; reprinted from KOMMUNIST No 2, 1991: "For the Socialist Nature of Perestroyka"]

[Text] The dramatic fate of the most recent years of perestroyka has made it necessary for society to consider in depth the tasks of the renewal of socialism, involving all the intellectual potential of the party and the country in creative search. The way in which events have unfolded here and in the East European states shows that one-sidedness, subjectivism, and a superficial approach are impermissible and fatal in this matter. This is why we started to prepare the documents for the Constituent Congress of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Communist Party and the Main Directions for its activity by taking counsel with the communists. Numerous meetings were held in the labor collectives and with scholars, political commentators, and party workers. It was in these discussions about the situation in society and paths for its further advance that the thoughts and assessments were born that I would like to share with communists and all readers.

1. The Soviet socialist state is going through what is perhaps the most critical period in its history. Against the backdrop of increasing shortages, the only shortage we are not experiencing is total condemnation of the past, panic assessments of the present, and gloomy predictions for the future. It seems that the supercharging of pessimism has become a competition, a game of chance for some politicians, scholars, journalists, and cultural figures.

We shall not join in the singing of that sorry choir. A feigned and banal optimism will, perhaps, turn out to be as bad as galloping and banal pessimism. Just as now, with its help, a **negative enthusiasm** is being instilled in the people: "Smash, wreck, drag down everything that still remains. Apres moi le deluge. It makes no difference, we have nowhere to go!" A bacchanalia of the doomed who hate each other and despise their past and are terrified of the future, who no longer believe in their own creative force—this is what is being provoked for the purpose of the final demoralization of society and the state and the dismantling of the existing sociopolitical and constitutional system.

The main task today is to stop this "feasting while the plague rages around us," and if we do not find a solution we will see neither constructive public dialogue nor civic harmony, even less will we see vigorous joint action by progressive sociopolitical forces prepared to assume responsibility for the country's fate. This is essential for the people to make a free and conscious economic, political, and moral choice that all parties and trends will be obliged to respect. **It is of fundamental importance that the choice of methods to extricate us from the crisis, and the strategic directions for further development be made precisely by the people in their own interests, not by someone else behind their backs and for ends that are alien to them.**

It goes without saying that the communists of the Soviet Union, including the Russian communists, cannot and should not remain on the sidelines in the process of self-determination by the Soviet people. They are obligated properly to express the interests of the workers, devise strategy and tactics to realize those interests, and organize the masses for purposeful action. This is the vanguard role of the Communist Party.

Communists must purge and restructure their ranks, renew their party, consider its role anew, and find methods for activity under the prevailing conditions of a multiparty system in politics and multiple styles in economics, when ill-matched elements—from anarchists to monarchists—are surfacing in public life and the democratic impulse of the masses sometimes assumes strange and inadequate, and even reactionary forms. The accustomed "party reins" are being snapped. The command method has lost its one-time magical force, but the tactic of political maneuvering and public flattery for the people, combined with secret deals in the "corridors of power" is also hopeless. What is really needed is candid talk with people, and practical actions done for the workers and in their interests. Sharp questions come from all sides, and they require honest answers. What has happened to the people and the country over the past seven decades? Where are we now? Who is right, who is to blame? What is to be done and how will we start? What are the roads down which we should proceed?

2. Today, it is the fashion to blame all misfortunes on the socialist choice of the workers and peasants in October 1917. But it is not out of place to consider what is meant by this, **precisely what kind of socialism** we have in mind. Is it that socialism with which the intervention by the imperialist states could do nothing, which in a very short time historically created a leading industry and science and culture, and smashed the most terrible force of imperialism—German fascism—and which in just a few years succeeded in setting to rights the consequences of the invasion and, by raising is nuclear missile shield, prevented a new war, the socialism which was the first in space? Or is it the socialism which has moved from its devil-may-care plans to catch up and overtake America in a few years, and arrive at the end of the century at the highest level of labor productivity in the world, to a position in which it has come down to begging food from the Germany it once defeated?

It is a painful question: to whose account must we post the crimes during the time of cult of personality, the deaths of innocent people, the deformations in the spiritual and moral foundations of the people's lives?

Finding a balance between these stark contradictions is incredibly complicated, but we must do it, for our own sakes. To bemoan our own past and strike it out, and to start "with a clean sheet" is a deliberately hopeless attempt to run away from ourselves. We must not strike out the lives of entire generations as lives supposedly lived to no purpose, but we must understand that people were different and that they experienced the tragic collisions of their time in different ways. Some—the majority—labored selflessly and served the Motherland and the people, and believed in something better, and steadfastly endured the most difficult trials. Even today they are not prosperous, as they accept the blows of these troubled times. Others associate all their concerns with the present conjuncture of events, taking from it the maximum they can for themselves personally. Essentially such people are indifferent to what social values should be defended and what words should be uttered. And their talk today about our common guilt and their calls for general repentance sound false, to say the least. **The millions of people who have lived their lives honestly do not need repentance but the truth about the essential nature of what happened and is happening in the country.**

Was it possible to have avoided the defiling of the socialist idea and insure a more humane, less brutal path of development for the popular masses? Historians will be arguing for a long time about the alternatives. And here, it is obviously essential to make a careful study of why the creative potential inherent in Lenin's concept of the New Economic Policy [NEP] was not fully realized. Although history is still being "re-played," I nevertheless think that the scholars close to the truth are those who suggest that **not only did an alternative exist, it was even to some extent realized** in our country, including during the 1920's through the 1950's. Was it not during that period that the objective process of self-development took place in a revolutionary people which had been raised up for historical creativity whose meaning was not only much broader than the ideology and practice of Stalinism but even spoke in favor of its radical rejection? The enthusiasm and selfless self-sacrifice in the building of socialism cannot be explained by blind stimulation of an unconscious mob. A conscious, democratic principle was involved.

It was precisely to the creative upsurge of the working masses, which blazed the road for themselves despite all the distortions of the socialist idea, that the country is indebted for its very existence. And its future fate hangs on the degree to which the workers will be the driving force of revolutionary socialist perestroyka, and how fully it realizes their interests. Only in this way will it be possible to halt the degeneration of perestroyka into an antipopular trend and return it to the channel of transformations that are socialist in spirit and meaning. This is why, having proclaimed the correctness of scientific socialism, the RSFSR Communist Party is striving to express in all its activity the interests **of the working class, the peasantry, and the intelligentsia—those who live on the income that they earn, who do not have other sources of income.**

What does this mean for a **political** party, and even more for the Communist Party? For this is the task that the trade unions have set themselves, and no mass public organization (at least those that are registered) is rejecting it. The question should obviously be that of representation and defense of the **class** interests of the working man, that is, basic, long-term interests stemming from the objective position of the workers within the system of social production and distribution. These interests, which directly affect issues of political power, are the main highways in the development of society.

It is, of course, possible to defend the interests of the popular masses by recognizing the immovable and unchangeable common socioeconomic and political conditions of their lives, which were created by other social forces, including exploiter forces; by not asking the workers to look within the framework of **these** conditions, set earlier, toward goals far beyond their aspirations, for the most acceptable and favorable position; and by bargaining for various kinds of unprincipled concessions from the ruling classes. Within the worker's movement this line of behavior has become known as trade unionism, and is being actively followed by contemporary social democracy in the capitalist countries. While recognizing the undisputed successes of social democracy in the West in raising the living standards of the people and defending their economic interests, we should not forget that the extensive social reforms are not only, or even not so much, to its credit. They became possible thanks to a number of revolutionary changes in the 20th century, and the October Revolution was the foundation of those changes. This is the reality about which a stubborn silence is now being maintained, but it has not ceased to exist.

It was precisely the October Revolution that showed that it is possible to defend the real interests of the people in another way—not by being satisfied with what was given "from above," by the powers that be, but by fighting so that the workers **themselves** could create the basic conditions for their lives, and so that the historical creativity of the masses could be introduced as a conscious and organized initiative. This is the **real** task for the political party of the workers, and no one else can fulfill it. This approach also defines the attitude of Russian communists toward the entire set of urgent problems, first and foremost the problem of switching to a regulated market economy.

3. In the lengthy and abstract debates about ways to make the transition to the market, in my view the most important thing has been lost, namely, the question of **who, how, and in whose interests** will it be organized and regulated? Should the workers, peasants, and labor intelligentsia hand it over to the owners of the underground, shadow capital in unison with their allies from the bureaucratic and corrupt part of the management apparatus, or can they deal with the whole thing themselves and insure democratic control over the market despite the claims of the alliance of the new bureaucrats and the new bourgeoisie for economic and political domination?

Today, these are the questions of concern to the workers: How is privatization progressing? Who will have the means of production? Will privatization not become a new kind of administrative tyranny, without the agreement or participation of the labor collectives? Will not private ownership be a factor in a new growth of corruption in the organs of power, and of pilfering national property? And there is the quite well-founded fear that without strict state and public control over prices and incomes and the quality of goods, without a fair tax policy, and without a developed court and legal system, the market may become, and indeed is already becoming, an anarchy of the most barbarous and extortionist forms, leading to stagnation and the collapse of social production.

Under these conditions it is not enough simply to announce that the Communist Party will defend the interests of the workers. It is necessary to point out that among the social forces that have declared their devotion to perestroyka, two diametrically opposed and incompatible political and economic trends have recently been clearly distinguished. One of them is turning with increasing certainty toward restoration of capitalist relations in the interests of the neo-capitalist elements of the criminal bourgeoisie that have sprung up here in the preceding period and are developing rapidly. The other is directed toward the renewal of socialism in the interests of the working people. Supporters of the liberal-shopkeeper ideal—those who have an interest in dismembering the country and eliminating it as a major world power—have taken their stand on one side of the political barricades. To achieve their ends they are today actively joined in a bloc with the nationalist forces. Truly democratic forces are gathering on the other side, fighting for survival and the independent prosperity of the Motherland on the basis of popular power, social justice, national equality, and human dignity.

The economic programs of both trends contain market demands, but if you look closely you cannot fail to notice that **their real meaning is contrary.** The workers understand the market primarily as a guarantee of economic independence, free distribution of their own property and the fruits of their labor, improved well-being, and their active inclusion in the management of production and society; while the new bourgeoisie sees the market as something quite different—a means of dismissing the labor collectives from the means of production and ousting them from economic and political power, a means to provide space in which the "free" buying and selling of the work force will be developed.

Some people are very reluctant to allow the central problem of the day to be seen in the public consciousness in this way. Many of the mass media in hundreds and thousands of published pieces are trying to conceal this **main, truly class contradiction between working people and the bourgeois-bureaucratic bloc opposing them.** It is being made to appear that no such contradiction even exists. At the same time, titanic efforts are being made to depict the internecine fighting stemming from the sharing of spheres of political and economic influence and going on in the camp of the people in the shadow economy and the bureaucrats, as the main content and main contradiction of perestroyka. There is nothing original in this—the "two-party" system and manipulating the consciousness and behavior of the masses was invented and put into use long ago. There is no better method for disorienting the people and depriving them of independence than to foist upon them a false alternative and draw into the internecine dissension interests that are alien to them.

In order to understand the real way in which events are unfolding it is necessary to reject the new but already familiar ideological stereotypes and to think about the

real socioeconomic meaning hidden behind the formula of "changing to a market economy."

4. In recent years, liberal ideologues have been spreading and introducing to the people's consciousness the latest myth, which is directly contrary to what was instilled through many of the preceding decades. It is the myth of the market as a universal socioeconomic mechanism that supposedly automatically resolves all social contradictions and leads to universal happiness and abundance. All we have to do, they say, is set this mechanism in motion after having smashed the "administrative command system." How real are these promises?

Initial experience of action in this direction has already shown the worthlessness of the new market dogmatism. The compulsory and hasty introduction, campaign style, of market relations, understood in a vulgar way, in many spheres and sectors of material production (not to mention the spheres of culture, education, and public health, which are basically or mainly incompatible with the market), and the endless train of compromises that entangle each other, have led to the progressive breaking of natural ties of cooperation already formed between enterprises and a decline in the production of many vitally important products and articles, and have caused an unprecedented wave of departmental and parochial ambitions and group egoism. All of this has promoted a collapse of the unified all-Union market. The latest, quite superfluous proof of this has been the fact that it is in no way a question of "temporary difficulties" but rather that it is impossible to treat all economic ills using the same medicine. The market (sometimes pseudo-market) "medicine," administered in doses large enough to choke a horse, is also affecting the vital centers for which it is in principle beneficial. Sweet hopes have turned to bitter disillusionment.

The fact of the matter is that the market can be neither "introduced" nor "banned" by decree. It is an aggregate of objective social relations between those involved in production, with the need for a social division of labor and the economic isolation of producers occurring at a certain level, and, just as importantly, the strengthening connection and interdependence of the individual elements of production, which are transformed naturally as they become obsolete as production is socialized. For example, there are no relationships of buying and selling of a product in subsistence patriarchal farming. Those relationships are transformed and largely lose their market character even within a modern major industrial association—a concern that integrates dozens and even hundreds of production facilities that rarely belong to vastly different sectors. Thus, the market is an historical category that is seen in diverse and increasingly complex forms. It has its own temporal and structural limits, which at this time are very broad, but it is in no way **all-embracing.**

Under capitalism, at the highest stages of production development, planned management methods are introduced that mitigate and block anarchic randomness in the market. Classic private property has largely lost its position and the state is becoming a direct subject in the regulation of social production in general, and the market is becoming increasingly dependent on deliberate initiative, and is oriented in a purposeful way. It is indicative that the proportion of the state sector in particular sectors of the economy in the developed capitalist countries is quite significant.

Socialism as an economic system is growing precisely because of this trend, but it should go further. It should eliminate the commodity form of labor and thus also the source whereby capital increases by itself—the exploitation of man by man. The sphere in which the most important kinds of fixed production capital are bought and sold is also restricted, which opens up the possibility of regulating production in accordance with a single state plan.

But neither can it be denied that under socialism a layer of real market relations that cannot be eliminated by order or compulsion is still retained, and will be for the foreseeable future. We are talking primarily about relations in those sectors and spheres and kinds of production where there is a dominance of enterprises that are insufficiently integrated one with another through intrasector and intersector ties of cooperation, that is, those national economic zones where what Lenin called the merging of diverse production facilities into a single social production process has still not been achieved. **This** market, like, of course, the market for consumer goods and services, has not disappeared. But because of voluntarist methods that ignore it, it has been driven into the economic underground and thus freed from any kind of social control, and as a result has partially fallen into total decline and partially come under the power of speculators. In one sense, if we consider the chaotic and random nature and uncivilized and predatory character of our market, it is much closer to our own "classic norm" than to the modern market in the West, which today is moving away from the "pure" market toward something basically new, and includes forms of organization and regulation of social production borrowed from socialism.

In light of the above, the formula set for the switch to the market can be seen in its true form. It is not a question of us supposedly not having a market as a sphere of commodity-exchange relations, but of restoring the normal economic "blood circulation" as essential in order to make an end to anarchy and confusion and to purge the market relations that really do exist of the authoritarian-bureaucratic deformations, and learn how to regulate them by applying the entire arsenal of economic management methods known in world practice.

Here, a broad field is opening up for activity by communists. The party, of course, does not organize and manage the economy, but it should act vigorously, particularly in those cases in which the market begins to show itself to be destructive, when it hurts the interests of the workers. It is important to define what should be defended in every possible way, and what should be affirmed. We will proceed strictly from the interests of the working majority and the priority of the various forms of public ownership over private ownership. In short, from the priority of the socialist choice.

The main thing that cannot be permitted is prolonged deterioration of living conditions for the people and mass unemployment, and sharp social differentiation and a new division of society into rich exploiters and a mass of exploited poor people. The planned bases for expanded reproduction and the national social and structural policy should in no way be eliminated because this would simply deprive the country of the important advantages and prospects for socioeconomic progress.

It appears that one subject of particular dispute recently has been the question of ownership of land, resolved long ago. Defining its own position on this, the RSFSR Communist Party proceeds from the premise that land is not the product of someone's labor, cannot be subject to reproduction by man, and has no price. It is part of nature, given to people as a blessing. It cannot be regarded merely as an object of agricultural production, even less as an object that can be bought and sold or belong to someone in the form of private capital. Given all the varieties of forms of ownership and farming and the great economic diversity in the agrarian sector, land should not be privately owned. It is quite another matter when we are talking about the free transfer of tracts of land to collectives or citizens under a legislative procedure for the production of agricultural output or the building of homes or dachas for use in perpetuity, including the right of inheritance. In cases in which a plot of land is returned to society by the user of that land, he should be fully compensated for expenditures connected with its development and amelioration and for maintaining it at a certain level of fertility. The issue of land is fundamental and should be decided only by the people by way of referendum.

One urgent task that should be resolved as quickly as possible is stabilization of the consumer market and curbing inflation. The recipes are known throughout the world: monetary reform, providing incentive for the production of goods and services, strict economic and administrative control over the balance between prices and incomes and between state and local budgets, making the saving of money attractive, and so forth. But up to now we are applying these measures only timidly, slowly, and inconsistently.

A socialist state should not step aside from the market; it is obligated to maintain positions vis-a-vis the market that are at least as strong as in the developed countries in the West. The state should remain the largest owner of the means of production, and the legislator and arbiter in the sphere of the action of market relations.

5. The task of normalizing commodity-exchange relations and insuring that they function in a healthy and civilized way on a socialist basis should, however, not be replaced by the task of introducing a "market for the market's sake" in our society, a total denationalization and the implantation of private ownership.

There is no doubt that the monopoly position of state ownership, regardless of the economic reality, is unsound. Socialization as an objective process growing out of the natural development of scientific and technology and the equipment for and organization of production, and out of the intensifying interconnection between many of its elements, is one thing; zealous administrative high-handedness striving for mechanical unification, under the aegis of the state, of everything and anything right down to hairdressing services and cleaning shoes is another. But the other extreme is also absurd: belief that economic decentralization and privatization saves everything. This is as much wooden dogma and the same kind of myopic reckoning as is the idea of denationalization at any price.

Lenin repeatedly emphasized the radical difference between **pro forma** socialization—nationalization, expropriation, confiscation, and so forth—and the socialization of production **in fact.** After the revolution the new order confronted what was in the full sense of the word the worldwide-historic task of achieving economic, political, and psychological mastery by the workers, who had not previously experienced being in the position of supreme and undivided owner of the entire national wealth, and thus finally consolidating the just completed revolution in production relations. **Being called** an owner, and **actually being** an owner, are by no means the same thing. The real process of transition from the former to the latter turned out to be considerably more difficult and prolonged than it had seemed in dream and theory. The objective circumstances resulting from the foreign intervention, the civil war, and the economic blockade showed that general statization of the means of production had not only its positive but also its negative aspects, and led to increased bureaucracy and a shadow economy, and, as a result, to the drama of the deformation of socialism. Elements of real alienation of the working man from bureaucratic state ownership arose, and he increasingly became to all appearances a "nobody," and in fact was trampled down by corrupt officials.

Unification of the workers with the means of production, which corresponds in the economic sense to the collective nature of socialism, did not occur; this is the generally recognized understanding of the nature of the crisis in public ownership. What what should be done next, how do we extricate ourselves from this wanton state? This is a problem through which a watershed runs between two economic and political lines. It is possible to move toward an efficient, democratic form of public ownership where the working people are the masters. But it is also possible to move in the opposite direction—along the path of capitalist privatization and different kinds and forms of private ownership, which assumes the indispensable condition of introducing an unrestricted private market, including a labor force market.

This is the choice that must be made. As communists we do not hide our adherence to the first of those paths. But we favor the choice being made on a strictly voluntary and aware basis by the workers themselves and by all the people precisely in their capacity as full-fledged owners of the national wealth, not as a deluded and stripped down "work force" under the pressure of underhand administrative privatization. Second, we favor actual diversity of forms in socialist socialization.

The essential nature of the latter problem is obviously that, without changing its social, collective nature, public ownership should radically improve the internal structure. It should be **personalized** in the various forms of brigade, family, and lease procedures, and it should overcome impersonality and indifference to the individual and at the same time be "born again" on the basis of the collective-group forms of labor and appropriation that already exist, and on their integration into higher forms under the pressure of objective economic need and on the basis of independent choice by the workers as collective co-owners of particular enterprises. The best reference point here is their own specific management experience under conditions of economic freedom. In the kinds of formations already created during the years of perestroyka in the countryside, such as independent individual, family, and other "small" labor collectives functioning within the framework of kolkhozes [collective farms], sovkhozes [state farms], and industrial enterprises on a contract, leasing, or other long-term contractual basis, but necessarily with full economic responsibility for the results of their own economic activity and with the right to dispose of the final product of their labor, the creative possibilities of the individual are discovered and the problem of public property "having no owner" is eliminated. This kind of experience is quite varied. At the Ordzhonikidze kolkhoz in the Dagestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the forms of economic mutual relations in the primary collectives between themselves and with the farm administration are not like the relations that have been established at the Za Mir i Trud kolkhoz in Krasnoyarsk Kray, while in the people's enterprise of the ferroconcrete articles plant in Ulyanovsk Oblast they are different from those at the cellulose and paper plant in Kaliningrad Oblast. There are many such examples in the country. Structures of the type used by the Kuban agro-industrial complex, the Staropolskoye People's Poultry Association, the Kvant Intersector Scientific-Production Association, and others have given a good account of themselves during the later stages of relations associated with storage, transport, processing, and marketing of the finished product, introduction of scientific and technical progress, and so forth. By selling their labor in the form of a final social product used for consumption, the workers at these formations, which are based on socialist public ownership, also act as the masters of their own labor. These kinds of production structures are a significant step forward compared to what we have had, and are essentially quite incomparable when it comes to the primitive, compulsory privatization envisaged in some programs for the transition to the market.

Thus, diversity of form in the realization of socialist, social property also makes it possible to find forms for efficiently combining the worker with the means of production and making him master of his own labor. Workers in the most diverse sectors of the national economy are gradually starting to be convinced of this. Thus, miners at mines that have been made totally independent economically are already beginning to talk about the need to combine the mines into a unified complex with mining-and-enriching factories and coking-and-chemical combines, otherwise they will not survive.

The choice here is restricted. If this association does not take place on an aware and voluntary basis, centripetal and integrating forces, which are not eliminated under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, will still force a road through for themselves. But it will take place in a random way and infringe on the radical interests of the labor collectives.

The workers should be aware of this prospect ahead of time. The communists are obliged to explain it to them. Without any kind of self-deception they must be told directly that a market in which labor will be treated as a commodity is a capitalist market. There most certainly is an alternative. Moreover, it is without prospects. It is not some invented "ideological" considerations that make us object to its "introduction," as some overzealous authors of market programs assert, but the facts, and a justified concern for the fate of the great majority of the population.

You cannot import the alluring capitalist market from the West in finished form. Establishing that market will require many decades of innumerable economic and political acts of violence against the workers. For proof of this, all we have to do is recall the methods used to "introduce" this kind of market in the "free" countries of classical capitalism. "Enclosure" leading to the destruction of an entire class of free farmers—Shakespeare's "proud yeomen"—terrorist criminal laws against the "vagrants" driven from the land, the workhouses, which were essentially penal prisons for those same vagrants—all this happened not all that long ago in England's past. Could capitalism have been made so strong on its feet in the United States of America without the barbaric destruction of the aborigines and the very extensive use of slave labor? Today, too, the relative prosperity in the developed zone of capitalism as a world economic system is paid for at the price of chronic hunger, poverty, epidemics, and the plundering of natural resources and destruction of the environment in the other zone—where a significant proportion of humankind lives. And this antagonism is not at all some "temporary defect" of development but **an essential condition** for the functioning of the capitalist method of production. In their leisure time our disciples of "common sense" in economics should calculate how many lives were wasted and continue to be wasted so that this "common sense" can triumph, and consider the role that would be assigned to our country in insuring a further burgeoning for Western society. Then we could have an honest talk with the Soviet people about the market.

The capitalist market in Russia has already suffered a defeat once, not as the result of the ill will of "a group of conspirators" but because it revealed its own inability to resolve the fundamental problems of an enormous multinational country. And now they are calling on us the start all over once again and be patient for another indefinite period of belt tightening for the sake of some problematic future prosperity. In fact, our people are endlessly patient. But where is the guarantee that by following those calls we will march into a future human civilization rather than yesterday's? Who has offered proof that true, unperverted socialism is devoid of historical prospects?

6. In the so-called "independent" press the talk about the lasting gains of civilization and common human values is being carried on in a tone that is increasingly didactic with respect to socialism. It turns out that capitalism alone has supposedly made and created the foundations of civilized communal living while socialism has destroyed them. This is obvious juggling, done in classic propaganda style, with the "good old times" when the hopes "of all progressive mankind" were focused exclusively on the stars of the Kremlin while the space outside was filled in with black paint. The only difference is that in this artless scheme the plus signs have been replaced with minus signs, and vice versa. There is not even a hint of the new thinking here.

We talk about the universally recognized achievements that have become and are still becoming part of the mores of modern civilization, it is simply dishonest to remain silent about or to deny the fact that many of them were born in the channel of socialist teachings and embodied during the course of the building of socialism. Planned regulation of the economy on a large scale, the right to work and to housing, worker participation in the management of production, free education and public health—these are just some of the values of socialism that have been increasingly affirmed as common human achievements. It is possible, and even necessary, to consider and enter into dispute about why, when the leading capitalist countries that found themselves at one time on the edge of economic and social upheavals and essentially total collapse, they managed to use them more effectively than have we. It is, however, nonsensical to cast doubt on their socialist origin, even more to reject them. On the contrary, it is essential, finally, to consider how to reveal more fully the inherent, original possibilities of the socialist social order.

The experience of the past few years has shown that the steps taken to renew socialism should be carefully weighed and realistic, and should proceed from the objective laws of the development of society and take into account the diverse historical, cultural, national, and psychological features of people's lives, which in our multinational Motherland is particularly important. Otherwise, any gains or advances in one direction may be overturned and turned around by serious losses in another.

How can we insure the proper sense of system in the matter of regenerating socialist society and giving it a "second wind"? I am convinced that this is possible only if we rely on the fundamental principles inwardly inherent in our society. They are an objective condition, even though attempts are made to deny them. Apart from public ownership of the means of production, which we have discussed, they include the direct social purpose of social production, distribution according to labor, and ideological-moral and creative factors to provide incentives for it, along with material and scientific planning and management of the national economic complex, national accounting and control over production and spending of the national wealth, and socialist self-government by the people.

It is amazing, but either none of the above-named principles have been adopted in the perestroyka process, or they have been construed and—the main thing—embodied in specific forms of management totally "the wrong way round." Judge for yourselves what the price will be for the premature claim that it is, so they say, impossible to restructure socialism! Have really serious attempts been made to effect a thorough reform of our society on socialism's own principled basis?

Take, for example, the problem of planning. The authority of state plans and programs has never fallen as low as it is now. This is understandable. For many reasons, among which we should name the extremely incompetent turn toward the idea of cost accounting, planning has been increasingly divorced from people's real needs and has become increasingly the manipulation of unadorned pseudo-values and arbitrary physical indicators. Planning has been done and is being done not on the basis of real resources and specific social needs, but "from what has been achieved" or "from what is desired," and this is happening as the ruble is losing its purchasing power in a catastrophic way. What relationship does this have with socialist principles?

Notwithstanding, some people are declaring that the idea of the plan in general is "discredited." This despite the fact that planning based on prediction of the individual's and society's needs is used extensively in all the industrially developed countries in the world. Their experience indicates that without advance planned calculation it is impossible to resolve any major scientific and technical or socioeconomic problem effectively, not to mention the global problems of the age—energy, food, the ecology, and so forth.

Another example. Enormous reserves for improving production efficiency are hidden in strengthening the independence and responsibility of the workers and the creative character of their labor. At the present stage in the scientific and technical revolution, the greatest returns are achieved by investing in the individual and developing his personality. Experience gained in entrepreneurial activity in the West and in Japan in particular shows that today the greatest economic successes are achieved by those companies that insure conscious worker participation in the technological process, introduce various forms of production self-management and competition, combine material and moral incentive for work, appeal to the sense of patriotism and professional honor, and so forth. It is not difficult to see that much here has been borrowed from the theory and practice of socialism. We, however, do not preserve our own invaluable experience and we not develop it. On the contrary, fetishization of the monetary interest and providing incentive for labor exclusively with the ruble have exacerbated a situation in which there are no commodities to cover the money available, and has bolstered inflation.

At one time Lenin called for a study of how production is organized among the organizers of trusts. To judge from the examples cited, to this day this appeal has been realized only poorly. Neither do we endow our own experience here, or the centuries-long tradition of communal labor, or mutual assistance and mutual help. For socialism cannot spring into being in empty space. It grows naturally from the development of the world's material and spiritual culture and it absorbs those elements that unite people, rather than setting them one against the other. No truly just or civilized society can be built on the exploitation of a naked craving for ready cash or on self-enrichment at the expense of others. This applies to all spheres of human communal living.

This is what the humanists and the representatives of socialist and communist thinking in past times thought: Everything that brings people together is good, and everything that disunites them is bad. Guided by this moral imperative, communists will act and participate in finding solutions to the entire aggregate of contemporary problems—economic, social, cultural, and national, ideological and moral. Decisively casting aside everything that during the process of the development of Soviet society has failed to pass the test of life and has turned out to be incompatible with the ideals of humanism, freedom, equality, popular power, and creativity, they will defend the lasting, positive gains of socialism that have become firmly incorporated in the common human experience and preserved in the layers of world civilization. The main task in our crucial times is to defend the purity of socialist values upon which mud and lies and slander are being so lavishly poured, and which are being attacked so insolently by the latter day bourgeoisie as it strains to gain power and deceive the workers who are making money. **The communists of Russia are for the socialist nature of perestroyka.** That is their position, and they do not intend to retreat from it.

Polozkov Assails 'So-Called Democrats'

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[Speech by Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee at meeting with party aktiv at Moscow's "Dinamo" plant on 4 February: "Upholding the Ideas of Perestroyka"]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

First of all, allow me to thank you for the invitation to visit your famous plant. I deem it an honor to be a guest of your labor collective and to address members of the Communist Party's oldest organization. I greet you with great satisfaction on behalf of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party leadership.

Our meeting also strikes me as important because it is taking place right after a CPSU Central Committee plenum which discussed central questions—without exaggeration, the acutest questions today—of communists' activity. I would like to convey to you the main purport of the plenum's decisions, the atmosphere of high responsibility in which it took place, and the main tasks which it set the party.

We know that the party and all society are in a difficult, crisis situation. This is why the earnest, sharp discussion which took place at the plenum attracted the heightened attention of the whole country. People would like to hope that the plenum will mark a turning point in the party's activity and the start of its sharp activation and serve as a signal for an offensive in the political struggle.

Yes, this word—offensive—is the key to understanding the plenum's significance. It was repeated by many speakers, it appeared in plenum documents, and it at once elicited a sharp reaction from our opponents or, to be more exact, our political ideological enemies.

But it is in vain that people are shouting that there will be an offensive by tanks and military patrols and that a transition to dictatorship has begun in the country. It is a question of something quite different—of the party's active, offensive role in society and of the communists' consistent fulfillment of their duty to the people.

The conclusion was drawn at the plenum—and I spoke of this in my speech—that perestroyka, which was conceived in 1985 and begun by the party and the people as the renewal of socialism, the fuller utilization of its potential for developing the economy and culture, the broadening of democracy, and the enhancement of people's well-being—that this perestroyka has not taken place and must be put back on the right path. The so-called "democrats" succeeded in supplanting the aims of perestroyka and seizing the initiative from our party. Society has ended up at a crossroads, in a grave crisis, profoundly disoriented and demoralized. The breakdown of economic and political structures has begun, and interethnic conflicts have flared up.

An ever greater number of people today feel themselves to be people without kith or kin, without historical roots, without a past, which democratic well-wishers have smeared with black paint, criticized, and spat upon. It turns out that whatever our fathers and grandfathers did and everything we are doing is bad and fit for nothing. And it is suggested to us that this is, above all, because for more than 70 years the country took the wrong road and because Bolsheviks and communists are criminals and wreckers. It is no coincidence that hysterical calls for communists to be shot and hanged are heard at gatherings, at so-called rallies and marches organized by "democrats."

In this situation they try to convince the people that the only way out, the better future that is coming to them, is a return to capitalism and the abandonment of the gains of socialism and of its values and ideals. That it is not the working class but some "middle class," i.e. slick operators and entrepreneurs, that is society's main engine and the conduit of democracy. Precisely this is asserted by N. Travkin, the former communist who heads a party which calls itself anticommunist. That full employment is bad, and unemployment is good. That we do not need the unified federative state which has taken shape over centuries, and that the fraternal republics, which have developed in close unity, must build relations among themselves as foreign states.

Well, we have before us the example of the East European countries which have taken the path of dismantling the socialist system. But what have the working people gained from this?

Yes, certain groups of the population seem to have gained, but the majority have lost out badly. Take Hungary. According to data published at the beginning of the year by the Gallup Institute, the world's most authoritative research institute, the material position of just 4 or 5 percent of the population has improved since the reforms were implemented. Living standards have fallen for 42 percent of it. A further deterioration in living standards awaits 84 percent of the population in the coming year, and just 2 percent of Hungarians hope that they will have a better life. And this in a country where new economic management mechanisms were being worked out long ago. Why should we reckon that the situation will be better for us?

You ask: What of the party? Why does it not rebuke those who encroach upon our system, who want to change society's whole way of life? Why was the CPSU unable to discern in time the start of the degeneration of perestroyka, and why did it allow this process to gather momentum? Why is it moving away from its historic purpose of protecting the interests of the working people above all?

A legitimate question. A question both to the party's leadership and to rank-and-file communists. And it is necessary to have a clear-cut answer to it not in order to chastise the guilty persons at all costs. Although we cannot overlook the actions of those who have broken with the CPSU and who oppose it, and the plenum, as you know, also examined some personal questions. But the chief thing for us is to really get to the bottom of the causes of the party's weakness in order to make it strong, so that it is able to emerge worthily from the crisis and fulfill its duty to the people in full.

We must honestly admit that we have made quite a lot of mistakes, above all in our theoretical quest. Where is the harm, you might think, in our starting to speak of the leading role of panhuman interests? Are we really opposed to them? Are there really interests common to mankind which the working class does not share? But our theoreticians complicated matters by starting to contrast the panhuman principle with the class principle.

By giving priority to worldwide values and saying: first the panhuman, then the class, we inevitably violated the dialectical unity of these principles. We weakened the party's class vision and drew a veil over the real contradictions between individual social groups of society. This ultimately meant that we pushed working people into the background. Was this not confirmed by the fact that the proportion of representatives of workers and peasants fell sharply in the last elections of people's deputies?

Having disoriented the working people, we also disoriented the party. On whom were we to rely, whose interests were we to defend? Yes, we became entangled and proved unprepared for an acute political struggle.

And while we were talking baby talk—pardon the expression—with our enemy and rejoicing in how panhuman we all are, he was firmly taking the party by the throat. Our radical friends began with honeyed words about democracy and glasnost, but, having gained in strength and encountering no proper rebuff, they quite quickly dropped the masks of democrats. Having proclaimed anticommunism their ideology, they are gathering beneath its banners the successors of the overthrown classes, nationalists, slick operators in the shadow economy, and all who are hindered by Soviet power.

And what is the glasnost preached by our pseudodemocrats like? Believe me, nowhere in the world is there such an anticommunist, malicious press as that published by our homegrown "democrats." Information terrorism is an accurate expression. And they have lost all notions of decency to such an extent that they try to shout out that they themselves are the target of propaganda violence, of an information blockade! That KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, IZVESTIYA, MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, and many others are trying to torment them, not us.

It is no coincidence that the anticommunist groups that have multiplied in our country are readily supported by international capital. Just what methods are not used to help expand their political positions. Things even go so far as the leader of the Russian television and radio company openly declaring that it will be able, if necessary, to conduct its activity from abroad. And he knows what he is talking about. He has only to ask, and how they will support him! And they will find the necessary "legal" basis for this. While we will continue to look blank. What wonderful democracy we have!

People said to us: Look, the whole world admires perestroyka, and everyone is interested in its success. But we had only to take the very first measures to instill the necessary order in the country and to defend legality, and the smiles vanished and people tried once again to converse with us in the language of threats and ultimatums.

Probably, many of you have read the report by independent experts on the Lithuanian events published in MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 1 February. The Western special services, which are seeking to stage a major political show, however much human blood may be shed here, are so prominent in the Baltic region.

Now is the very time to speak of our interethnic problems. What is happening in the Baltic region today is nothing other than a process of drawing into civil war. The confrontation, if we look at the root of the matter, has been brought about by the fact that Western-oriented totalitarian regimes of a nationalist trend are hastily being formed there. Working people of nonindigenous nationalities are subject to unprecedented discrimination. They are trying to replace the Constitutions of the USSR and the republics with anticonstitutional acts violating citizens' sociopolitical rights.

And what is the point of forming new organs of power supposedly on the basis of democratic elections? Is it really a matter only of the election mechanism? You will recall that even the Hitlerites came to power as the result of elections, also "democratic-style." I have already said how, given our really most democratic norms, workers and peasants have mainly been left outside the organs of power.

So what is important is not only democratic norms but also the nature of the political organizations which make use of them and the aims and substance of their activity. Everyday practice in all countries proves that, in conditions of democracy, forces which speculate and parasitize on it can emerge.

Those who place the mass media on the same level and in the same category as political organizations are right. They frequently become the mouthpiece of people who have not passed through the sieve of democratic elections or become an organ of professional journalists who represent only themselves. But they do, of course, claim to express public opinion and to have the right to speak in the people's name. An example of this is the present situation in the sphere of the mass media in our country.

Of course, "democrats" will be indignant to hear this. But take the example of Nevzorov, for example. I mentioned this at the plenum. He had only to make one broadcast which did not meet their interests, and literally the next day they flung mud at him. What about the way the so-called "independent press" tries its best to whitewash those who were mixed up in the scandalous affair involving 140 billion rubles?

And what about the way it has been up in arms against the order relating to joint patrols by the military and the militia in city streets? Whom can the order frighten? Probably only those who really have no interest in maintaining order.

Or, finally, the wailing about the national salvation committees. How come their creation can suddenly be anticonstitutional? In what way was "Democratic Russia" formed? Other public organizations? Was it not on the basis of an initiative from a group of people? Then, if we are to be consistent, let them also be considered illegal.

The RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee feels particularly keenly the whole spuriousness of the myth of the mass media's "independence," the myth that they are objective and impartial. We are the only party organization in the CPSU not to have its own mass media. The majority of state and independent mass media either boycott us or subject us to harsh attacks. Most frequently the latter.

For our party, which operates under the slogans of defending working people's interests and reviving Russia, has, so it turns out, the support of the majority of the republic's population, and this is extremely alarming to our enemies. They are afraid that our position will hinder the realization of their plans. And they are right to fear this. But they struggle against us using not just permitted methods but, above all, illicit ones. This is the whole point.

Just what do they not say about us, just how do they not distort our positions. They say that our party was formed not according to the rules and pursues a conservative policy. And it hinders the work of the Supreme Soviet and the government. And that it is not a party at all but some group of impostors, although there are 8.6 million of us.

Honestly speaking, all this is disgusting. We are ready to argue, discuss, find points of contact, and even cooperate with decent, worthy opponents. And we are pleased when we find them. Yet those who dislike arguments and the truth and who want only to rant and fling mud predominate. Of course, we will never let ourselves descend to their level. But we must and will expose them and struggle against them.

It is very important for a socialist society to have forces capable of reflecting and defending working people's interests. And the Communist Party is such a force in our country. But, in developing democracy, we reached the valid conclusion that a multiparty system within the framework of socialism could more fully reflect the whole diversity of society's interests, that in healthy competition among various political trends there will be more guarantees against making wrong decisions, political morality will be enhanced, and there will be stronger barriers against corruption. Let some parties be ruling parties, and others propose constructive alternative solutions and play the role of a constructive opposition.

And yet here it was a question precisely of socialism. But most of the new political formations were opposed to the socialist system.

As a result, one can only conclude that we do not now have any multiparty system. There is the CPSU upholding socialist perestroyka, which the people approved and voted for, and there are numerous groupings which, in the final analysis, have just one political face—anticommunism. These groupings advocate the breakdown of socialism, the breakdown of the unified union state.

We cannot fail to be alarmed at the fact that destructive circles are seeking to pool their efforts. The "Democratic Russia" movement was set up last November, embracing diverse anticommunist organizations. The "Democratic Congress" was formed in Kharkov at the end of January, following repeated attempts; organizations related to "Democratic Russia" and also so-called "national democratic" organizations have gathered beneath its roof—in all, approximately 30 organizations from nine Union republics. The tasks are the same—to struggle against the unified state, against socialism, against the CPSU.

In other words, an organized political opposition with far-reaching aims is operating. It makes attacks, above all, on all-union structures, the Army, the KGB, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The USSR president is subjected to shameless attacks. In short, we have had imposed on us a tough political struggle which we cannot and must not evade.

All this is very serious, comrades. Each of us asks himself: What must all of us, the party, and labor collectives do to emerge from the situation which has come about? Every member of your party organization also asks himself such questions.

Unfortunately, certain comrades have found the way out by leaving the party. Well, not everyone's shoulders are equal to the heavy burden of responsibility which communists bear today. But are you and we doing everything to strengthen these shoulders and to help everyone to understand what is happening and to find faith in his own strength? No, not everything, and I think you will agree with this.

Of course, it is not just a matter of the attitude to general political problems or of understanding them correctly. This is not enough; every communist must take specific actions in his own collective, at his own work place. But you must not confine yourselves even to this. For you cannot organize things at the plant, even if you are thrice strong and united, if the state continues to be torn apart, if the economy is collapsing, if antisocialist trends are growing in the country's political life. So the first task of every communist is to support the measures of the state leadership and the president's decrees aimed at stabilizing the situation in the country. It is a question, above all, of mass political, explanatory work and of exposing our enemy's schemes. Every communist must become a propagandist and an agitator in his own collective and where he lives.

The second task is to activate the work of communists in soviets. Of course, this concerns deputies above all, but not only them. For voters too can and must influence their own organs of power. But do you often meet with deputies, consult with them, and help them? What is your party organization doing to influence the positions of those for whom votes were cast? For each of us has several of his own, so to speak, deputies—at the rayon, city, oblast, republic, and Union levels. All their good undertakings must be supported. For you are a very important mainstay for them.

The need to establish more effective ties with communists working in soviets and their establishments was mentioned at the plenum. The Russian Communist Party Central Committee sees it as one of its chief tasks to assist their primary party organizations. To help form active communist factions in the soviets. A special plenum is to be held on this question.

It is probably hard to say which is the most important area in the work of party organizations. But I will not be mistaken if I name as the key area work in production, which is the foundation of all social life.

It is no secret—and Silayev, chairman of the government, spoke of this once again in the republic Supreme Soviet several days ago, reporting on the situation in the economy—that this situation is grave. Economic ties have been disrupted, and there is no contract discipline. But the debate in parliament has shown once again that they do not tackle the economy properly there. Suffice it to say that the government still believes that the manifestly adventurist "500 days" program is viable. Many clever phrases are pronounced, and lofty matters are discussed, but no concrete practical results are achieved.

Rather, they are, but they are negative results. The production slump has not only not been halted but is even progressing. Shops in a number of enterprises have been at a standstill since the very first days of the new year, and production of the majority of the most important types of output fell in January compared with the same month last year. The delivery and storage of goods are badly organized. The plans for production and material and technical supplies have not been balanced. Mutual pledges among republics are violated.

True, the party does not assume purely economic functions today or resolve operational questions. But under conditions of a market economy, when neither the republics nor the center will order enterprises about, the role of labor collectives' party organizations remains very important.

They must show concern for all aspects of economic activity and influence it through communist economic leaders, by voicing their opinion at meetings of labor collectives, before labor collective councils, and in trade union and other public organizations. Or take ties among allied enterprises under the auspices of party committees. This has always been an effective factor of economic life. What about questions of cadre work in the enterprise? Is there not a field of activity here for the party organization?

Is the exemplary labor contribution of every communist at his work place not an effective area for influencing the economy? If every machine tool works well, things will go well throughout the national economy. For production means not only resolving purely organizational or technological tasks. A great deal here is decided by labor morality and a sense of responsibility, and communists must have these in the highest degree.

And take questions of social protection. The resolution of many of them has deteriorated today. The level of housing and sociocultural construction has fallen. It was pointed out at the plenum that the greatest failure in commissioning housing has occurred in Moscow, where 1.5 million square meters of housing less than planned has been constructed. Of course, the responsibility for all this is borne, above all, by the corresponding economic organs and Moscow City Soviet, where the majority is in the hands of our magniloquent "democrats." But have we done everything to support and help the construction workers?

In conclusion I would like to emphasize particularly the role of primary party organizations under modern conditions.

It has to be admitted that our enemies understand well the role of primary organizations. They form them in their own parties with special care. But they defame and discredit communists. Not just the party as a whole but also each organization and each communist, trying to hold them responsible for all affairs in the country.

As was emphasized at the plenum, every party cell must be constantly working, operating, achieving concrete results. This, in addition to the consistent democratization of party life, is the guarantee of the party's real renewal. The special role of primary organizations stems from precisely this.

This is not a commonplace, formal statement. Yes, the role is special, of full value, and crucial. The role is independent and active, when an organization acts with initiative and without constant control and goading on the part of higher organs, when it sets itself tasks and resolves them. Of course, rayon committees must also help them, but, after all, the party's entire political energy is realized in the actions of primary organizations. If they are passive, the party will perish.

I will tell you frankly that I sometimes receive notes at meetings with enterprise communists and at party aktiv meetings: Please explain what our primary party organization must do. I do not answer such questions. Rather, I say the following: Think for yourselves, this is your duty and your right. The party's leaders cannot know the state of affairs in every primary organization, and they are not required to either. The Central Committee must ensure a view of general political problems and our strategic course and define the goals—big and small. Assist the exchange of experience and cadre training. But the communists of each party organization must work for themselves.

In my opinion, this is a good approach. It helps us to coordinate the efforts of the whole party, and it does not hinder every communist from revealing himself and creatively tackling the great cause to which he has devoted his life, conscious of his own responsibility and leaning on a friend's shoulder.

Permit me to wish you too, dear party comrades, and the entire collective of the "Dinamo" plant great successes in all your affairs.

Khasbulatov, Yeltsin Assailed Over Riga Events

91UN0813A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Jan 91 Second Edition p 3

[Letter by Larisa Khrapova, member of the USSR Union of Writers: "Deputies, Have Mercy on the People!"]

[Text] Rostov-on-Don—**I would like to talk to you about a sleepless night. For me, the night of 21-22 January was sleepless. From the windows of our high-rise, I could see the windows of similar adjacent high-rises. There was light in a majority of them. This meant that they were likewise awake, and the clock indicated that it was almost 0200.**

I could see in my mind's eye how many elderly peers of mine were clutching at their hearts—the hearts at which TV screens were shooting. It was impossible to evade and impossible to scream. Whether you screamed or not, there was no feedback. The old, worn-out hearts burst with strain, pent-up grief, and anger. Good God, was any one of these fine-looking gentlemen, from the chairman and the one in the chair to a popular actor and a ranking military man, aware of what they were doing and who their bullet-words were aimed at?! Intoxicated with their hatred for the Communist Party and its leader, and at the same time for all of us, people of the socialist option, they failed to notice how they personally crushed and trampled underfoot the principles to defend which they had allegedly convened an early session...

At the doors to the auditorium, people from the Baltic area, who could have added yet another grain of truth regarding events in their region, waited for a long time for permission to enter. Despite the persistence of some sober voices (to the credit of individual parliamentarians, such were heard after all), it appears that these people were not allowed into the auditorium. At any rate, we did not get to see this. The seeker of truth and humanist Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov resorted to all kinds of tricks in order to give an aura of legitimacy to this act of insolence, in human terms, or an antidemocratic device, in political terms. Before the eyes of millions of TV viewers, the elementary human rule worded by an ancient Greek philosopher in his time—"Do not pass judgment without hearing both parties first"—was mocked. This was apparently done in the belief that the public had been ultimately fooled. This was precisely where the pathos of your speech should have been directed, our respected popular actor Basilashvili! Meanwhile, you expended the entire fervor of your talent to cast the now customary slurs upon the party and to defend what appears democracy to you against the current leadership of Central Television and Kravchenko—who supposedly had the intention to fool TV viewers by means of his entertainment programs—personally. As it turns out, he has more charity and humanity than you do. He understands better how and by what means to shelter millions of people from the now serious threat of massive psychological breakdowns and stress.

However, it appears that our parliamentarians who taught us one more lesson of "democracy" could not care less. There was haggling over the rules of procedure, deliberate stalling for time, and deliberate "failure to understand" remarks from microphones on the part of the person in the chair... Should Alksnis be given the floor? He should not? Anyway, we know what he is going to say; is it worth wasting time? This was an astounding argument! The dodges of Khasbulatov were way too obvious. They did give the floor to Alksnis after all. It appears that what he talked about—group abuse of the kidnapped wife of an OMON [Special Missions Militia Unit] officer, the event that became a fuse in the explosive situation in Riga on that day—should have roused any audience, even the most biased one. However, this was not the case! The nerves of Russian parliamentarians had been steeled, and the main point was that you could not put one over on them easily. Immediately, a question-retort followed from the floor: Give us her name—if this woman is not an imaginary one. The colonel waved his notebook—there was a name all right, but, naturally, he did not name it. Are those who demanded that the name of the woman who had been abused be named publicly for all to know, men? Time will come when the name will be named in an appropriate setting in order to hold accountable those who have committed outrages and those who have winked at this.

What happened next after the Alksnis speech? What could be expected happened. Khasbulatov let onto the podium another Latvian, but this time certainly one "on the team," who cited counterfacts and a list of misdeeds by OMON personnel. This was impressive, and the audience applauded. Few people noticed that not a single comment, or fact, or explanation of circumstances and reasons for which the OMON personnel used weapons was present in this chronologically clear enumeration. These reasons indeed existed and they were not that unjustified; newspapers have reported this.

The business day of the session came to a close. It became ultimately clear why the person in the chair had defended so diligently the rules of procedure and the list of speakers prepared in advance. I am certain that they had their people on it. They were the ones to complete a psychological attack on the main "enemies of democracy": the Communist Party, the president, and the Union legislature. They completed it brilliantly, to the sound of applause...

It was said clearly about the army: Russia needs an army of its own. In a recent TV program "Political Dialogues," Khasbulatov attempted to prove in every way possible that Yeltsin was misinterpreted, and that he had supposedly never said that it was necessary for Russia to have its own armed formations, its own army in order to defend its sovereignty. To be sure, on this occasion as well nobody uttered who specifically this army was going to shoot at. Not being absolute idiots, we may figure this out.

Therefore, the idea of civil war has gained currency. The current head of Russia and of the Russian legislature has been drumming it into the minds of people systematically and persistently. Perhaps, no one has done this in different contexts as persistently as he has. In general, there is no denying that Boris Nikolayevich is methodical and assertive. Perhaps, this is the main feature of his method of political struggle. The situation with his logic is worse. It is absolutely bad for a politician. Now that the cult of his personality created by the democrats is beginning to become hyperbolized, this trait turns into instability, squabbles, and political tensions. The people are tired of this opposition.

It is frightening! It is frightening, gentlemen and comrades!

Conflict Between Russian Parties Viewed

91UN0855A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA in Russian 24 Jan 91 p 2

[Article by L. Ivanov under the rubric "A Multiparty System: Hearing One Another": "Socialists on the Left, Republicans on the Right"]

[Text] Or the reverse, if you are observing from the Presidium. In any case, the VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA correspondent turned out to be in the republicans' camp, sitting on the right. But had I not guessed correctly, I would have unwittingly joined the Social Democrats. Political leanings—my own personal leanings, in any event—would have been determined from a randomly selected seat.

In this case everything was different. It looked like the building of the Dzerzhinskiy CPSU Raykom [rayon committee] and rayon soviet, where just recently a unification conference was conducted of the Moscow organizations of the RPR [Republican Party of Russia] and SDPR [Social-Democratic Party of Russia], was attuned to businesslike harmony and the propounding of their own political views. The rules of the game were observed in their entirety—four political speeches, report of the credentials commission, debate, adoption of basic documents and orientations of activity. Whereas this agenda was somewhat mindful of a CPSU conference, the course of the debates resembled those parliamentary discussions capable not only of dragging down the event, but also of threatening it with disruption.

Such was the feeling when, in the morning, the socialists met alone in the hall for some considerable time (the republicans were preparing for a conference in another location). Sharp words were cast about—"They are foisting unification on us," "Unification is possible only on a Social-Democratic basis," "For a certain portion of the people, the RPR are communists painted over. Is that the image we need?" And when representatives of both parties united and moved to various parts of the hall to make the vote-counting more convenient, it was apparent there would be no dialogue. Especially since one of the speakers accused certain RPR leaders of "secret talks with the Communists." Protest resounded from the hall and the speaker was accused of excessive political ambition. Then it seemed the incident was forgotten. But some time later a young man in jeans ran up to the microphone and inquired of the audience—"But is there a quorum?" They began to recount the socialists, whose camp had thinned out after the break. Finally they reported joyously that a majority was in fact present. The conference proceeded...

I would ask, Messrs. republicans and socialists (thus it has become customary to address one another in their company), that you forgive me for the somewhat mischievous tone of the preceding lines. But the nature of what was taking place in the hall seemed somewhat comical to me. When discussion has begun concerning unification, of establishing a unified bloc, is that the time to present internal disagreements and ambitions on the floor of the hall? Especially since the idea is a pretty sensible one—remaining independent and preserving loyalty to their charters, a united RPR and SDPR should become organic components of the movement "Democratic Russia." A unification congress is planned to be conducted on this question first on the Moscow level, then on the all-Union level. But each of the "mating" parties must prepare for such an event beforehand, disavowing their disagreements and engaging in a search for what will bring them closer together. Otherwise, coalition members will be torn apart by internal discord. And then someone will again run up to the microphone and throw out to the hall the sacred words: "Gentlemen, do we have a quorum?"

Where you are going to sit—on the right or on the left—is an irrelevant matter. The important thing is that you sit together.

RSFSR Foreign Minister Discusses Republic Issues

OW3101073391 Moscow Central Television First Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1900 GMT 22 Jan 91

[Interview with A.V. Kozyrev, RSFSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, by M. Tkachenko in Moscow; date not given—from the "Utro 120 + 30" program]

[Text] Compared with the enormous building of the country's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with its thousands of employees and its branched system of foreign representatives, the small three-storied structure of the Russian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] located on a quiet Moscow lane, where only several dozen people work, appears far too modest. In fact, its role for many years was to deal with individual matters pertaining to cooperation in the border areas shared with neighboring countries. With the adoption of the Declaration of Sovereignty of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] about six months ago and the recent influx of new people, it now appears that the influence of this department on the life of Russia will grow.

[Begin recording] [Tkachenko] It seems that the foreign policy line of the republic has been developed and that it coincides, in many ways, with that of the USSR MID. However, where do the two differ?

[Kozyrev] We came out with a statement, in which we said that Russian diplomacy—the RSFSR in general—will support the continuity of the foreign policy line. However, I think our line will differ in that it will be focused on more specific questions and will be less global in nature, so to speak. We have the republic in mind. I think that we will have to set up independent representations that can make independent decisions abroad on questions pertaining to our republic, on matters concerning the RSFSR in particular, but done within the framework of Union organs, within the framework of Union embassies. What sense is there in creating several more embassies? It is expensive and will put our overseas partners in the difficult position of having to make some kind of a choice.

[Tkachenko] Many foreign policy programs, including the billions [of rubles] given as assistance to foreign countries, to a great extent were financed out of the Russian wallet, insofar as Russia is the largest republic and contributes the most to the all-Union budget. How will this issue be dealt with now?

[Kozyrev] I think that we will have to come to some sort of a concensus and that Russia will have to decide for itself specifically where, to whom, and for what the aid is given. I think that Soviet foreign policy overall will be the winner from this kind of intervention. Take the Persian Gulf crisis as an example. For many years, Iraq has been receiving our assistance, particularly military aid. This should teach us something.

[Tkachenko] How are your relations developing with Bessmertnykh, the country's new foreign minister? By the way, is he your boss?

[Kozyrev] Well, I sent him my congratulations on his appointment with pleasure. I know Aleksandr Aleksandrovich professionally. We worked together in the Union MID. I respect him as a very good and internationally known professional, and I am sure that it will be easy to come to agreement on a professional basis. In fact, with Shevardnadze, we pursued a policy of cultivating model cooperation—that was his expression. I think that with Akeksandr Aleksandrovich, we have every chance for such interaction. He is not my direct chief. I was appointed by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, to which I am answerable. At the same time, I do not think that the matter is one of subordination, but one of learning to cooperate and to respect their role as the coordinating central mechanism.

[Tkachenko] In your view, what influence does Russia have within the international arena? Will the world seriously interpret Russia's independent foreign policy steps as those of a state?

[Kozyrev] Today, in particular, the Russian legislature—Russia—comes out as one of the most powerful guarantors of preserving democratic traditions. In connection with events in the Baltics, I think that our voice will be heard in the international arena as a voice of reason calling for the cessation of bloodshed and stability. I think this will be valued at home and abroad. [end recording]

RSFSR Deputy Premier Filshin on Ekho Affair

PM290111249126 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 91 Union Edition p 2

[Interview with G. Filshin, deputy chairman of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, by correspondent I. Zhagel; place and date of interview not given: "G. Filshin: We Had To Think About Russia"]

[Text] The last issue of our newspaper published a report from the USSR KGB Public Relations Center on the detention at Sheremetyevo-2 Airport of a British subject who was found to be in possession of documents relating to a deal concluded between the Chelyabinsk of the "Ekho" firm and the British company "Dove Trading International." It was also reported that the deal supposedly makes provision for the sale of 140 billion rubles [R] for 7,756,000,000 U.S. dollars, and that the documents included a letter promising assistance to the contract, signed by G. Filshin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers.

Along with this report our newspaper also brought readers the view of the USSR Gosbank [State Bank] leadership, who feel that the contract is not lawful and that in the event of its implementation the consequences could be disastrous. Naturally, it is our duty to allow the other side to speak out too. IZVESTIYA's correspondent therefore met with G. Filshin.

[Zhagel] Gennadiy Innokentyevich, I will not seize the initiative, so to speak; let us begin with what you see as the most important aspect of this whole story of the contract.

[Filshin] The most important aspect is that Russia is currently virtually without currency resources of its own. It is not all that easy to obtain major credits from abroad in the present situation. Yet they are badly needed. What for? If only to feed the people.

Unfortunately, only one-fourth of the republic's production capacities are oriented toward the consumer, and the rest consist of raw materials sectors or military industry. Formerly the shortage of goods was compensated for with petrodollars. But today the situation has changed radically: There are no petrodollars, no goods, and no food. Things have reached the point where in some regions people are being issued with 500 grams of meat products per person per month.

Incidentally, our base sectors are also suffering today—oil, gas, chemicals, timber, machine building. Neither the Union nor the Russian government has the resources to maintain them.

We spent a long time considering how to survive in this situation, and here is the plan we formulated. Back in the fall of last year we began to work with foreign firms, proposing that they deliver goods and food to our market and sell them for rubles, while at the same time they would be permitted to invest the funds thus earned in our economy. This kills two birds with one stone: On the one hand consumer demand is satisfied, and on the other, additional financial resources are poured into industry and agriculture.

And the government's role in such operations can vary greatly. It can act as intermediary between a region and a foreign firm. It can act as guarantor of the deals. Or it can participate directly in such agreements. Incidentally, one large-scale agreement of this kind is currently under consideration at the Russian Supreme Soviet.

[Zhagel] The contract that all the fuss was about also stipulated that the foreign partners will supply goods, and our side will pay them a certain sum in rubles which will be invested in our own economy. What was the Russian government's role in this?

[Filshin] In this case I signed a message to the British firm's president saying that the RSFSR Council of Ministers will give assistance and support in the realization of the contract. This document was not some kind of firm pledge, it simply expressed approval for cooperation of this kind. I think it can only be beneficial.

[Zhagel] On the face of it the contract does indeed look attractive. But doubts arise as soon as you go into the details. The foreign firm is to receive R140 billion, on payment of only $8 billion. Even if the rubles are not taken out of the country, it is not very reassuring to see that people will be able to obtain rubles in vast quantities at practically the black market rate—1 to 18. Here we are on the threshold of privatization of state property.

[Filshin] As far as the specific figures are concerned, they were not known to me. The preliminary documents I studied did not contain them.

And you will agree that the deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers is not obliged to study every detail of such contracts. For me it was more important to know that it was supported by the ispolkoms [soviet executive committees] in Chelyabinsk and Kurgan Oblasts, where, along with other regions, the goods were to be sold. Furthermore the foreign partner guaranteed that the currency credit arrangements were clean. The list and quantity of goods to be purchased is to be determined by the RSFSR Ministry of Trade, which will be involved in selling the products.

[Zhagel] Forgive me, but you should surely have inquired about the dollar-ruble exchange rate. Without that detail, how was it possible to evaluate and approve the contract? The prices for the goods supplied would be in direct proportion to the exchange rate, and the prices could go soaring up beyond the clouds.

[Filshin] I repeat: It is not my job to discuss the details of contracts. Let the contracting parties do that. In this case, everything took place with the participation of highly qualified RSFSR Trade Ministry workers.

On the subject of prices, I can say that I studied them, and also the list of goods that it was proposed to deliver to our country in 1991 under the terms of the contract. Certain articles and food products, for instance children's food products, were to be sold virtually at a one-to-one rate—however many dollars they cost abroad, they would cost the same number of rubles here.

[Zhagel] All the same, the sum of R140 billion is to be handed over in exchange for goods worth only $8 billion. That means that for some consumer goods prices will have to be increased many times over, which is only possible if the goods supplied are not essential products like meat, milk, or children's clothes, but once again, computers and video recorders.

[Filshin] I think the RSFSR Trade Ministry workers will succeed in keeping prices at a normal level. I have no reason not to trust the specialists involved in drafting the contract. Incidentally, let me remind you again: The money obtained from the sale of the goods is to be invested in basic sectors of the RSFSR national economy. Whether this takes place on a barter basis or through the setting up of joint enterprises is up to the sides to decide.

[Zhagel] The KGB information service report mentions the Chelyabinsk branch of the "Ekho" firm attached to the nongovernmental foundation "Perpetual Memory of Soldiers." In your letter you speak of support for the efforts of the "Urals Countryside Revival" association. Although in both cases the British company "Dove Trading International" is mentioned as the foreign partner. So who is actually involved in this deal?

[Filshin] I only met with the president of the intersector association "Urals Countryside Revival." That organization is a party to the contract on the Soviet side.

[Zhagel] Did you meet with any representatove of "Dove Trading International," or with the British subject who was detained at the airport?

[Filshin] No, I did not. I was only involved in discussing the contract on one occasion, when representatives of the soviet authorities from Chelyabinsk and Kurgan Oblasts, the "Urals Countryside Revival" association, and the RSFSR Trade Ministry were present.

[Zhagel] Why did you support that association specifically?

[Filshin] First, I was introduced to it by the RSFSR Trade Ministry leaders, who are excellent specialists, and I have no reason not to trust them. Second, the project interested me specifically because the goods were to be delivered to those oblasts and republics of Russia where the situation regarding goods and food is most complex. [Filshin ends]

From the Editorial Office: The two sides' views have been expressed, but it is too early as yet to draw any conclusions. As you know, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has formed a commission which is charged with studying all details of the case. The details of the contract are also still being studied at the USSR Gosbank. We will inform IZVESTIYA's readers of this work and of the findings of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet commission.

Tataria Rejection of RSFSR Treaty Viewed

91UN0895A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent M. Zaripov: "They Do Not Want to Be Matreshkas—Notes from the Session of the Supreme Soviet of Tatarstan"]

[Text] Unfortunately, the inevitable has occurred. The irreconcilable war of sovereignties inspired by Boris

Nikolayevich Yeltsin has shifted to the area of multilingual Russia in which the republics, krays, oblasts, and districts are dolls within a large painted matreshka. Some of the autonomies announced in their declarations that they remain subjects of the federation, and others decided to define interrepublic relations and all-Union relations with special treaties of "equals with equals." However, time passed but information about specific treaties did not appear, and it seemed that the "parade of sovereignties" would conclude with a permanent uproar at the level of parliamentary charters. The "great"—that is, Russian—the legislature is loaded down with other more important concerns: The signing of lateral pacts with the republics of the Baltics, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Kazakhstan—but the hands of the Russian legislators do not reach as far as problems in their own house, such as the conclusion of treaties with national territorial formations. Most likely, it is not a matter of being "convenient" or timely, but it is considered a secondary or tertiary matter which can easily be resolved in good order by the traditional "instructions, recommendations, and orders." Then the latently maturing feeling of insult and infringement spilled over into a serious dispute. Last Friday, the session of the Republic of Tatarstan Supreme Soviet refused to review the draft Federal Treaty with the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. The reasons—the document is not acceptable, it is compiled not laterally but vertically, and it reinforces the leadership position of one republic over another.

Nothing at first indicated this result. In the second half of the session the parliamentarians of the republic coped with the reorganization of the organs of administration: The State Planning Committee became the State Committee on the Economy, the State Agroindustrial Committee was returned to its former status of a Ministry of Agriculture, new structures of authority were organized, and, in particular, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the Committee for Land Reform, and the State Control Committee of the Tatar SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] amended and supplemented the Constitution.

In fact, the draft Federal Treaty—this is precisely the form of political, social, and national relations that is envisaged in the republic declaration of sovereignty—was not on the session's agenda. But they did not begin to discuss the problem of the suitability of the document, in particular, as is suggested by parliamentary protocol, after a preliminary study by interested parties, commissions, and committees, and after unavoidable refinements of rights and mutual obligations. No, the draft came from "higher up," with already prepared judicial and legal wording and conclusions, as if this was not a momentous treaty which defines mutual relations, the character and norms of cooperation of two of the most populous ethnic groups of the population of the RSFSR, but simply current instructions on the agro-industrial complex or an order on the redistribution of bank credits.

Information concerning the official draft of the Federal Treaty was disseminated among the population, and the report and the document were handed out to the deputies beforehand. The members of the coordination council of the public committee "Sovereignty" came out in the local press with a categorical statement that the form of mutual relations of the two republics, in which one side gives directions and instructions and the other only listens and obeys, affects the honor and integrity of sovereign territory. Here are the concluding lines of this document which, alas, do not allow for any compromises: "The inclusion on the agenda of the forthcoming session of the republic's legislature of consideration of the proposal of Yeltsin's order to become an autonomy of a model that is even worse than today's would show disrespect for themselves on the part of the people's deputies of the Tatar SSR and ignore a decision they once actually adopted. Discussion of this provocative proposal would be blasphemous with respect to the Declaration on the State Sovereignty of the Tatar SSR."

The employees of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion supplied the igniters for the bonfire of discord, and tossed the smoldering piece of wood that was ready to burst into flames. At the close of the session on 7 February, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA published a commentary by Boris Dubin, an official of the All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion, entitled "About Sovereignty," under the rubric "Public Opinion," which, incidentally, deputies appraised as unprofessional and provocative.

Sociology is a objective science, and, according to its status, it is free of politics, ambition, and passions, but it seems that it can also be turned into a mouthpiece for political games and national and group passions. The All-Union Center for the Study of Public Opinion reviewer Dubin reported that they conducted a "poll of the population with a representative sample of 1,115 persons," in an effort to clarify what Tatars, Russians, Chuvash, Bashkirs, Ukrainians, and all residents of the republic think of the proclaimed sovereignty.

Professional sociology, in contrast to the familiar readings of beans or coffee grounds, requires one thing above all—accuracy in facts and objectivity in conclusions. Researchers had the right to talk only about how the 1,115 respondents who were selected replied to the questions. But the point of view of the selected thousand is presented as the opinion of the entire population of the republic. On the whole, a majority of the population (51 percent—can it be affirmed that the representational polling of 1,115 persons is a "majority" or a "minority?") is for the existence of the republic in the structure of the "Russian Federation." "The declaration on sovereignty is much more actively supported by village residents and the less-educated strata of the population." "On the whole, the population of the republic trusts the Supreme Soviet of Russia most of all.... But the leadership of Tatarstan is for membership of the republic in the Union." "The less-educated and informed groups more often support the 'list' that presents the official leadership of Tataria and the most radical leaders of national movements.... The more educated groups give a vote of confidence to figures of a different and more democratic inclination...."

So, these are the political "theses" with their implications and purposeful charge! If a person comes out for sovereignty, this means that he is a poorly educated nationalist, and if he is against, then he is an enlightened and profoundly intellectual democrat.

If one is to believe the sociologists, and the newspaper that offers its space for such insinuations, the most poorly educated and poorly informed part of the population of the republic is sitting in the legislature. Because it is the people's deputies who on 30 August of last year unanimously, with one abstention, voted for the Declaration of Sovereignty, for a new way of life, and for the democratic principles of perestroyka and renewal.

It happens that there are scientific know-it-alls who, gaining access to a small fact, generalize it on a universal scale. Look at what we discovered and to what heights we have risen! But, you see, the article went through a dozen hands in the editorial office. Is it possible that professional journalists, whose trade is to be sociologists and politicians simultaneously, did not examine the biased and stretched interpretation of unconscientious grins and helped push this igniter onto the bonfire of hot interethnic passions that were ready to burst out with any accidental spark? Deputies from both the "left" and the "right," pressed to the wall by impatient and uncompromising "public opinion," were forced on the last day of the session to express their opinion of the submitted draft of the Federal Treaty. The results? One hundred and fifty votes against the draft, 35 for, and 10 abstentions. The legislature of the Republic of Tatarstan recognized that the document was developed on the former matreshka model of the national organization and that it consolidates the leadership of one republic and subordinates another republic. The Presidium of the Republic Supreme Soviet was instructed to develop its version of the treaty with Russia in order to come out with its position, which assumes a union and a community of republics that are equal and with equal rights, and to present it for public discussion.

Toward the end the session announced an inquiry of Deputy F. Safiullina to O. Antonov, the republic's procurator, and approved a proposal to examine the facts concerning the insult to the parliament and humiliation of the people (this is exactly the way the description "poorly educated strata" is appraised), by whose authority forms and questionnaires are getting around that incite interethnic passions, who is doing this work and financing it, and, most importantly, what forces are directing it.

The war of laws, first and foremost of the Union and the Russian Federation, have brought the country to chaos and disintegration and have placed it on the brink of economic catastrophe. The war of sovereignties in the broad expanse of the multinational Russian Federation also threatens even more unpredictable consequences—interethnic conflicts and the loss of a "single and indivisible Russia." The dispute with Tataria—this is the first alarming sign. The problem of the sovereignty of national formations has to be treated seriously and responsibly, and the aspirations of the people for self-determination and independence are not to be considered a "universal farce"—such opinions are being expressed in the leadership of the RSFSR parliament—but a serious political problem that cannot be solved along the traditional dictatorial vertical but only with good and harmony.

Moscow Mayor Popov Describes U.S Trip

91UN0909A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 7, Feb 91 p 5

[Interview with G. Popov, chairman of the Moscow Soviet, by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given: "Why G. Popov Went to America"]

[Text] **The weekly GLASNOST printed a caustic note to the effect that Moscow Soviet Chairman G. Popov had set out for the United States on a private invitation to study the work experience of mayors on the other side of the ocean instead of, as GLASNOST writes, "making the lives of Muscovites satisfying and joyful." I am asking the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY editors to report on the purposes of this trip as well as on its results.**

[Signed] V. Korneyev, Moscow

Our correspondent met with G. Popov and asked him to discuss the recent trip to the United States by the Moscow Soviet delegation.

[Popov] During my trip to the United States I pursued three goals: establishing contacts with mayors and city officials, solving a number of Moscow's economic problems, and presenting to the American public the opinion of the country's democratic forces about the situation that has developed in the Soviet Union. Our assessments diverge from the official position and I thought that the United States should have a completely clear idea of this issue.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] With whom did you meet while in America?

[Popov] I met with Senate Majority Leader Gephardt [as published], Secretary of State Baker, and a large group of senators—both Democrats and Republicans. I also met with American trade union leaders, H. Kissinger, and others.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] What did you tell the Americans about the present situation in the USSR...

[Popov] I said that up until the summer of 1990 the country was led by a right-centrist coalition in which the major role was played by the president, who was in charge of the conservative elements. Last summer, as a result of the strengthening of the democrats' position, conditions were created for the appearance of a left-centrist coalition. There was a meeting between the president and Yeltsin.

But in September and October, first the Ryzhkov government and then the USSR Supreme Soviet and other forces spoke out against this. Actually a blow was dealt not to the "500 days" but to the very idea of a left-centrist coalition. And then the president gave in to the most powerful pressure from conservative forces.

In my view, significant changes have now taken place in the center. A whole group of people who symbolized this center for us have left it: Yakovlev, Bakatin, Shevardnadze, Petrakov, Shatalin.

Essentially, only the president is left of the center as it was before. Thus we are now speaking about the fact that, under the guise of a presidential regime, we are seeing the formation of a regime in which the main voice belongs to conservative forces. And the president, left alone, will not be the main figure.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] How did the Americans assess the possibility of rendering economic aid to the USSR in the present situation?

[Popov] Our situation is very grave. Dozens of American companies, even whole states, are prepared to cut off all economic relations with us. I tried to rectify that situation. I had to explain that cutting off the loans would play into the hands not of democratic but of conservative forces in the USSR. At the same time I agreed with the idea that there is a real danger that American loans would be used by conservative forces in the USSR. I suggested developing a policy and form of cooperation whereby aid to the Soviet Union would continue and at the same time democratic purposes for the use of this aid would be ensured.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] How will ties between Moscow and American cities develop?

[Popov] I met with the mayors of New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and other U.S. cities. I can say frankly that the problems that bother me are not the ones that bother them. While in the morning I am interested in how sales of milk, eggs, sugar, and so forth are going, their mornings are devoted to the number of highway accidents. But still there are also common problems related to city traffic, the housing problem, and the pollution of the urban ecology.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] How did the American businessmen feel about the new ukases from the USSR president concerning the activity of the joint ventures.

[Popov] As we know, a decree was adopted here whereby a joint venture can "invite" workers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB to participate. But there is not a single foreign firm that will risk its technical and commercial secrets. The American firms stated that this would actually deprive them of the opportunity to compete, that is, it would abolish the real market.

During my trip I discussed several contracts, including for the construction of a plant with a capacity of 15,000 cottages a year, of which 5,000 cottages would be shipped abroad to compensate for the hard currency expenditures. The rest would be sold for rubles in our country.

First of all, such a plant would address the problem of our "homeless" officers. In Moscow we have thousands of military servicemen who have neither apartments nor any hope of obtaining them. I spoke with Comrade Yazov and his first deputy and we reached a common denominator. A cottage means 35-40 meters of dwelling space with all the conveniences.

I agreed also that a U.S. delegation would come to our country prepared to conduct negotiations on the construction of a plant for producing medicines.

I wish to note at the outset that the final documents have not been signed. Specialists are needed for this. But it was important to gain the support of the Americans, which I managed to do.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Why did you decide to go to the United States on a private invitation?

[Popov] I wish to note that when the hosts organize the trip the effectiveness is increased ten-fold. When it is organized by the Soviet Embassy the results are less.

If I had gone at the invitation of the mayor of New York I would have been tied up with a large number of protocol measures and therefore I accepted an invitation from Senator Kennedy.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] You are frequently being accused in the Soviet press but you never give any explanations. Why?

[Popov] We grew up under the same system. Accusations are usually made against people for only one purpose—to keep a person from doing his job. At first I resisted but then I developed a rule: I will not give explanations! One must respond with deeds and not self-justification. Remember how much noise was made about the trip of S. Stankevich and G. Popov to Japan! And the result? The auctions took place. The cars, video equipment, and other consumer goods we brought home produced 12 million rubles when sold at auctions. All this money was deposited into the fund for the social protection of the underprivileged. This sum, for example, is enough to pay the subsidy for all the preschool children in Moscow for a whole month.

That is my response to all the articles about "social" calls.

Deputy Criticizes Work of Moscow Soviet

91UN0922A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Deputy V.P. Shantsev, leader of the "Moscow" group in the Moscow City Soviet, by I. Alekseyenko; place and date not given: "Deliberate Confusion"]

[Text] [Alekseyenko] Valeriy Pavlinovich, a sociological study conducted by a group led by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences V. Komarovskiy showed that most Muscovites are disillusioned with the work of the Moscow City Soviet. Only slightly more than 20 percent of the voters would vote for the same deputies today, and more than 30 percent would not even participate in elections. What is this—a crisis of power?

[Shantsev] The reasons for such a negative assessment by Muscovites of our activity as deputies are well known. The main one is the ineffectiveness of the work done by the Moscow City Soviet. The capital finds itself under siege from problems large and small, and it is a circle that is tightening. But the Moscow City Soviet, which is supposed to resolve them, has turned out to be incapable of exerting any effective influence on the situation. If you analyze its activity, and nine months have already passed, then it becomes clear that only one decision has been reached—on the reform of children's preschool establishments. And even that is not being realized because there is no funding. I fear that even this, so far only legislative enactment, also just remains on paper.

As far as privatization of housing and public catering and trade projects is concerned, and about which there has been so much fuss, the Moscow City Soviet has not reached decisions on them. The deputies have approved the main directions and now the executive committee must devise a mechanism to accomplish privatization and discuss a plan of measures, and submit specific proposals to the session. The absence of any final product from legislative activity is leading to a crisis of power. That is certain.

[Alekseyenko] Why is the work of the Moscow City Soviet so ineffective? There were so many promises...

[Shantsev] The Moscow City Soviet is not organized in its work. Any problem must be prepared for discussion, even more in a collective of 400 and more deputies; it is of no use simply to gather us together and "wheel it out," as we say, and present the session with a fait accompli. If a certain amount of preparatory work is not done no decision will be reached at that meeting. But the presidium of the Moscow City Soviet prefers to operate precisely in this way—taking people unawares. The impression is created that it either does not want to or cannot organize the work of the corps of deputies competently.

Often before the latest session many of the deputies do not know what issues are to be discussed. But they must be brought into the work and their opinions canvassed. New issues are often added to the agenda during the course of a meeting. Anything goes, and the problems—well, there are so many. What is the sense in this? I repeat, it is essential to prepare a question, "run it past" the standing commissions, the executive committee, and finally the financial organs...

There is a second, not unimportant factor. Right from the start of the activity of the Moscow City Soviet it has been possible to trace a desire to politicize it. Political debate sometimes replaces the matter in hand. We listen for hours at a time to eloquent revelations about the advantages of one ideology over another, about our attitude toward symbolism. For example, do we have to place a bust of Lenin in the hall, and if not, then what should be there, and so on. In short, Muscovites have grown tired of waiting for us to find specific solutions to their everyday problems.

[Alekseyenko] You are against politicization of the activity of the Moscow City Soviet, but then how do you rate the creation of the "Moscow" group of deputies that you lead? Surely this is a political formation, is it not?

[Shantsev] The constant attacks on the Communist Party have forced us to join together. The "Moscow" group includes 86 communists. They include national economic experts, mainly part- time deputies. We stand at the positions of the Moscow city party organization and we represent it and try to protect its interests. Our group has never been an organizer of political debate. At the same time, at one recent meeting of the session I had to stand up and demand that the groundless attacks against the CPSU be stopped. Otherwise, henceforth at every meeting we will be offering a well- argued response; that will be quite capable of finally turning the Moscow City Soviet into a political debating club. But our aim is exactly the opposite, namely, to help the Moscow City Soviet organize constructive work.

[Alekseyenko] Valeriy Pavlinovich, why has the formation of executive power been so difficult in the Moscow City Soviet? As a sign of protest one group of deputies walked out of the hall during one of the sessions in January. What is it that is not to the liking of the majority—the makeup of the executive committee? Or were the deputies against the organizational structure itself?

[Shantsev] For eight months we were unable to form an executive authority. This is just one more reason for the neglect of the city's economy. Many deputies were in principle against the executive committee, considering that all power should rest with the soviet and its presidium. Legislative, executive, and judicial powers exist throughout the world, and all deputies went into the elections under the slogan of separating them, but after they had taken their seats in the comfortable armchairs of the Moscow City Soviet they forget everything. Now they want to pronounce laws and execute them. Real bosses.

Our group of deputies has believed and still believes that strong executive power is essential. The role of the soviet, to put it graphically, is to set up the plank, and the executive committee should itself decide how to set it up. But a majority of the deputies sees the executive committee in the role of a small boy at everyone's beck and call—go there, fetch that. This is not what it is all about. Experts, and experts alone, should be engaged in finding solutions to the city's socioeconomic problems; they cannot manage on a public foundation.

[Alekseyenko] If I have understood it correctly, however, in his second open letter to the deputies and the people of Moscow, G.Kh. Popov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, also favored strong executive power. In particular he counseled in favor of a significant reduction in the role of the elected organs in problem solving, and a greater role for the organs capable of complying with the instructions of Union and republic departments.

[Shantsev] That is what he says. In fact, for eight months Gavril Kharitonovich has done nothing to form a strong executive power. Now, when the work is finally falling to pieces he has decided to give up the soviets for lost, reducing their functions to the role of a mute. We have already been through this. In the recent past all power was in fact vested in the executive committee. Having withdrawn the resolution of all issues to himself, the chairman of the executive committee, Saykin, used to work 16 hours a day. Now instead of Saykin comes Popov, but will he work 16 hours a day? I am not sure. So why repeat the old mistakes? We have divided power into legislative and executive but we have not in fact managed to test the effectiveness of the new organizational structure. And I believe that it is viable and it must produce results. Only there is no need to rush with respect to municipalities and mayors as proposed by Popov. The names may be new, but the content is old.

[Alekseyenko] But he makes reference to the West, where the structure he has proposed works effectively...

[Shantsev] Everyone now sees in the West what he wants to see. Popov has taken Madrid as his model, but why, I would be interested to know, not some other city. In the United States the mayor often does not have executive power. The desire to concentrate power in one person's hands is ours, a purely Russian desire, and it is not worth looking for analogies on the side, there are enough right under our noses. The results of this are also well known.

[Alekseyenko] Does this mean that, as always, the basic issue is power?

[Shantsev] Naturally. And yesterday's accusers, who are today's powers that be, want everything immediately.

[Alekseyenko] I recently familiarized myself with the appeal from the Moscow City Soviet standing commission on industry, transport, communications, and information systems to deputies to improve the results produced from their activities. It raises a direct question for Popov: Is your team weak or do you have weak leaders on your team? How would you respond to this?

[Shantsev] In the affirmative, in both cases.

[Alekseyenko] That same appeal contains the following emotional lines: "Russia will not forgive us, the people's deputies, or you, the chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, if we allow destructive forces to destroy the democratic Moscow City Soviet." In your opinion, are there such destructive forces? And how democratic is the democratic Moscow City Soviet?

[Shantsev] It has become a rule for us to mix concepts when we do not understand who is a democrat and who a conservative, and what to regard as a destructive force. In my opinion, there are no such things in the Moscow City Soviet. As I have already said, the reasons for the stagnation in work are deeper and more complex. As far as the second part of the question is concerned, outwardly the Moscow City Soviet is democratic. Here, they are saying what they want and how much they want. But if we look more deeply then the picture is different. Our democrats of yesterday now favor iron discipline within the faction. They vote as one, for or against. The Democratic Russia bloc has thus brought all the work of the Moscow City Soviet under strict control. The opinion of the minority is not considered. Let me remind you how this outraged yesterday's democrats when they were in the minority. Now everything is normal, everything is fine.

I am sure that three hundred or more full-time, government-paid deputies are a great evil for the Moscow City Soviet. They live too well (wages range upward from 400 rubles [R]) to be really interested in reorganizing the soviet for more productive work. They regard any outside proposal as an infringement on their own power. They switch on the voting machine in an instant and thus "democracy" triumphs. It is high time to define the concepts. It is impossible to call those who have nothing to do with democracy democrats. It is not a person's affiliation to a party or group that makes him a democrat, but vital principles, a cast of mind, and ultimately, specific activity. The last-named has shown the pseudodemocratic nature of many of our radical politicians.

[Alekseyenko] Do the deputies of the Moscow City Soviet receive additional food and other boons?

[Shantsev] I have not made a special study of that question. I will say only two things. Whereas previously the Moscow City Soviet managed with R1.5 million from the state budget, this year its leaders have asked for R16 million. And second: Our deputies have developed a passion for trips abroad. Now the United States, now Japan, now France, but no real results are produced from the trips.

[Alekseyenko] And what is your attitude toward statements to this effect: The city budget has not suffered. I went abroad at the invitation of some other party that paid all expenses?

[Shantsev] I am simply ashamed. In the West, if legislators travel to another country and it is suddenly discovered that that country has paid for the trip, this is regarded as lobbyism. Pure and simple. It is considered that a person cannot represent the interests of one side if the other side pays. But we talk about this on television as though it were some kind of achievement. It must be made very plain that if a deputy travels at the private invitation of a company and at its expense, he can in no way represent the interests of the Moscow City Soviet.

[Alekseyenko] An appeal has been published in the press to deputies from the Moscow city procurator, G. Ponomarev. Speaking about the existing situation—the "war of laws," the neglect of city economy, the undermining and bribing of law enforcement forces—he unambiguously believes that in this situation the bribe-takers, thieves, scoundrels, and social pimps are best off. Do you agree with him, and what has been the reaction of the corps of deputies to the appeal?

[Shantsev] If an expert makes such a claim then it means that he has appropriate facts at his disposal. Conditions are ideal for the "shadow economy people" in today's confusion. They are flourishing, bringing increasing amounts of new capital under their own control. For them, the upcoming privatization is like manna from heaven. The Moscow City Soviet is closing its eyes to this. And so the appeal from the city procurator has gone unremarked.

[Alekseyenko] Does the Moscow City Soviet really want to bring order to the city?

[Shantsev] I think not. Most of its interests today lie elsewhere, and they have been set forth clearly enough in Popov's pamphlet "What Is To Be Done?" It includes denationalization, de-Sovietization, and defederalization. Each of these three "de's" worsens the situation and lowers the living standard of the population even more. I can in no way agree with the author.

Soviet of Republic Head Criticizes Legislature

91UN0857A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 5, 6 Feb 91 p 2

[Interview with V. Isakov, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic, by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA staff correspondent for the Urals N. Zenova; place and date not given: "Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of the Republic Told Himself: Indeed, We Learn From Our Own Mistakes"]

[Text] **Prior to our interview, we should recall that at the last congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies the chairman of the Soviet of the Republic criticized the style of work of the legislature. He talked about the violation of procedures, shortcomings in the organization of sessions, and the desire to "push through" certain decisions, and finally he warned: "It will be a pity if the words 'rule-of-law state' once again remain a dead letter for the Russian citizens."**

Is it abrasive? Is it fair? And, most importantly, is it timely? After all, the situation in the Russian legislature is tense to begin with.

[Zenova] Vladimir Borisovich, your speech at the congress caused a sharp response on the part of voters, despite, apparently, there being little reason to worry about the style of work of the Supreme Soviet that much. After all, this is an internal matter of our legislature... However, I know that some people considered you virtually an apostate. Are you aware of this response?

[Isakov] Of course. This is why I agreed to this interview.

However, I would like to stress first of all: I do not at all consider the style of work of the legislature to be an internal matter. The results of our activities and the presence or absence of mistakes directly depend on how we organize these activities. Incidentally, fewer mistakes could have been made. We hastened to abolish quite a number of ministries, and now we are encountering a situation whereby enterprises that would like to abandon Union affiliation and become affiliated with the republic cannot do this—who is going to take care of their material and technical supply before the market starts working? The process of privatizing property is beginning, but we still have not delineated the property of soviets of different levels. Nobody knows what he owns yet but everybody makes property decisions. What about meat prices? Of course, the Union Government precipitated a new round of inflation by its decisions on grain, but we also made "a worthy" contribution. As a result, a huge hole in the republic budget emerged...

These are complications that have developed here in the course of implementing the marvelous idea of sovereignty. In many instances, we bring about these complications ourselves because we lack organization and precision in decisionmaking.

[Zenova] What is the "root" of evil?

[Isakov] Certainly, the organizational "shortcomings" are merely an outward sign of serious troubles: our poor legal culture, and in particular the culture of decisionmaking. Alas, as I see it, the Supreme Soviet was not spared the ills that the Moscow Soviet, the Leningrad Soviet, and other local organs of power in which democratic forces dominate suffer. To be sure, the arrival of new people is beneficial, but these people are not necessarily skilled and competent; they frequently bring with them the culture of rallies, and at times they are just plain arrogant... It is precisely the rally element that is to blame for us cranking out a pile of rough laws for which there are no implementation arrangements. The last days of the last session were overshadowed for me by altogether unconstitutional decisions. For example, Article 12 of the Constitution indicates that parcels of land are allocated by the state only for producing farm goods. Only for this! Meanwhile, the Law on Property says that a citizen may also acquire a parcel of land for erecting a residential building. I am not discussing here whether the decision itself is good or bad; it is unconstitutional. This is the main point!

[Zenova] However, Doctor of Legal Sciences Isakov was present during preliminary discussions and at the meetings of the Supreme Soviet. What prevented him from making his well-reasoned arguments in a timely manner?

[Isakov] Naturally, I do not keep silent at Presidium meetings. However, the problem is that procedures for considering documents have been violated continuously (this is what I said at the congress). On occasion, they have been submitted to the meetings of the Supreme Soviet bypassing the Presidium and the chambers. In addition, there have been divergencies from the Union law.... For example, we have adopted the Russian Federation Law on Retirement Benefits. What are we to do now in numerous cases when a person worked for some of his tenure in the Ukraine, and some of it in Kazakhstan: Under which law is he to be paid retirement benefits?

[Zenova] Could it be that life itself makes them hurry? Would you say specifically whether it is haste or arrogance?

[Isakov] As I see it, it is both. I for one consider efforts to circumvent the law and the very spirit of a political game of hazard in the legislature to be absolutely impermissible. I have been told by economic managers, businessmen, and representatives of the new economy: It does not make any difference to them whether to live according to Russian or Union laws. It is important to be able to proceed from these laws, conclude transactions, and make plans without fear of being stabbed in the back by some new law 15 minutes later and told: This is the only law you will obey.

[Zenova] Your discourse is certainly logical, and it is difficult to raise an objection... I feel with regret that an aura is dissipating around the Russian legislature, whose proceedings we watched on TV with such pleasure. Nonetheless, it is better to abandon a certain illusion rather than give up the truth. Incidentally, what was the reaction to your speech by those who do not have illusions, your colleague deputies?

[Isakov] Mixed. Some supported me; some began to look for an "ulterior motive": So, the comrade is trying to interfere; this means that he has some agenda of his own, or he has altogether "switched sides."

[Zenova] It appears to me that you are absolutely aboveboard on this one: Your "democratic past" is impeccable—after all, you are the leader of a powerful informal movement in the Urals, and the beginning of your Moscow period was very prominent—after all, you specifically were the one to offer Yeltsin for the post of chairman back then, at a meeting with Gorbachev before the first Russian congress...

[Isakov] I still believe that this was the strongest candidacy without any doubt... It is not important what the attitude of the opponents toward me is (yet, it would be hypocritical to believe that it makes no difference for me). There is something immeasurably more serious: an uncritical attitude toward one's own work. To my mind, if an individual makes something—a table or a stool, to say nothing of a law—he should be interested in testing the strength of his product—will it last, will it fall apart? Meanwhile, here you turn into a political enemy the moment you touch a product.

In general, I observe with great distress that we have begun to restore slowly and subconsciously the worst features of the party apparatus style that we criticized so harshly during this election campaign. There are attempts to lean on a certain restricted circle of people, the very selection of people on the basis of their personal devotion, and the desire to solve their issue "on a routine basis..." All of this has accumulated and created a quite complex situation in the Supreme Soviet. Sensible people have begun to leave the Supreme Soviet.

[Zenova] And yet...you spoke at the congress at a tense moment, when our society needed the consolidation of democratic forces more than ever. Are you sure that yours was a timely presentation?

[Isakov] Truth is always timely. If I see democratic procedures being crushed and authoritarianism being manifested, do I really have to sit back and wait for an opportune moment to make a statement to this effect? Perhaps, this moment will not come at all because of you, me, and us together procrastinating. After all, our entire previous experience indicates that, when democracy is violated, hasty and erroneous decisions are made that do not bring consensus and peace closer but rather make them more remote.

[Zenova] Naturally, you will continue to persistently demand in the future that procedures, norms, rules, and so on be observed. We may empathize with you. Pedantry is a worthy trait but, alas, it does not particularly win the public over for you, especially in our society and among our people with their broad-brush approach and their penchant for things big...

[Isakov] Everything is useful in its rightful place; "broad strokes" are absolutely unacceptable in law creation and generally in parliamentary and state work! Recently, we have been affected by an epidemic of resignations: Yavlinskiy, Minister of Finance Fedorov, and Administrator of Affairs Sterligov have left.... I should say that I have also given some thought to leaving.... However, at the same time I have felt that I am responsible to the people who have voted for me, and understood that it would be very difficult to explain this step to them.

Perhaps, it would be impossible: They would not understand why someone would resolve to take such a step being in the legislature and having an opportunity to influence events. Leaving? This is excessive luxury at present.

On the whole, let us not dramatize anything excessively. We indeed learn from our own mistakes. Since the last Russian congress the situation in the legislature has changed somewhat. At any rate, the former cavalier approach to making decisions is no longer there, and due respect for the issue of the quorum appears to be returning as well... It would be good for this process to proceed more vigorously, and for us to draw closer to civilized norms faster in our entire life, and primarily in the work of the legislature.

Danish Legislators Meet Sobchak in Leningrad

LD1202101891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1816 GMT 11 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Nikolay Kondratenko]

[Text] Leningrad, 11 Feb (TASS)—A delegation from the Danish Folketing, which is in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet and arrived in Leningrad yesterday evening, today met with Anatoliy Sobchak, the chairman of the Leningrad City Soviet, and with a group of deputies from the Soviet legislature at Marininskiy Palace.

Hans Peter Klausen, chairman of the Folketing, said in talking about the aims of the visit that the members of the delegation representing the presidium of the Danish legislature intend to acquaint themselves firsthand with the situation in the Soviet Union, and particularly with the situation in the Baltics. "We are content that our trip has started with a visit to Leningrad, where interesting political processes are taking place."

Anatoliy Sobchak noted in his conversation that "democratic processes in the country will continue. One of the causes of this current difficult socio-political development lies in the fact that the CPSU has ceased to be the leading party, but it is trying to maintain its positions. This is manifesting itself most accutely at present in the mutual relations between the center and the republics, which is also confirmed by the Baltics. But with all the difficulties, I would not dramatize the events that have taken place there. This is a transitional period. We speak in support of a political settlement to the problems of interethnic relations."

Also today the delegation had a discussion with Boris Gidaspov, secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast committee of the party.

The leader of the Leningrad party organization of communists, in response to the questions of the Danish legislators, emphasized that the tragic events in Lithuania and Latvia should be studied carefully both by specialists of the law enforcement bodies and by the USSR Supreme Soviet. "Any form of hasty conclusions and decisions would be out of place here, and they could add fuel to the flames of ethnic passions. A way out of the situation that has taken shape can only be found by means of serious political dialogue, without ultimatums and conditions. In order to achieve this, the rights of every individual and all social or ethnic groups must be properly guaranteed."

The visitors have left this evening for Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania.

Siberian Communists Advocate Adherence to Union

PM3001165591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

["Statement by Participants in Conference of Secretaries of Siberian CPSU Party Organizations"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] The country is going through a very acute crisis which is giving rise, on the one hand, to intolerance, extremism, and outbreaks of violence, and, on the other hand, to apathy and a lack of faith.

At the same time, there is a growing and increasingly strong realization in public awareness of the need to move from rally-style democracy and the bandying of words to constructive, creative work. Many party organizations have started adopting more active positions geared to working people's interests.

In the prevailing situation and at this most responsible and decisive stage of perestroyka we reaffirm our loyalty to the course elaborated by the 28th CPSU Congress—the course of improving society by resolutely implementing economic, political, judicial, legal, and other reforms, whose main provisions were formulated in the program statement and congress resolutions.

The main task of the country's present-day development is to preserve the Soviet federation and to bring about the signing of a new Union treaty. We share V.I. Lenin's idea that peoples can only be united "**not** by the power of the ruble, **not** by the power of cudgels..., but by **voluntary** consent" (vol. 30, pp 73-74).

We advocate sovereignty for Russia. Moreover, it was the desire to strengthen its autonomy and restore its full-fledged statehood that was one of the decisive motives behind the formation of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party. In all our practical activity we will promote the preservation and development of the Russian people's age-old economic, cultural, and other ties with the peoples of other republics. Russia's sovereignty, just as that of all other republics, should not be set in opposition to the sovereignty of our entire Union.

We are concerned that, as a result of the contradictory and inconsistent policy pursued by B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, destructive processes are intensifying in the USSR and, consequently, in the RSFSR too. It is impossible to verbally uphold the idea of concluding a new Union Treaty while in practice ignoring the USSR Constitution and Union laws. The "law war" should be brought to an end.

We believe that if Russia were first among the republics to sign the Union treaty it would be a powerful stabilizing factor and an initiative of immense historical and political importance.

We state that we will resolutely oppose any attempts to shift the fire of interethnic and other conflicts to Siberian territory, and we will do everything in our power to prevent violence and arbitrary rule, to reveal the sources and aims of the destabilizing forces, and to demonstrate the immorality of those who are striving to make political capital out of inciting discord.

We cannot permit any weakening in the country's security or defense capability, any further whipping up of anti-Army sentiment, or any attempts to destabilize the USSR Armed Forces and organs and troops of the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and KGB. We resolutely support the measures being taken by the USSR president and government to strengthen legality, law, and order, and to protect the Soviet Constitution.

We advocate the consistent strengthening of people's power. We need a strong executive authority today more than ever. Not a crude monopolistic authority, but a highly competent and professional authority of reason, goodness, justice, and legality. We are struggling for such an authority, we will support such an authority.

We call on all political parties and movements to realize that the fatherland's fate is more important than internecine strife and internal dissension.

The aim of our meeting is to coordinate the efforts of the party organizations of the republics, krays, and oblasts in solving socioeconomic problems and in stabilizing the political situation in the region.

"Russia's might will grow through Siberia"—those words by our great compatriot M.V. Lomonosov proved to be prophetic. But, unfortunately, also topical are the words of the famous Siberian academic and public figure G.N. Potanin, who described the deprived nature of this wealthy region: "The first part of the state regalia is the sable. Sable goes only into the state's coffers. The second part of the state regalia is gold, the third is timber. In what way is this not a colonial policy?"

The only thing to have changed is that today we can add that the fourth part of the state regalia is oil, the fifth is gas, and we could go on to mention ore, coal, diamonds.... Siberia continues to be a raw-materials appendage. The only difference being that whereas previously it was only the center that had a claim on these resources, now there are two claims on them—one from the Union, one from Russia.

In terms of their material position and the provision of social welfare Siberians occupy one of the last places in Russia. There is an extremely serious position in the Siberian region as regards the provision of foodstuffs and industrial goods to the population. There is serious concern about the decline in production volume, the amount of construction work being carried out, and the destruction of economic ties. The Siberian countryside is in an incredibly difficult position.

It is time for the Russian Government to seriously embark on organizing the republic's economy rather than seeking culprits in the "center." It should work in conjunction with local administrative organs rather than pinning full responsibility for the resolution of fundamental issues on them.

We are forced to state yet again that, under the conditions of the transition to the market, party organizations in the republics, krays, and oblasts of Siberia will consistently maintain relations with the Russian and Union Governments which would make it possible to safeguard territorial and production autonomy in practice and, above all, in the utilization of some of our resources and products in the interests of the region's population. We will be making collective efforts to consistently implement the programs adopted by the council of the "Siberian Agreement" interregional association.

We propose that primary party organizations and all Siberian Communists become actively involved in resolving highly acute socioeconomic problems. We need to be bolder in making use of the opportunities for economic reform and in overcoming departmental monopolies and workers' alienation from the means of production and the results of their work. And it is important to keep to the positions of the socialist choice: to give priority to collective forms of ownership and not allow land to be turned into a commodity to be bought or sold. Siberia is rich, and communists should seek out and find ways to improve the lives of every person, collective, rayon, city, and the region as a whole.

We are not appealing to Siberians to keep quiet. They cannot and should not keep quiet. We appeal to them to pool their efforts and do everything to strengthen our Soviet power, overcome chaos, and restore discipline, law, and order.

We appeal to the patriotism of Siberians, who, as is well known, are a cohesive but select people. The revolutionaries, free thinkers, convicts, and settlers who were once forced to live in this immensely harsh land sired a race of hardworking, courageous people whose hearts, as the writer Vyacheslav Shugayev noted, seem to bear a higher moral stamp. At this difficult time for the country we appeal to these, the best qualities of Siberians—their good nature, industriousness, and courage.

[Signed] I.V. Aparin, secretary of Altay CPSU Kray Committee; V.B. Lykshitov, second secretary of Buryat CPSU Oblast Committee [Obkom]; V.P. Ivanitskiy, second secretary of Irkutsk CPSU Obkom; S.V. Bereznev, secretary of Kemerovo CPSU Obkom; V.A. Mindolin, first secretary of Novosibirsk CPSU Obkom and member of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee; USSR People's Deputy I.A. Nazarov, first secretary of Omsk CPSU Obkom; O.L. Podberezin, department chief at Sverdlovsk CPSU Obkom; A.A. Pomorov, first secretary of Tomsk CPSU Obkom and member of the CPSU Central Committee; USSR People's Deputy G.Ch. Shirshin, first secretary of Tuva CPSU Obkom; N.V. Merzlikin, first secretary of Chita CPSU Obkom. Tomsk, 26 January 1991.

'Communists of Russia' Faction Described

91UN0795A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with B. Kibirev, second secretary of the Krasnodar Kray Party Committee and cochairman of the "Communists of Russia" group at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, by PRAVDA correspondent K. Aksenov in Krasnodar; date not given: "Faction"]

[Text] Krasnodar—*PRAVDA readers who followed the Second RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Congress of People's Deputies believe that factional struggle at the congress intensified sharply. Seeking the adoption of the decisions they want, numerous groups and their leaders are engaged in a polemic, sometimes overstepping the bounds of parliamentary relations. The sharp and even malicious words here, the authors of letters observe, sometimes have no connection with the problems being discussed. The purpose, evidently, is just one: to inflame passions.*

In such a situation it is, understandably, difficult for the people's deputies of the "Communists of Russia" group also to conduct parliamentary business. Was it able to withstand its opponents in seeking the adoption of constructive decisions?

"So, Boris Grigoryevich, can it be said that a new page in the history of Russia—a multiparty parliament, in which a tense factional struggle is under way—has been opened before our very eyes?" This question began our interview with a cochairman of the "Communists of Russia" group at the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, B. Kibirev, second secretary of the Krasnodar Kray Party Committee.

[Kibirev] Yes, this is a truly new phenomenon in our life. And unfamiliar as yet. Why hide it, the CPSU, in power for decades, had simply become unused to political struggle. Decisions, even major ones, were adopted unanimously or by "overwhelming majority." The imaginary unanimity so lulled us that even today some communists do not believe in the reality of the existence of a powerful, well-organized opposition purposively conducting a parliamentary struggle.

It has to be confessed that many communist people's deputies in the Russian corps found themselves simply unprepared for this. Was this not why at the first congress even we found ourselves in the minority on certain key questions which had been brought up for discussion. We clearly lacked parliamentary fighters capable of concisely and clearly expressing themselves on controversial problems or of simply forestalling a rival at the microphone. We had become accustomed to sitting serenely in an easy chair and were simply reluctant to understand that the time of "wedding deputies" was over. We now need to defend the ideas of the Communist Party in struggle, by the sweat of our brow, without being afraid of sharp disputes.

[Aksenov] Many PRAVDA readers are requesting a more detailed description of the "Communists of Russia" bloc and its work at the congress and want to know who leads them and why not all members of the CPSU are members of it.

[Kibirev] The republic's corps of deputies is divided today into approximately 30 different groups supporting the most diverse positions. But mainly the congress is split in two, as it were. On one side of the "barricades," the "Communists of Russia," on the other, "Democratic Russia." There are also, of course, "intermediate" groups, professional clubs, and so forth.

[Aksenov] What do you think, are these really two irreconcilable opposed camps?

[Kibirev] The experience of the last congress showed that mutually acceptable solutions could be found even on problems that seemed insoluble. The "adversaries" need only have a sense of good will, work constructively, and seek compromises. Only on the path of consolidation may we really revive our Russia and ensure a good life for the people.

[Aksenov] Our readers note the positive fact that at the second congress the communist faction not only actively made its presence felt but also had a precise plan of action.

[Kibirev] Yes, on many items on the agenda we had our own alternative draft solutions proceeding from the interests of the peoples of Russia and in the spirit of the documents of the 28th CPSU Congress and the subsequent RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee plenum. The aim of our faction is to work constructively and seek points of contact, not a severing of relations, with the "democrats." Of course, some people did not like the fact that we were able to considerably change and, I believe, enrich the congress agenda. The television audience, for example, knows how much effort the communists put into ensuring discussion of the question of the Union treaty. It is an urgent problem, passions are seething around it, and it simply cannot be avoided. But those who are interested in confrontation between Russia and the center suddenly put up resistance, and it seemed that the issue was about to be withdrawn. But a debate, very useful, in my view, did nonetheless take place. I personally spoke on this subject three times. At my suggestion the more precise "Russia is a part of a renewed USSR" formula was recorded in place of the former vague wording.

Or another fact. Not long before the congress the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA had published two draft constitutions—one prepared by the Constitutional Commission, the other by the "Communists of Russia" group. It is no secret that some people had hoped to swiftly push through at the congress the highly contradictory, to put it mildly, "official" document, which had evoked considerable censure in the republic. People had begun to ask: Will we not be turning onto the path of restoration of capitalism? It was clear that rejecting our draft simply thus would not succeed. Russians may now discuss everything and choose the road they will take calmly and unhurriedly. At the congress the deputies behaved intelligently, revising the articles of the Constitution that are really today holding back the processes of perestroyka in the republic.

[Aksenov] Judging by the letters and phone calls, incidentally, PRAVDA readers' attitude toward the adopted amendments is ambivalent. The Kuban peasantry, say, is very critical of the decision to introduce private ownership of the land and the possibility of buying and selling it. And, what is more, some people believe that the "Communists of Russia" faction clearly lost in the debate with the "democrats" on this key point. Do you agree with this assessment?

[Kibirev] Not entirely. While supporting the ideas of a renewal of the countryside as a whole, our faction believed that at this stage it was perfectly sufficient to enact a law enshrining the right of the individual to the indefinite use of the land in the most diverse forms, including its transfer by inheritance. The sole thing we sharply opposed was the authorization of the buying and selling of land. Why? The answer is provided by the peasants themselves. They fear, not without reason, that today, when the workers of the countryside are poor and cannot acquire land, the best areas will pass to smart operators of the shadow economy and millionaires who have been able in recent years to "launder" money earned dishonestly.

It was not fortuitous that it was during discussion of the amendment concerning the buying and selling of land that an impasse situation arose. Sparing no words, our opponents hurled charges at the communist faction, endeavoring to portray us as inveterate conservatives not conversant with the people's aspirations. And there appeared in the press also manifestly unobjective reports alleging that the private ownership clause was supported by the vast majority of the country's population. Not everyone is capable of withstanding this, you will agree. We agreed to a compromise version permitting the buying and selling of land only after 10 years' tenure of it. And 499 deputies voted against this article when it was put to the vote, what is more. Including, I will not hide the fact, myself.

Perhaps in Smolensk, Novgorod, and Pskov Oblasts, where there is much low-grade land, this process will not be painful. But we need, after all, to look the truth in the eye: Who will want to pay money for areas without roads and power lines, gas supply lines, and so forth. On the other hand, there will be enough hunters of Kuban land, particularly in the resort zone. Yet there are essentially no vacant areas here. The fields belong to the collective and state farms, and over 50 quintals of grain per hectare and good sugar beet, rice, sunflower, and vegetable harvests are obtained. The state receives from here a large quantity of food resources. So, what, destroy what has been made? Of course not.

The "democrats" charged us communist deputies with being too politicized and wearing "ideological blinders." But it seems to me that it is our rivals who are suffering from this "disease." They believe, for instance, that there is only one road out of the crisis—transferring the land to private ownership. Is this not an illusion? The country essentially lacks an infrastructure for farming on small plots.

I shall cite our parts. We have several dozen tenant farms engaged in the production of milk, meat, vegetables, and other produce. We have helped them repeatedly—one needed a tractor, another, fertilizer, yet another, livestock feed. But is such assistance the solution? What is needed is a state system of assistance to tenant farming, if we wish to obtain big returns from them. Banks and credit for the building of processing plants are needed, and it is necessary to organize services and so forth. It was observed at the congress that 1 billion rubles will be allocated for the support of Russia's peasant farms in the coming year. But this is peanuts. And, besides money, metal, timber, bricks, machinery and fuel are needed, and all these are in short supply even today.

I would like to emphasize that our faction as a whole supported the decree on renewal of the Russian countryside because it contains many really important propositions concerning a revival of the economy, culture, public education, and other most important spheres in the countryside. But problems connected with the fate of the land have not yet been solved, we believe. It was not fortuitous that the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies also decided to hold a referendum on the question of private ownership of the land.

[Aksenov] The "Communists of Russia" faction includes far from all deputies who are members of the CPSU. Why is this?

[Kibirev] We should evidently not demand that they all be members of our faction. Many CPSU members are working in professional and territorial groups and are performing fruitful work there, supporting the party line. At the same time it has to be acknowledged that some people are avoiding our faction. Why? Some people's deputies obtained a mandate not with the support of the party organizations and, perhaps, in spite of them, and some people even demonstratively quit the CPSU. Let us not close our eyes either to the fact that our opponents are working actively with communist deputies, trying to lure them over to their side. In a word, our group has substantial work to do to unite its ranks under the flag of the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress and the RSFSR Communist Party and defense of the people's interests.

[Aksenov] Who leads the faction?

[Kibirev] Nine cochairmen have been elected, and the coordinator of all work is A. Sokolov, secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee.

[Aksenov] PRAVDA readers are complaining that the work of the "Communists of Russia" faction at the congress was not covered all that objectively on television and in certain newspapers.

[Kibirev] There are many such instances, unfortunately. ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, for example, calling itself an independent newspaper, incidentally, published the names of the deputies who voted against the adoption of the decree on the agrarian issue. Just look, it said, how few there are—only 91 persons. But it remained silent for some reason or other about those who were opposed to the introduction of the buying and selling of land (there were, I recall, 499). Although the electorate would most likely be interested in knowing who is defending mother and benefactor land and how. Unfortunately, neither is the party press pampering us with attention as yet.

[Aksenov] And the final question. With what is your faction preoccupied today?

[Kibirev] We are preparing documents for the next congress. It has, after all, to discuss alternative drafts of the RSFSR Constitution and other burning problems. There will, I believe, be no less keen a struggle than at the last congress. After all, it will be a question of the future of the republic and the fate of its peoples.

In a word, the communist deputies will endeavor faithfully and truthfully to serve Russians' interests.

Communist Party's Ilin Views Domestic Issues

PM2901122191 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 10 Jan 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with A. Ilin, member of the Politburo and second secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, by A. Osinskiy; place and date not given: "Threat of Diktat: Reality and Inventions"]

[Text] Many of our readers are interested in the present viewpoint of the leaders of the Russian Communist Party on internal political processes. Satisfying that interest, we offer for your attention a conversation with A. Ilin, member of the Politburo and second secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee.

[Osinskiy] For almost two weeks the whole country and many people far outside it followed with rapt attention the way events were developing at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies. You were a direct participant in it. Aleksey Nikolayevich, are you satisfied with the results of the work of the congress? What, in your view, should be singled out in particular?

[Ilin] First about satisfaction.... On the whole, probably, yes. The main thing is that we succeeded in making political decisions which inspire hope of surmounting the crisis situation in society.

I would single out, in particular, the debate on the draft Union treaty. It highlighted, in the main, three viewpoints on the USSR's future. The first proposed preserving the former model of the Union by means of strong-arm, authoritarian methods. The second consisted in that it is first necessary to grant the republics full independence, establish bilateral ties between them, bypassing the center, and only then reach agreement on general integration. And, finally, the third provided for concluding the treaty without delay as the basis for transforming our state into a voluntary union of sovereign republics.

At first sight, these are just different tactical lines. The answer to the question of whether or not a state called the USSR would be on the political map of the world depended on which of these viewpoints would prevail.

I would like to emphasize that the RSFSR Communist Party and its representatives at the congress firmly adhered to the position of concluding the Union treaty as soon as possible. In championing it, we were guided, above all, by the desire of Russians, like the majority of Soviet people, to live in a common home. According to the data of the CPSU Central Committee Social Sciences Academy Sociological Research Center, 73 percent of the population advocates the preservation of our Union. I am convinced that behind this percentage lies the people's wisdom, which the "sovereignty euphoria" has been unable to shake. The RSFSR Communist Party's representatives at the congress unhesitatingly supported the proposal to hold an all-Union referendum on the question of the USSR.

[Osinskiy] Naturally, you experience a sense of satisfaction in connection with the decisions adopted by the congress regarding the Union treaty. And yet, in what way do you dislike your opponent's positions? How, in your view, will events develop now?

[Ilin] For principled reasons our party rejects the concept of preserving the Union by means of diktat. Under conditions when people have felt themselves to be not mere "cogs" but real masters of their own fate, it is undemocratic, to put it mildly, to impose anything on them by force. Nor can we agree with the viewpoint of those who believe that the time for a treaty is past, that the idea of it is doomed. I do not think there is any need to prove the scientific insolvency and the political danger of attempts to destroy everything down to its foundations and only after that to create something new. I will remark that only quite recently precisely the champions of such approaches were insisting on the conclusion of a new Union treaty. Of course, we have no illusions that the question of it has been decided in advance or that the conclusion of the treaty will not encounter resistance from separatists and nationalists. There will also be a struggle for public opinion when preparing for the referendum on the question of the USSR.

Under these conditions international education is categorized as a top-priority area in party work. There is no doubt that the center of this work must be in labor collectives. It is precisely labor collectives, including those in Moscow which have felt the consequences of the territories' economic isolation and of the severing of economic ties, that are called upon to have their weighty say in favor of concluding the treaty.

Communists bear special responsibility. Let us look the truth in the face—sentiments of nationalism and separatism have, unfortunately, penetrated our party milieu too. Faced with the imminent threat of the destruction of the union state, it would not hurt to recall Lenin's words: "...We must beware of any national struggle within social democracy, which would nullify the great task of the revolutionary struggle..." (Volume 23, p 59). Only by acting as a united international front will we be able to actively promote the preservation and renewal of the USSR.

[Osinskiy] You were given the floor at the congress. What dictated this desire to mount such a high rostrum? Do you make the same assessment today of everything you said during those few minutes as you did then?

[Ilin] Frankly speaking, I had been preparing to participate in the debate on the question of the Union treaty. My conscience as a people's deputy and a communist did not allow me to sit silently at the congress when the situation in the country had assumed a dangerously explosive nature. Apart from the inner need, I was also obliged to do this by my voters' demands. Finally, the Central Committee Secretariat had charged me with conveying the RSFSR Communist Party's position to the congress. So both personal and public duty came together there.

From the rostrum I spoke of what was painful, what had been achieved through suffering, and what had been endured. My only regret is that, owing to the shortened standing orders, I had to be brief and did not manage to speak of everything. I wanted, for example, to share some views on the practice of concluding bilateral agreements between republics. The thing is that today it in fact proceeds from the premise that the USSR no longer exists, as it were, and only the norms of international law act as the regulator of relations between the "high contracting parties." Is this normal, if we live in a unified federative state?

It is also unnatural that people know practically nothing about the treaties' contents. The following fact, for example, still gives me no rest. MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 27 November 1990 carried a short report stating that the Latvian People's Front and Supreme Soviet were "openly and hastily preparing a total rupture of ties with the USSR and the establishment of a totalitarian profascist regime." And literally the day before IZVESTIYA's evening edition had published the report made by A.V. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, following his two-hour meeting with B.N. Yeltsin: "The plans for the future—Russian and ours—fully coincide."

I hope that there is some misunderstanding here. And yet...It is worrying that the bilateral treaty between the republics has still not been published. And the talks with B.N. Yeltsin, so it has been learned from the press, were also conducted by the Latvian leadership behind closed doors. I would not want to draw parallels, but this somehow really reminds you of the notorious "secret protocols" of 1939.

Naturally, a lack of glasnost gives rise to all kinds of rumors and inventions. People associate with those talks, for example, backstage territorial haggling and plans by the Baltic republics to extend their land borders at the expense of certain Russian oblasts. I think you know of facts on this score.

[Osinskiy] In your opinion, do the "Basic Guidelines of RSFSR Communist Party Activity" agree sufficiently with the decisions adopted by the Fourth Congress? Are there any substantial differences? How is it proposed to resolve the possible contradictions?

[Ilin] Generally speaking, I would not compare these documents directly. The point is that the basic guidelines embrace quite a wide range of problems in our party's activity for both the immediate and the longer term. But the Congress decisions deal with priority measures to surmount the crisis situation which has taken shape in the country. Moreover, the question of creating a new system of executive power arose after the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee November Plenum and, naturally, was not reflected in the basic guidelines.

Although, of course, a comparison on a number of principal points is possible. I mean the attitude to stabilizing the economy, to the population's social protection under conditions of the switch to the market, the settlement of interethnic conflicts, and the fight against crime. There are no substantial disagreements in our approaches to resolving these problems; they fully agree, since they take account of the interests and will of Soviet people, including Russians. Nevertheless, I would like to draw your attention to two points.

First, to an assessment of the socioeconomic and political situation. We believe, for example, that the causes which have brought the country to the brink of disaster are rooted not only in the vices of the past, not only in the mistakes made during the years of perestroyka, not only in the raging of separatism and nationalism. You do not have to be a seer to understand that antisocialist forces are largely to blame for the disintegration of the Union's economic, social, and state structures. It is no coincidence that the lines of the struggle for the collapse of the USSR and the routing of the CPSU have come together. For it is only by realizing these plans that the aims of the homebred nouveaux riches, the slick operators of the "shadow" economy, and the so-called "businessmen" can be achieved. It is perfectly understandable that our party took this factor into account in elaborating the basic guidelines of its activity.

And the second point. To emerge from the crisis situation, the congress appealed to all citizens and to all political parties and movements which adhere to the positions of perestroyka to pool their efforts. Is this appeal acceptable to us? Of course, but on the indispensable condition that it is a question of consolidation on a platform of socialist choice and communist perspective. For it is no secret that those who seek to turn the country and the republic toward bourgeois usages also adhere to positions of perestroyka—in their own way, it is true. Of course, we are not going the same way as such advocates of "perestroyka."

[Osinskiy] According to the assessments of many politicians, people's deputies, and representatives of the mass media, E.A. Shevardnadze's resignation was a critical aspect of the congress. This, as he himself emphasized, was a form of protest against the threat of dictatorship. In this connection I recall the recent PRAVDA article by I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, entitled "On the Russian Communists' Action Program," which assumes the danger of rolling back toward neo-Stalinism or, in other words, toward a dictatorial regime. But is the likelihood really so great as to warrant sounding the alarm? From where does this threat stem?

[Ilin] To tell the truth, talk of a threat of dictatorship sometimes resembles a search for a black cat in a dark room. Nevertheless, I believe there are grounds for thinking like this. What I have in mind, above all, is deviations from the principle of democratic centralism in management. Having unconditionally abandoned the "administrative command system," we fail to notice, as it were, that the country today is suffering not so much from that system as from the products of its decomposition—anarchy, regional egoism, and ignoring of the decisions of Union organs in the republics and provinces.

What is more, the present situation confirms the Leninist conclusion that the transition to a new state of society is an extremely complex process and that firm state power is needed to facilitate it. We have already seen for ourselves in practice that without such power no laws or decrees work. So the strengthening of executive power, from the viewpoint of dialectical unity in developing democracy and enhancing responsibility, is an objective necessity today. It was enshrined constitutionally at the congress.

Of course, the strengthening of personal power always potentially entails a threat of diktat. Today, however, this threat stems not from the center but, rather, from the aforementioned forces of anticommunism, nationalism, and anti-Sovietism. Take those leaders of the Interregional Deputies Group. In calling for an end to socialism and the soviets "on one-sixth of the world's dry land," they do not rule out the violent nature of transformations and dream aloud of the power of an "iron hand." We should also remember the extremist "Action Program-90," which is, at the same time, a plan for a political coup directly involving violence. Not to mention the fact that the brown stains of fascism are standing out increasingly clearly on the political map of the country.

A campaign of "de-Sovietization," of establishing a special regime of executive power, was born of the "turbid foam" on the wave of democratization. Some people maintain that during the period of perestroyka precisely such power must be the key link in the political mechanism. Speaking of the soviets' inefficiency, they peremptorily try to suggest to us yet again that this is the only option and that nothing else is permitted, as it were. What is meant by a special regime? Nothing more nor less than the institution of governors, mayors, and headmen, resurrected from nonexistence. At the same time, and this should be emphasized especially, they must be independent of the soviets and be subordinate only to a higher administrator. In other words, away with democracy, and scrap the organs of people's power.

It is evidently no secret to many Muscovites that G.Kh. Popov preaches these ideas in his new scientific work "What Is to Be Done?" It is also known that similar thoughts are also voiced by certain other people's deputies. It is curious that they all seriously regard themselves as democrats and "left-wing" radicals.

You might raise an objection with me—for the efficiency of many soviets really is low today. All this is so. Only it must be borne in mind that, in criticizing the present organs of people's power, people bring their anger to bear not on the soviets but on the "miniparliaments" which they have become. These are fundamentally different forms of democracy.

I am convinced that the little "Bonapartes"—governor generals, capital mayors, and provincial headmen—are not our way. The idea of reviving the soviets as working establishments combining legislative and executive functions, adopting decisions, and organizing their fulfillment, is now making increasingly insistent headway. People are tired of mere talk and need real action. It was for this that they gave their elected representatives a mandate of confidence.

[Osinskiy] What are the priorities for today in the RSFSR Communist Party's activity?

[Ilin] For the immediate future we have set the key task of promoting in every possible way the stabilization and improvement of the socioeconomic situation. I do not think there is any need to set out in detail the reasons why precisely this priority has been chosen. We have gotten really close to the dangerous line beyond which the "clinical death" of the national economy could ensue.

We see the reasons for this, above all, in the fact that the disproportions that took shape in the economy earlier have come up against the new destabilizing factors which have emerged during perestroyka. Union organs must undoubtedly take the brunt of the blame for this. And yet there is also the RSFSR Government, endowed, incidentally, with considerable powers. Light is shed to some extent on the way it manages these powers by an interview published in IZVESTIYA with B. Fedorov, the RSFSR finance minister who has resigned. He maintains, in particular, that the government does not have its own policy but swims with the tide and stops up holes and that its activity is imbued with populism leading to the bankruptcy of Russia. The harshness of these assessments is explicable. However, there seem to be no grounds for not fully trusting them.

Guided by the November Central Committee plenum decisions, we drew up proposals for stabilizing the economy and going over to market relations in the republic. Most of them were supported by the extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and were made the basis of the resolution adopted on this question.

Our priority task now is to raise people to resolve the most acute questions such as food, consumer goods, and housing. Of course communists must do all they can to restore economic ties among enterprises; otherwise economic collapse is inevitable.

[Osinskiy] Many people assert that the RSFSR Communist Party or, rather, its leadership is in tough confrontation with the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. To what extent does this tally with reality?

[Ilin] It seems to me that a certain substitution is willy nilly taking place in these assertions: Ties between the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet are identified with the personal relations between the leaders of these organs. Such a "transformation" does not reflect the true state of affairs.

In our relations with the RSFSR Supreme Soviet we do not act as an opposition but proceed from the degree to which working people's interests are taken into account in the decisions that are adopted. If draft laws do reflect them, the Central Committee supports these acts through the "Russia's Communists" group, but if they infringe them it opposes them.

I could cite many examples where the positions of various parties' factions in the Supreme Soviet have coincided in resolving problems of concern to Russians. Thus, communist deputies voted for the adoption of laws on improving the position of women and the family and maternity and childhood protection in the countryside, eliminating the aftermath of the Chernobyl disaster, and a number of others. Incidentally, this is perfectly understandable—for their social thrust is obvious. At the same time the majority of communists disagreed with the decisions setting Russia against the USSR.

I wish to emphasize here that our position is one not only of rejecting drafts we dislike but also of formulating alternative versions. Graphic evidence of this can be provided by our steps with regard to the Russian Federation's draft constitution prepared by a working group of the Constitutional Commission. O.G. Rumyantsev, its leader, addressing the congress of his own "Democratic Russia" party, did not hide the fact that this draft rests entirely on bourgeois law and creates constitutional bases for asserting the capitalist system and "burying" socialism.

Rumyantsev's version of the constitution elicited a sharply negative response from people and from entire labor collectives. Typical in this respect is the resolution adopted by the Moscow Meat Combine collective and recently published in your newspaper, which points out that the draft "is of a dictatorial, probourgeois nature and will strengthen the power of the country's 'newly appeared masters,' of corrupt strata, operators in the shadow economy, and the mafia. It will not serve as a base of legislation for a people who made numerous sacrifices to create a progressive system." It is difficult to add anything to this.

The Communist Party Central Committee adopted a decision to prepare an alternative version of the Constitution. It has been drawn up and published by an action group represented by RSFSR people's deputies and scientists. We are counting on active support for it from Russians and on their high responsibility before the present and future generations of compatriots.

[Osinskiy] Is the already formed structure adequate, in your view, for the RSFSR Communist Party to resolve or actively influence the resolution of the complex tasks of society's cardinal perestroyka? How are relations shaping up between the Central Committee and the oblast, kray, city, and primary organizations on the republic's territory? Are there any complexities here, and how are they being overcome?

[Ilin] First of all, I wish to point out that the period of our party's organizational formation has been complex and painful and has taken place under conditions of an unbridled campaign to discredit it.

Its creation, for example, has been presented as an unnatural step, and the party itself as illegitimate. The constituting of the conference as a constituent congress was also falsified. The fact that a resolution on holding the Russian Conference had been adopted by the CPSU Central Committee March (1990) Plenum at the request of the masses and that 69 out of 72 oblast, kray, and republic party conferences had advocated the creation of an RSFSR Communist Party with full rights was hushed up. The fact that the political expediency of such a step was dictated by the processes occurring in the country and the republic and that the right to it existed because the delegates represented all the kray and oblast party organizations operating in the republic without exception, while an absolute majority of them had the communists' mandate to form a Communist Party, was also ignored.

It is obvious now that that "crusade" failed. The period of the party's "self-determination," despite all the difficulties, is coming to an end. The Basic Guidelines of its activity have been adopted, and communists' action programs have been drawn up locally. The structure of the Central Committee and its apparatus has been approved with due regard for them, local organs have been formed, and work on bringing the structure and staffs of the republic party organization into line with the realities of the day is being completed. The decisions of the Central Committee November plenum were greeted with approval locally.

Thus, we have a program, the tactics have been elaborated, and the organization has been created. We have our own newspaper. In my view, such a party is capable of helping to extricate Russia from the period of protracted crisis and of accelerating the renewal of its socioeconomic, political, and spiritual life.

We advocate the broad development of internal party democracy and believe that party work must be decisively freed from the extremes of red tape, overregimentation, and ritual. At the same time communists are aware that what is needed in the present situation is a strong, ideologically and organizationally cohesive party which advocates working people's interests. Therefore, in pursuing a policy of democratization, we must not overstep the mark beyond which party organizations and committees might turn into debating clubs and lose their militancy and the capacity for vigorous action. Now more than ever it is necessary, in our view, to restore the Leninist concept of the principles of democratic centralism—freedom of debate when discussing questions, and unity of action after adopting decisions.

As regards the Central Committee's relations with the republic's party organizations, they are shaping up normally, on a businesslike basis. We seek to ensure a constant living link with them, to visit the provinces more frequently, and to meet with communists. Naturally, we devote considerable attention to the capital's party organizations. I am sure that we will achieve full mutual understanding and truly businesslike cooperation with them. The necessary foundations and preconditions for this exist. We are enabled to think this, in particular, by the decisions adopted at the Moscow City Party conference, in whose work I participated and where, incidentally, I made the acquaintance of many interesting people.

Kravchenko Attends Voronezh Obkom Plenum

PM1902165391 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[A. Pyatunin report under the rubric "Multiparty Life": "The Masks Have Been Thrown Off. Communists Accept the Opposition's Challenge"]

[Text] Voronezh—Even before they took their seats in the hall, participants in the joint plenum of the CPSU obkom [oblast committee] and the oblast party organization's Control and Auditing Commission studied with curiosity the pamphlets now being circulated in cities and villages on behalf of the "Democratic Russia" Movement's Coordinating Council. This is what one of them, prepared by USSR People's Deputy A. Murashev, says:

"The majority of democrats have lost their illusions about the possibility of forming a so-called 'left center', the possibility of an alliance or cooperation with Gorbachev. He has openly shown his solidarity with the most reactionary forces in the past few months... It is time for the democratic forces to openly and unambiguously declare themselves as organized opposition to the leadership headed by Gorbachev, and the task of coming to power must be on the agenda as a political program."

The authors of the pamphlet go on to give detailed instructions about what needs to be done to implement this task, what information to gather, whom to nominate as governors and mayors in the upcoming elections, how to use the mass media for this purpose, and which mass media to use. "Make a row, bring court actions against people, tell ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, DEMOKRATICHESKAYA ROSSIYA, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, and OGONEK about it.

The newly hatched "mentors" of the people make no secret of who their bosses are, the forces on which they are relying in their struggle against the existing consitutional system and the country's president. "Solve the problem of financing your organization. Establish contacts with the private business world—members of cooperatives, leaseholders, and small enterprises—we express their interests."

Well, this time there's no denying that the esteemed democrat gentlemen are making themselves clear. Everything has been clearly outlined. The masks have been thrown off. The challenge has been made.

Could the communists of a large and mature oblast party organization, which numbers around 200,000 party members, fail to notice it? Of course not. The report by I. Shabanov, first secretary of the party obkom, on the current situation and the program of actions of the CPSU oblast organization said straight out:

"A bloc of parties and movements opposed to the CPSU is being knocked together, whose aim is to change the social order in the country... In essence they have moved on to an open struggle to squeeze the CPSU out of the political arena, to renounce socialism, and to cause the Soviet Union to disintegrate..."

How did Voronezh's communists react to all this? In their opinion, what are the reasons for the profound crisis that has struck our society?

Debate speakers A. Sherstyukov, metalworker at the "Tyazheks" Production Association; G. Parkhomenko, secretary of the Polytechnical Institute party committee; V. Frolov, mechanized link leader at "Ertilskiy" Sovkhoz [state farm]; and others said that it would be incorrect to lay the blame for all our present misfortunes and difficulties only on the "heavy legacy of the past." Many of our adversities are the result of today's times. The leadership of the country and the republic, they said, has committed serious errors in implementing reforms. The prestige of perestroyka has been undermined by a series of hasty, inconsequent, and incompetent decisions, by mistakes in the national economy at all levels. The well-planned dismantling of the edict system has turned into disorderly destruction fraught with irreparable consequences both for the Communist Party itself and for millions of working people. The vacuum of power has started to fill up with ambitious demagogues, calculating opportunists, and out-and-out adventurers.

G. Kostin, director of the machine plant, gave a very good explanation of what this has led to in practice.

"We were led to believe that as soon as the edict system had been destroyed, as soon as the party had abandoned economic matters, as soon as the 'partocracy' had given up running the economy and new 'progressive' forces had been allowed in...there would be an abundance of goods and economic prosperity—paradise on earth, in one word.

"So, we destroyed, abandoned, gave up, and allowed in. So what? Name me just one link in the economic mechanism, just one component of our life that has improved. There are none. Tell me exactly which one of those 'democrats' who kept making promises has done something useful for people and for the country? You cannot.

"What is to be done in this situation? How can we stop the economy and the living standard from falling, how can we protect the working man? To my mind, communists have just one option, the speaker declared to applause from the hall: Together with the healthy patriotic forces of society, to take all power and responsibility in their hands and impose order in the country. In the prevailing situation this is the only way that the motherland's independence, the shoots of democracy, and the vital interests of the working people can be preserved. We must resolutely say 'No!' to dictatorship by the criminal bourgeoisie regardless of the democratic robes it may don or the kind of smoke screen it may raise to conceal its true aims!"

Maybe Kostin is excessively harsh and categorical in his judgments and conclusions, but you can understand him. Not a single plant director in Voronezh has recently been subjected to as much persecution and as many attacks as this experienced economic leader, chairman of the Voronezh Association of State Enterprises, scientist, and member of the Russian Supreme Economic Council. A group of city soviet deputies, radically opposed to him, "denounced" him and even demanded his resignation from the post of director. They used the city newspaper VORONEZHSKIY KURYER to heap so much dirt on him, that the plant's labor collective was forced to stand up for the honor of its leader by recently publishing a long letter in the oblast newspaper KOMMUNA, in which the absurd accusations against G. Kostin were conclusively exposed.

Incidentally, other plenum participants also spoke about the prejudice and obvious anticommunist tenor of VORONEZHSKIY KURYER. This newspaper's editorial office is not embarrassed to present a spiteful caricature of our past and present life and of the party and government leaders, or to make statements about the work of local party and Soviet organs in a presumptuous and supercilious tone.

And meanwhile, the plenum participants noted the following significant trend in the chaniging political climate in the country: As of last fall, public sympathy has clearly turned away from the bourgeois radicals, and even they themselves stated at the Kharkov congress that trust in and attention to the CPSU and its positions is at the same time being restored, albeit with painful difficulty. What helped people to gain insight was not so much precise and timely actions by central party organs—they were actually always late—but the actual realities of the people's life, particularly in places where ultra-radical politicians had come to power. People in the provinces are now well aware of the benefits that democrat legislators in local soviets have brought to the ordinary worker in Moscow or Leningrad, for example.

And the residents of Voronezh have seen for themselves the "efficiency" and "touching concern" shown by many of their elected representatives as regards people's urgent needs. At sessions of the oblast and particularly the city soviets, they frequently waste whole days on fruitless debates and discussions on minor procedural questions. Because of this, basic problems of the oblast's socioeconomic development are not being resolved or else are being resolved in an incompetent manner without profound consideration for the future or any analysis.

Here is the result. Never before, not even in the most stagnant of times have industry, transport, and the construction and agro-industrial complexes worked so badly here as they did last year, the last year of the five-year plan. The increase in the volume of industrial output did not even reach 1 percent (it was 0.9 percent), whereas this indicator exceeded 4.2 percent on average in previous years of the five-year plan. Shortfalls in output deliveries under contracts more than doubled. Output worth 36 million rubles was not produced due to direct losses in working time alone. Although it possesses a powerful nuclear power station, the oblast is on the brink of an energy crisis.

The economy's agrarian sector was not very successful either. Procurement of grain, sugar beet, and sunflowers was less than planned, and there was a reduction in the milk yield and the volume of milk purchases. Not enough potatoes and vegetables were laid in. It is no accident that food store counters are incredibly depleted, and many essentials are available only on coupons in the rich chernozem area.

Some people are inclined to put all these disorders down to adverse weather conditions. Yes, weather conditions were extreme. But the plenum participants said openly that neither they nor the obvious inefficiency of local soviets were the sole cause. The hasty transition to market relations, the disintegration of the existing economic mechanism, and the unjustified reduction of assistance to the countryside all had a negative effect on the economic slump.

The positions of party committees must be mentioned too. Having given up administrative functions and the solution of technological problems by edict methods, many party organizations have completely "freed" themselves of production worries and have stopped analyzing economic processes and actively influencing them on the basis of the state of affairs. Such a situation, it was said at the plenum, is especially unacceptable and unnatural for the simple reason that the overwhelming majority of leaders and specialists are CPSU members, and no one has relieved them of their party, official, or professional responsibility for matters concerning the work sectors assigned to them.

The plenum approved the realistic assessment of the current state of affairs and of the situation in society made at the January plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission, and endorsed a ramified action program for the oblast party organization.

L. Kravchenko, member of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the All-Union Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, participated in the plenum's work and made a speech.

In connection with the fact that obkom secretaries I. Dorokhov, a USSR people's deputy, and V. Butyrin were recently elected deputy chairmen of the oblast soviet of peoples' deputies, the plenum relieved them of the posts they held and terminated their membership of the obkom bureau. V. Lebedev, hitherto first secretary of the Voronezh party gorkom [city committee], was elected second secretary of the party obkom and member of the obkom bureau.

Newspaper Editor Discusses Russian Media

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[Interview with Valentin Andreyevich Logunov, USSR people's deputy and editor in chief of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, by announcer Natalya Bekhtina in Moscow—live]

[Text] [Bekhtina] In our studio today we have a visitor—Valentin Andreyevich Logunov, USSR people's deputy and editor in chief of the very popular ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA—which, Valentin Andreyevich, is also a very elusive newspaper, in so far as your readers are concerned.

In the first place, how do you feel about the fact that your newspaper is not reaching everyone?

[Logunov] Well, thank God it has at least started reaching some people!

[Bekhtina] Well, at any rate we have had lots of phone calls and requests for us to give a detailed review of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, because what people really want to know is—well, you see—we at Radio Rossii—the way our services, our mass media, are structured, it is not always that we have rapid news of parliament, and it is that which interests everyone. Even though we are the most flexible mass medium. All the same, it is natural that people should be interested in the newspapers. The newspapers can provide some sort of analysis, and can spare rather more space. And so, can you provide a ray of hope for your readers, who might yet become subscribers?

[Logunov] I should say that the decision to set up the newspaper was made at the end of October—and we started publishing on 3 November. It took just a week. Anyone who knows even a little of what is involved will realize just how difficult and complicated that was. We were producing a newspaper on our knees!

[Bekhtina] By that you mean not that you were down on your knees before the authorities, but on your knees because there was little in the way of space!

[Logunov] Yes, that is the first thing. So we started publishing on 3 November. True, sometimes we ended up publishing every second, third, or even fourth day. But then, on 27 November, we started publishing daily. We were given the task—or rather, we set ourselves the task—of doing this by 27 November—in other words when the extraordinary congress of Russian deputies started. Of course that all had to be covered. We published an eight-page paper. Our circulation was very limited—100,000 to 120,000 copies, distributed in Moscow and Moscow Oblast. But I can tell you that as of 22 January, in addition to those 100,000 we have started distributing a further 200,000 throughout Russia. In other words, throughout all 73 of our territories. If you divide 200,000 by 73, then you get under 3,000. I don't know how, say, Leningrad, or Sverdlovsk, will manage, for of course 3,000 is nothing.

[Bekhtina] You know, in some respects we are now in the same boat. For when Radio Rossii used to broadcast on the first program and on Mayak we could be heard. Well, of course even then the first program was not received equally well in regions other than Moscow—that was a problem—but at any rate on Mayak we could be heard across the country, and it should be remembered that there are Russians throughout the country, not just in Russia. We get a lot of calls from the Ukraine, Transcaucasia—in short, there are Russian people everywhere. You have just divided up the territory and seen how few copies there are available per capita, and as of yesterday we can reach only about 60 percent of our territory with our broadcasts. In this connection I would like to ask you: Yesterday there was an all-Russian conference of editors of Russian newspapers—presumably from all our newspapers, independent, official, and unofficial alike...

[Logunov, interrupting] I will just explain: by and large—of course, we invited them all—but by and large they were from the independent and newly launched Soviet newspapers, newspapers that have only recently been established by the soviets of people's deputies—town and oblast.

[Bekhtina] Even the official reports make it clear that the conference tackled the issue of our transfer to Radio Two—that is, the issue of Russia to some extent losing its voice. Can you comment on this?

[Logunov] Well, in the first place I should say that this report—this unpleasant story—was simply received with fury by the editors of the Russian newspapers. Everyone realizes full well why this was done. All these decades, Russia has been without a voice of its own. And now that, thanks to the Law on the Press, the tender shoots of one have begun to appear, now all this is being smothered, is meeting with resistance—all this was received with—well, hostility—that is probably not the word.

[Bekhtina] Each person there probably extrapolated the situation to himself, because if you can do that today to Russian radio, then the same could be done tomorrow to the newspapers. Incidentally, the rumors concerning a moratorium on the Law on the Press—to what extent do you place any credence in them?

[Logunov] It is anybody's guess. Anything at all could emanate from there—the so-called center. Anything at all.

[Bekhtina] So, you are faily pessimistic about the problem?

[Logunov] I do not want to believe it. Because any shutdown in the sphere of glasnost will mean the eventual shutdown of the whole of our future. The channels are only just—they are developing—we are only just becoming normal people. If you shut things down and prevent people from having any conscious attitude to politics—how is that possible? It is impossible. How can you have Voice of America freely audible, or Radio Free Europe, when you cannot listen to Radio Rossii freely?

[Bekhtina] All the same, I hope somehow this problem will be sorted out. My hopes might proved unjustified. But I still want to believe it. But anyway, you are the editor of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, and so let us—in just a minute, after some music—you know, I just wanted to say that, even though we have moved to a different wavelength, the telephone keeps flashing on my desk here, indicating that people are constantly phoning in—we will just listen to these calls, and then we will comment on them. Now, a minute of relaxation, and then we will speak about ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. [musical interlude]

Here on Radio Rossii we continue our chat with Valentin andreyevich Logunov, editor in chief of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and USSR people's deputy. We have even had a phone call on the subject of our conversation, but it is a question we have mentioned already: When can people receive your newspaper? More later—you wanted to give out your index number, and we will do that a little later. Now, as for the newspaper itself, I know that a few days ago ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA published an article which has again provided a focus for criticism of you from the center. I am talking about your article on the subject of the military coup that was in preparation.

[Logunov] This was a retrospective view of the events of 1990. Our writer made this analysis. He looked at all the actions that led up to the events in the Baltic, the events in the Baltic themselves, and the subsequent events. He systematized them, and reached the conclusion that it was no mere coincidence, and that there was—and is—a scenario that involves the stifling of...

[Bekhtina, interrupting] Glasnost, among other things.

[Logunov] Glasnost, among other things. Yes, this has been perceived in many different ways. We have received very many calls and letters in response to that article. I repeat that there were different reactions...

[Bekhtina, interrupting] Sorry for interrupting—presumably neither the author nor the paper claimed that this was the ultimate truth—it was just an analytical article.

[Logunov] You know, what happened was that hour by hour, and day by day, news came in of those events. I do not want to recap them, for everyone knows about them. But when these are collated, then you can end up with a sinister picture. It can be viewed in the way our writer viewed it. The conclusions he drew are there for anyone to draw. Other conclusions could be drawn. But he drew those conclusions, and we believed those conclusions were worthy of publication. We have had many calls, including threats.

[Bekhtina] Such, probably, is our fate. So I have this question: What are your relations, or your interrelations, and how do you under equal or not quite equal conditions, with regard to the organs of the press—how do you relate to, let us say, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, a newspaper of a completely opposing persuasion? Do you have contacts or links of any kind, or on the contrary conflicts, let us say, of one kind or another here?

[Logunov] You know, we literally have no contacts, with the exception of perhaps indirect ones, a large section of journalists who previously worked for SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA—and you remember the conflict that came to a head there—simply came over to work with us. Here you are, if you wish to speak about contacts. What relations can there be? At one time people were saying that this was the newspaper of the Supreme Soviet. I was always against this.

[Bekhtina] Against SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA being a newspaper of the Supreme Soviet?

[Logunov] Yes, yes. It was defined a very long time ago. It has its own history, in which there are different pages, including glorious pages. Well, let it stay with its history. We do not intend to come forward with polemics on each incident, because SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA is published, and there is literally something to respond to in each edition. But we are not going to become involved in these sorts of polemics—if only so as not to waste strength on fruitless activities.

[Bekhtina] That is right. I do not intend to enter into any squabbles, because in the final analysis everyone has the right to their own point of view.

[Logunov] Yes, yes.

[Bekhtina] Let people think for themselves, and work out who is more correct.

[Logunov] We simply fought, and I will not say anything more.

[Bekhtina] Yes. I would also like to say this as well. We have already indirectly touched on the events in the Baltics. You know one of the main accusations made by our opponents—we also, like you, have different listeners, some like us and thank us and welcome us, and consider that we are the only ones who, generally speaking as it were, tell the truth, whereas others—and it is as a result of the other conversations that we are today working on the frequencies of Radio Two—accuse us of blackening our lives, and of somehow discrediting the lofty ideals for which we have been fighting throughout the last seventy years or so. In particular—and this was one of the main accusations addressed to us during recent times—why do we at Radio Rossii speak most often about the Baltics now? We tried at that time to explain to our opponents, to our listeners, that we, when speaking about the Baltics, are thinking about Russia.

[Logunov] You know, I support you, and I can only respond here, let us say, briefly. The formulae contained in the headline to the article—that we had undertaken a coup in the Baltics—which was discussed in Moscow, and destined for Russia—I agree with this. This is why we speak about this. And not only for this reason. Of course we are worried. I, as a Russian, am worried about the fate of Russians. Twenty-five million Russians live outside the boundaries of Russia, and this is indisputably a problem that demands a solution. But if we have come to an agreement—the Russian legislature has come to agreements with the governments of Estonia and Latvia—it is difficult to resolve the issue with Lithuania on this issue and precisely on this issue. I can say here unambiguously that in the case in hand, I think that the legislature has taken up an incorrect position.

[Bekhtina] The Lithuanian legislature?

[Logunov] Yes, the Lithuanian legislature, with regard to this issue. I understand the sources for this.

[Bekhtina] Of course, there are sources, nonetheless, of course, of course.

[Logunov] But somewhere, evidently, compromises need to be made—well, 60 million, 60 million of our people live altogether outside the boundaries of their republics. This is a fifth of the population. What can we do now—are we to have a tower of Babel?

[Bekhtina] Or a migration of the peoples?

[Logunov] This needs to be taken into account in politics, in economics, and in everything. One should proceed from this.

[Bekhtina] Well I think that—I would like simply once again, as we have touched on this—I did not want very much to return again to these events, although I think that they will probably for a long time yet effect different aspects of our life—but I would simply like once again, and I think that you will support me here, as a man of influence for russians, as the editor of the Russian newspaper which everyone awaits and loves so much—I think that we have not just abandoned Russians in the Baltics, in particular. We have not abandoned them. On the contrary, we have spoken a great deal about this, and have thought about it, and we very well understand their situation and share all of the difficulties they are encountering. I would like to state that when thinking about the Baltics, when thinking about the problems of the Baltics, we all think first and foremost about Russia.

[Logunov] But Natasha, we abandoned them well and truly, then, we abandoned them then. We abandoned them to the dirtiest of enterprises. They were all immigrants, they were all people who went as cheap working forces. We abandoned them at that point, and at that time introduced a system where they did not study the language, and they did not form relations, and so on. But now, in my opinion, the return of Russians is under way from Lithuania and Latvia, in a decent, friendly...

[Bekhtina, interrupting] In a legal manner, if laws of one kind or another are adopted regulating these relations.

Valentin Andreyevich, I am grateful to you for taking part in our broadcast. If you have something else to say to your potential, future, and present readers, please go ahead.

[Logunov] I would like to address readers. I have said that we now have a run of 200,000 for Russian towns and oblasts in Russia. We are now accepting subscriptions. I do not know what they will be like. I do not think that there will be a great number, because people simply do not know about it, in actual fact. Although there is some curiosity, of course, here.

[Bekhtina] Will it be expensive?

[Logunov] There is no reason to value us particularly yet. I am not saying this out of modesty, because we really are just starting...

[Bekhtina, interrupting] Will your newspaper be expensive?

[Logunov] Not very—well, on a level with these newspapers. At the kiosks it will cost 10 kopecks; its subscription price for a year will be 21 rubles. But now a year...

[Bekhtina, interrupting] There will not be a full one. Yes.

[Logunov] So it is possible to subscribe for ten months, up to 12 February, and then for nine months, as with all newspapers. I, unfortunately—the scale...

[Bekhtina] Well, we will say later, by the end of the program, definitely, of course.

[Logunov] Thank you.

[Bekhtina] Of course. Thank you once again for taking part in our program. I wish you success, and I think that we will together—well, I do not want any elevated, empty words—but we will fight together for a new, revived, strong, and free Russia.

[Logunov] I think that we will succeed—is this not so?

[Bekhtina] Thank you; let us hope so.

RSFSR Industry Minister on New Ministry

*914A0369A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian
No 4, 21-27 Jan 91 p 12*

[Interview with Viktor Ivanovich Kisin, RSFSR minister of industry, by Sergey Romeykov; place and date not given: "We Are Calling on the Industrialists of Russia"]

[Text] **Viktor Ivanovich Kisin, minister of industry of Russia. Age 49. His ministry is not yet a year old—it is new. After being appointed head of the ministry, without premises and without colleagues, Kisin put forward his first proposal: No worker from the old ministry should be in the new one. And things got under way....**

[Romeykov] Viktor Ivanovich, I am sure that this is the question readers will immediately ask: Why did we, in this country with a record number of ministries and departments, need yet another—the Ministry of Industry of Russia? For the talk is about reducing and eliminating....

[Kisin] Let me start by saying that we have never had this kind of ministry in the USSR. As in most of the European countries, our ministry is one that does not engage directly in the economic activity of enterprises. It is thus distinguished from its sector counterparts, which set the plans, provide centralized funding, collect amortization deductions, and then allocate something for the enterprise.

Our type of ministry has been designed to influence the enterprises through investment. These are new economic relations based on agreement with the republics and territories.

The influence should be active, and should rely on resources available. Not iron, cement, or wagons but resources of another kind, namely, finances and property. These are the two main resource sources that make it possible to influence particular strategic changes in the economy. Along with this I would make note of the two predominant functions of the Ministry of Industry—regulating and providing expert evaluation of major programs and projects, which were previously the prerogative of the sector ministries.

[Romeykov] Let us assume that you have justified the need to set up the Ministry of Industry. But questions arise. First, who does your ministry control today, when all our enterprises have been firmly "secured" in terms of their departmental affiliation? Second, what sources will be used to provide, for example, expert evaluations of projects?

[Kisin] Let me start by saying that there is no kind of enforced or mechanical subordination of enterprises to our ministry according to "territorial" attributes; nor can there be. Enterprises acquainted with the Provision on the Ministry of Industry themselves come to us. Many managers at the local level think about it and then reach the same conclusion that we have reached, that is, they recognize the need for economic freedom. The general director of the Bratsk Timber Industry Complex, Eduard Yevtushenko, came to us in July last year with just one single question: how to transfer to the management of the Ministry of Industry of Russia?

Today the Bratsk Timber Industry Complex is a major independent concern. In turn, we have proposed that the Bratsk Timber Industry Complex have a new form, a new content. Using it as an example, we have decided to set up a unique model, a graphic aid demonstrating how to initiate an independent form of activity. What was in Bratsk? The production and reproduction of timber, a complex of processing enterprises with tens of thousands of people working at them. Elementary logic suggested that it was worth linking it technologically in a chain with publishing and printing activity. And today that has been done: The "BratAss" Publishing and Printing Association has been created.

Today something on the order of 20 to 25 enterprises are being managed by our ministry. Projects for more than 100 other enterprises wanting to come under our management are in the stage of preparation and expert evaluation. I would like to note that the approach here must be on a strictly individual basis because different enterprises have different degrees of development. For some of them, only leasing is acceptable for today, while others are capable of switching to a more complex form of activity, namely, setting up joint-stock companies.

From what sources are our work and expert evaluations funded? An Innovation Fund has been set up for industry in Russia. The plan is that the fund will attract, on a voluntary basis, assets from enterprises, organizations, and private individuals both in the USSR and abroad. In 1991 fund assets will not be liable to tax. The aims of the Innovation Fund are to support information and technological innovations and support first initiatives in the entrepreneurial sphere, and initiative-filled activity. By making use of this fund we want to create a certain institution of unconventional solutions and inventions that are difficult to develop. The more so since the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Ministry of Industry is now setting up a Russian branch of the creative union of inventors...

[Romeykov] Forgive me, but what enterprise, and from what source of revenue, will suddenly start deducting assets to your fund? What will it have to gain from this?

[Kisin] Enterprises may have their own purely personal interests. By transferring assets to the fund an enterprise has an opportunity to make use of the entire program of innovations. By giving a trifle it can receive completed work or a tested model for switching to new management forms. In my opinion this is quite attractive.

In addition, by giving a sum to the fund and financing an expert evaluation of some particular economic object, the enterprise has an opportunity to consider all aspects, as it were, of "how it will all turn out," and to draw definite conclusions for itself as applied to its own specific conditions. This is less expensive than immediately "experimenting" for itself.

At one time the Bratsk Timber Industry Complex went to the "Vneshkonsult" independent consulting firm, and Finnish specialists were called in to do an analysis of the activity of the timber industry complex, and they then presented their recommendations. But we are not calling in foreign experts all the time! At some point we have to start doing things for ourselves.

World experience indicates that mistakes cannot be made in underestimating a management system or a system for state regulation of an economic process. This costs dearly. Managers make up one of the most respected and highly paid categories of specialists in foreign countries.

[Romeykov] But how much are outside experts needed to "cover" such extensive economic structures as ours? Even on the scale of Russia....

[Kisin] We are thinking about creating a definite infrastructure, beyond the confines of the Ministry of Industry, that would provide intellectual support at the local level. It would be a network of coordinating councils—a scientific and economic council, a council for entrepreneurial activity (which companies such as Siemens, MacKenzie, and the Hertel Group from Germany have agreed to join), a council for matters pertaining to industrial ecology, matters of conversion....

The situation in which people have to come to Moscow from all over Russia to make a single correct economic decision is intolerable. It is a nonsense that did much harm in the past. By creating support points of the Russian Ministry of Industry at the local level we should optimize use of the structures that have been put in place historically. Of course, these support points will be sustained by the intellectual potential available in the ministry. But the pivotal figures in them should be local professionals with the highest authority in their fields, with a firsthand knowledge of the problems and special features of a specific rayon, kray, or oblast.

Let me emphasize once again that it is not a question of subordination to the Russian Ministry of Industry. We have no plans to command, but rather to coordinate and direct. We must give each enterprise that enters into a relationship of partnership with us a unique escort.... I repeat: Everything goes on at the local level, in the territories; we do nothing inventive here.

[Romeykov] Viktor Ivanovich, I understand that you are right at the beginning of a very difficult road toward a healthy economy, toward sensible, diligent management. It is probably still too soon to be talking about results. Nevertheless, has anything yet appeared that we could really feel with our hands, as they say?

[Kisin] Nothing. But here, for example, Russian enterprises engaged in the production of essential output—construction materials and equipment—are already today enjoying favorable taxes, and that is a significant allowance.... Take that same Bratsk Timber Industry Complex. The enterprises making up the Bratsk concern have become legal entities, which they previously were not. They have become masters, and that means freedom. And at the same time, mutual economic responsibility. A new economic environment is being formed at such enterprises.

I would very much like things to turn out well for us. I believe that if we go further in this they will do so, by relying on honest partnership and a high degree of professionalism among executors at all levels. And on a proper sense of order. For example, in Vorkuta a comprehensive program is being implemented to utilize waste from the coal-extracting industry. Our western colleagues insist that what is needed in Vorkuta for the miners—clothing, sociocultural items—must absolutely be brought to them. Our partners are right; they know that if working people see that within the context of a specific program the company is giving something to the workers, then they in turn will embrace the program.

RSFSR 1990 Economic Performance Viewed

914A0385A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Article by V. Ovcharov under the rubric "Russia Reflected in Numbers": "Chasing A Shadow"]

[Text] The intensity of the politicized battles being fought from the podiums of Russia around economic models of tomorrow is in inverse proportion to the volume of what they can offer each of us today. Recent data from the USSR and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Goskomstats [State Committees on Statistics] confirm this correlation, which, alas, has already become a law of this current "transition period."

Like bullets shot from behind, the numbers summarizing last year's performance have caught up with us, though we are already immersed in the concerns of 1991. We will not be able to dodge them, since the clink of champagne glasses has the magic of relieving us from our troubles only on New Year's Eve. The morning comes, and each of us soberly realizes that the new year has only added new troubles to the old ones.

During the past year the socioeconomic situation in the country has worsened substantially. The crisis phenomena continued to multiply, expanding to encompass all spheres of economy, especially the monetary system. The volume of public production in absolute indicators started to fall. The monetary income of the population grew—in comparison with the previous year—by 94.5 billion rubles [R], substantially exceeding the growth in production of goods and services; as a result, inflationary processes became stronger, and the consumer market disintegrated. The decrease in the purchasing capacity of the ruble has led to barter exchanges among enterprises, republics, and regions, which has led to the breakdown of existing economic links. Ever-increasing sociopolitical instability had a negative effect on the economy. Gross national product fell by two percent in comparison with the previous year; national income by four percent; and labor productivity by three percent. Problems, problems, problems...

We are reminded of these problems by the collection of articles "On the Results of Functioning of the RSFSR National Economy in 1990." Under its state-issue cover there is a concentration of information so explosive it would be more appropriate to talk not about bullets but about whole mine fields to which the our economy has become hostage. And not only the economy! The entire social fabric, or, essentially, the whole life and future of Russia.

Let us pause and think: By the end of 1990 the population of the republic numbered 148.5 million, which means that during the year it only increased by 500,000 (0.3 percent)... In 1989 the increase was 700,000. The decrease in the rate of population growth, as statistics impassionately tell us, is the result of the worsened demographic situation in the republic: In one year the number of births decreased by more than 160,000. On the other hand, almost 100,000 more people died in 1990 than in 1989. As a result, the natural growth rate in the federation last year was half (!) of what it had been in 1989, and amounted to a little more than 325,000 people...

What is happening? It turns out that in the mid-1980's, due to a certain general improvement in the demographic situation in the country, the mortality rate in the republic dropped. However, since 1988 the situation has worsened sharply. The deterioration of the socioeconomic situation in the country manifested itself first in the number of deaths from accidents, poisonings, and traumas—that is, from unnatural causes. In 1990, the number of deaths from these causes in the RSFSR came to about 200,000 people, including 145,000 able-bodied ones, which is one third more than in 1987. The number of deaths by murder almost doubled in the last three years, and the number of suicides grew by 15 percent.

Right and left, democrats and conservatives, radicals and liberals—think about these figures! And remember them every time you go "us against them" within parliamentary and other walls. Do not forget about this, either: According to the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee on Labor], more than 40,000 migrants (we use this word without quotes because this frightening notion has become a reality)—those who were forced to leave Azerbaijan in 1990—have been resettled on RSFSR territory. The stream of refugees from the Baltic republics is increasing...

Politization is clearly not conducive to "economization.-" Intensive activity in the former, according to specialists, often runs ahead of concrete measures that are crucial to stabilize the economy, soften the impact of negative phenomena, and a change for the better in regard to at least selected goods on the consumer market. As the contributing authors justly emphasize, major positive changes are intermixed with dangerous tendencies. People are concerned about sociopolitical instability, manifestations of extremism and regionalism, the growth of the shadow economy, and the increased crime rate.

Where did the RSFSR stand as it entered 1991? The national income last year fell by 5.5 percent, and public labor productivity by five percent; monetary emission was almost twice the level of 1989; and the situation on the consumer market continues to deteriorate. Completed state-financed residential construction fell by 12 percent. The volume of foreign trade, both imports and exports, also fell. Planned export deliveries of natural gas, oil, coal, cellulose, and most types of petroleum-based products have not been fulfilled. Gross agricultural output totaled 97 percent of the 1989 level. State purchases amounted to 34 million tons of grain (29 percent of gross harvest). The state purchased less potatoes and vegetables than in 1989; the plan for putting this produce into storage has not been fulfilled. The stock of cattle and fowl fell somewhat. Extraction of oil, coal, and other energy resources also decreased.

A sad picture, is it not? Actually, we feel it daily even without the statistics: Something has happened in our house. It is not accidental that one of the meanings of the word "economics" is: The art of managing the house—"housekeeping." A lot has been said lately, at congresses of the USSR and RSFSR people's deputies and during sessions of both parliaments, about the causes that have brought about the current situation. Presidential decrees are issued, laws are passed, but there is no improvement. Moreover, according to some experts, because of cuts in its flesh, the economy of the country resembles an airplane in a tailspin that has already gone beyond the point where it could recover from the dive...

Quite possibly, this prognosis is too gloomy. But this much is obvious—unless broken ties between enterprises are restored, unless the "war" between Union and republic laws is stopped, severe cataclysms are in store for us. And this brings us back to politics again.

It is amazing, but it appears that history has not taught us anything. Again somebody absolutely needs the discord, again the newborn "revolutionaries" call us to rallies and incite strikes. Is it really the people that they care for, although they speak in the people's name? You can judge for yourself where it all ends: Last year strikes and mass absences from workplaces were registered in 260 enterprises, offices, and organizations. Strikes took place in the 32 territories of the republic. The volume of undelivered production (loss of potential production output) amounted to more than R13 million.

Who is better off because of this? Perhaps, it is the worker who goes from the empty store to the "black market," where a coat costs four times the state price? What does the "black market" have to do with this, you will ask. Very simple: The fewer goods that are in the stores, the more goods there are on it. This is also one of the current laws. If today only about 20 percent of the residents of Russia occasionally use the services of the "black market," in the nearest future this number will grow to 48 percent, according to the forecasts. That means every other one of us will go there. Keeping in mind that the cost differential for food products alone came to 3 billion rubles last year...

So what are we to do? We can either keep going to rallies, or work. There is no other choice. In his recent statement the president of the country emphasized that in the sharp polemics that are going on today he shares the position of sensible people who remind us that the most important things today are political stability, firm law-based order and discipline, normalization in economics, decisive movement toward a market, and the democratic transformation of our multinational state. One wants to believe that sensible people are not yet a minority—in Russia or in the other republics.

Only such people can pull our house through. They prefer deeds to words. And they do act. For instance, more than 1,600 enterprises worked under leasehold arrangements last year. They produced almost R32 billion worth of goods. But, even more importantly, their basic indicators are much higher than for industry as a whole. While the total volume of production fell by 0.8 percent, it grew by 3.7 percent at leasehold enterprises.

Leasing arrangements are being expanded in agriculture as well; the number of peasant (farmer) homesteads is growing. In the second half of 1990 their number increased fivefold and now stands at 4,400. Leningrad, Novgorod, Volgograd, and Sakhalin Oblasts, Krasnodar and Khabarovsk Krays, and Checheno-Ingushetiya are the leaders in this area. A total of 202,000 hectares of land have been converted into farmer homesteads—on the average 46 hectares per farm.

Gingerly, and not always in the best possible way, first steps are nevertheless being taken in the direction of transferring state property to collective and private ownership. According to the survey of RSFSR industry, as of 1 October 1990, 13 enterprises had been privatized. In the service sphere, by the beginning of this year destatized entities included 17 retail enterprises (eight of them sold to individual owners), four public catering enterprises, 88 tailor shops and other service shops (eight to individual owners). In the nearest future, according to the RSFSR Goskomstat, the conversion from state to other forms of property will include more than 19,000 retail enterprises, almost 12,000 cafes and cafeterias, and about 15,000 "Rosbytsoyuz" [Consumer Services Union of Russia] enterprises. God willing, these innovations will give our economy a boost and bring positive results for the entire society.

By the way, participants in an all-Union conference which recently took place in Moscow supported the idea of noncompensatory transfer of property to the ownership of workers collectives (44 percent of the respondents). These people are managers of state enterprises who know the business from inside. One-sixth of the respondents were in favor of giving—free—a certain (equal for everybody) share of state property to every citizen. Twenty-eight percent advocated selling state property to workers collectives. Selling state property to individuals was supported by six percent of respondents.

Among others, the respondents were asked this question: Can a coalition government that includes representatives of conflicting sociopolitical forces be an effective institute of power? Twenty- four percent said "yes," 59 percent "no," and 17 percent could not answer. And, finally, a question that is directly related to our topic: Which economic interests can provide stability for your enterprise? The captains of industry responded in this way: economic interests of the country—50 percent; economic interest of the republic—17 percent; regional interests—12 percent; business partners' interests—27 percent; interests of the enterprise—51 percent; and noneconomic interests—six percent. As we can see, there is a direct correlation perceived between the interests of the country and those of the enterprise.

There are things to think about. We can only turn things around for the better if we act together as a whole country that would become one economic organism. The other way is clear: At best we will be running in place, at worst—chasing our shadow. We should remember, however, that nobody ever managed to catch up with his shadow.

Leningrad Free Enterprise Zone Plan Rejected

PM3101104191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Jan 91 First Edition p 1

[Correspondent V. Ivanov report: "Daydreams About an Enclave of the 'Good Life;' Why the Leningrad Oblast and City Soviet Session Rejected the Free Enterprise Zone Plan"]

[Text] Leningrad—A joint session of the Leningrad City and Oblast Soviets has rejected the draft Regulations a Leningrad free enterprise zone that had been put to it for ratification. Even at a fleeting glance this outwardly attractive concept turned out to be a gaily colored chimera, and the specialists at the city's leading scientific institutions who had opposed the project essentially demolished this enchanting prospect using all the tact for which scientists are famed.

Here is just a short quotation from their damning conclusion: "The assessments presented in the plan (the level of Leningrad's socioeconomic development—V.I.) are made **without prior analysis** of the placement of productive forces, **without assessing** the features of people's labor or sociopolitical activity, **without assessing** the population's material living conditions (the level of the development of productive forces or the population's cultural and educational level), **without assessing** the level of development of organizational, labor, economic, social, legal, and other relations between the city and oblast, **without taking account** of national-territorial and historical features (customs, traditions, and views), and **without assessing** natural geographic conditions (the region's geographic position, territorial spread, settlement features, and population density)."

To this we would add the main point—the complete failure to take account of the interests of the people living on this territory. Working people, whose needs—one would have thought—the free enterprise zone was being set up to serve, feature solely in the proposed economic management mechanism as providers of labor. But are the initiators of the "zone miracle" really unaware that without the population's support major reforms are doomed to failure?

It seems that they are. The principle of "the worse, the better," on which certain people's deputies seem to have been elected, has been implemented in this ill-conceived concept. Particularly in the approaches taken toward resolving Leningrad's housing problem. The authors of the concept have wholly ignored the fact that around 40 percent of citizens current live in hostels and communal accommodation. How is it proposed to solve this problem in the free enterprise zone? First by abolishing residence permits, and second by permitting apartments to be bought and sold. That is the extent of the specific proposals. You can imagine that neither of these approaches will increase the city's housing stock.

Incidentally, a similar irresponsibility typifies all points of the plan and the provisions connected with safeguarding social guarantees for the region's residents—medical services, working conditions, the minimum wage, pensions, grants.... Yet out of Leningrad's 5.4 million people more than 1.3 million are of pensionable age!

Having "glanced briefly" at the needs of ordinary worker-citizens, the "zone champions" were unusually consistent in their concern for that small population group which cannot be classed as ordinary people—our own entrepreneurs and foreign entrepreneurs. These are people who cannot consider themselves gate-crashers at the planned "party of life"! It is for them, the "heroes of the zone" that the utmost comforts are planned. Taxes are low enough to keep them happy. The local authority's influence on affairs is minimal. Export opportunities are maximized.

The clear patronage of the "businessmen within the law" inevitably prompts a reply to the question of who this "zone paradise" was actually planned for. Like it or not, the rejected (for the time being?) plan for a free enterprise zone was an attempt to turn Leningrad into a commodity transshipment base for everything that the city obtains from the country. Ideal conditions are proposed for this: Goods produced on "zone" territory are exempt from customs duty if exported, while goods to which no less than 30 percent of value has been added are considered to have been produced in the "zone." And the "rivers of hard currency" that the authorities are planning to get should clearly flow in recompense for their vigilant monitoring of this "black hole" called a free enterprise zone—a hole through which the people's assets would flow abroad to general applause. The best aide in this business is the local "entrepreneurial element," for which such great efforts have been made.

"The planners of the free enterprise zone essentially proceed on the basis that foreign investors' interests and the region's interests are the same, that foreign capital enjoys a certain 'infallibility,' and that foreign investors are always honest and competent," the group of independent Leningrad economists from the M.A. Voznesenskiy Finance and Economics Institute, from the Northwest Branch of the Central Economics Scientific Research Institute under the the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] State Committee for the Economy, and from the Institute for Socioeconomic

Problems. "It is very easy to imagine a situation in which the interests of making a profit (and investors from 'over there' have not come to the free enterprise zone for charity's sake but to make a profit!) stimulates investment in those spheres which we have no interest in developing or no time to develop."

But is what is good for Western investors necessarily good for us? "We cannot accept this position, since it would represent a one-way street rather than two-way traffic," the experts conclude.

We have already explained the direction in which this traffic is headed. Further comprehensive analysis makes it possible to conclude that by itself the creation of a free economic zone as an enclave of the "good life" is virtually impossible. If only because 42 percent of Leningrad's economy is made up of the machine building and defense complex. Many thousands of economic chains terminate in the city, and it would be impossible to transfer the end point of these chains elsewhere. And trying to alter the situation overnight is just absurd.

Thus, the reason why the deputies refused to adopt the free enterprise zone question which was put to them for examination is not that certain factions and deputies' groups were acting arrogantly but because the actual attempt to improve people's position at the expense of others lacked any socioeconomic foundation. And, of course, because of the frankly "foreign-orientated" nature of the project. The point is not that the plan's compilers were lazy and failed to adequately work certain points out, but that the narrowly self-seeking thrust of the venture was obvious.

This, incidentally, is clearly understood by economic manager deputies, who have always been and continue to be more concerned by the need to effectively organize fulfillment of the plan rather than by the wordy prattle of their parliamentary colleagues. It was these economic manager deputies who voted together for the oblast agricultural aid program as a realistic and socially important plan, and rejected the plan to build a zone of "utopian capitalism" in the city.